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A bstract
T his d issertation  explores the  concept of belief as bet: when an agent accepts 
a proposition, she is b e ttin g  on the  tru th  of th a t  proposition. I then  argue 
th a t  which acceptances are ra tional can be decided in the  same way th a t  
o ther bets are  evaluated, through Bayesian Decision Theory. The m ethod of 
evaluation I develop using th is theory  I call the  Bayesian Theory o f Rational 
Acceptance (B TR A ). One of the  im plications of B TR A  is th a t  w hat m akes an  
acceptance ra tiona l depends upon b o th  epistem ic and  practical u tilities, as 
these u tilities are p a rt of w hat determ ines evidential thresholds for ra tional 
belief.
Some Bayesians (R ichard Jeffrey, P atrick  M aher, and M ark K aplan) have 
argued th a t practical utilities are norm ally irrelevant to  ra tional acceptance 
(and thus any threshold  setting  for them ) because it is irrational to  base 
practical decisions upon acceptances. I argue against th is claim, showing 
th a t  it is a t least som etim es ra tional to  base decisions upon acceptances, thus 
practical u tilities figure into ra tional acceptance th rough  these decisions.
R egarding epistem ic concepts and B TR A , I argue th a t there is no one 
“righ t” concept of epistem ic justification. I also argue th a t  the  ordinary  
concept of knowledge is incoherent (the incoherence is m ade visible by skep­
tical argum ents and Jason  S tan ley’s case for practical interests affecting w hat 
am ounts to  knowledge). T hus variability becomes possible for explications of 
b o th  epistem ic justification and of knowledge, w ith  usefulness becoming one 
of th e  m ain desiderata  for either. I th en  offer B TR A  as a useful explication 
of bo th  of these concepts.
Finally, I apply B T R A  to  burden  of proof and m ethodological naturalism , 
arguing th a t  B TR A  explicates burden of proof, and th a t  m ethodological 
natu ralism  is only ra tional for people w ith  certain  practical and epistem ic 
preferences: those w ith  hum anist tendencies.
iii
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C hapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Higher Order A ttitudes
Suppose Fred accepts th e  proposition P , th a t  there  is ex tra-terrestria l life, 
and Sarah denies i t .1 Each has the  same evidence for P . C an bo th  be 
rational?
Suppose Sarah rejects P  because she is skeptical ab o u t P  and  Fred accepts 
P  because he is not as skeptical tow ard P . Again each has th e  sam e evidence 
for P  (including general background inform ation). C an bo th  be rational?
T he goal of th is  d issertation  is to  try  to  answer these questions, and to  
spell out w hat it is th a t  would m ake either Fred or Sarah rational. T he 
answer to  bo th  questions will be found in exam ining w hat we m ight call 
their higher order attitudes tow ard P . A person’s first order attitude  tow ard 
P  specifies w hether she accepts, denies, or suspends judgm ent on P . Higher 
order a ttitu d es  specify more abstract or general psychological dispositions 
tow ard P . One such higher order a ttitu d e  is how skeptical a  person is toward 
P , which could be in terp re ted  as a m easure of how m uch evidence a person 
requires to  accept P . T he setting  of these evidential thresholds will be a 
m ajor focus of th is  thesis.
My in terest in th is  question stem s from th e  observation th a t  intelligent
T ’ll be using “P ” to stand for any proposition and “S ” for any subject throughout this 
thesis.
1
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and well-informed people often differ in which controversial propositions they  
accept. Religious and m oral claims are com m on examples. Theists, ag­
nostics, and a th e ists  can all be found am ong well-informed and intelligent 
people. Intelligent and well informed people m ay also be political liberals, 
conservatives, pacifists, ju s t war advocates, pro-life, pro-choice, natu ralists 
and non-naturalists.
I t seems to  me th a t  in m any of these d isputes b o th  parties are rational. 
Two fu rther intuitions: there is an objective t ru th  regarding these disputes, 
and in these d isputes b o th  parties are often exposed to  the  same evidence 
(or evidence in which there is no significant difference). Are these intuitions 
com patible? I th in k  th a t they  are, if the parties involved are rationally  ju s ti­
fied in having different higher order attitudes tow ard propositions involved in 
these disputes, especially a ttitu d es  reflecting how skeptical or tru stin g  each 
is. Fred, for exam ple, could be rational in accepting th a t  ex tra terrestria l 
life exists when Sarah  ra tionally  doesn’t  if F red ’s evidential threshold for 
accepting th is proposition  is rationally  lower th a n  S arah’s.
A case for these claims abou t thresholds can be m ade by offering, elabo­
rating, and  defending an account of ra tional belief th a t  sees belief as, am ong 
other things, a bet: w hen a person accepts a  claim , th a t person is wagering 
in one way or ano ther on the  tru th  of th a t  claim. According to  th is account, 
ra tional people can differ in b o th  their lower and  higher order attitudes, even 
when they  are exposed to  the  same evidence, if th ey  differ in w hat they  value. 
This relationship is cap tu red  by the Bayesian T heory of R ational A cceptance 
(B T R A ), which describes these bets in term s of Bayesian decision problems. 
T hus ra tiona l a ttitu d es  for an  agent tow ard propositions depend a t least 
partly  upon  th e  ag en t’s values (or so I will argue). This is one of the  m ain 
points of my thesis.
2
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Of course, accounts of this type have already been offered: Isaac Levi 
(1967), M ark K aplan (1996), and Patrick  M aher (1993) have developed ver­
sions of B TR A . M y account differs from theirs in th a t  I claim  th a t practical 
in terests som etim es affect when it is ra tional to  accept a proposition because 
of the  practical decisions th a t could be based on the  acceptance.
Higher order a ttitu d es  also apply to  skepticism . W hether it be C artesian  
m eta-cognitive doub t, external world skepticism , m oral skepticism, and even 
some of the  skeptical/re la tiv istic  a ttitu d es  found in critical theory  (they often 
begin by rejecting com m on sense), these skepticism s m ay be related  to  burden 
o f proof, ano ther type of higher order a ttitu d e . If the  possibility of a  skeptical 
hypothesis is raised, skeptics will often insist th a t  we rule out th is hypothesis 
before we claim  knowledge. In o ther words, there is a burden  of proof on 
non-skeptics to  rule out th is hypothesis.
H igher-order a ttitu d es  also apply to  m etaphysical questions. O ckham ’s 
Razor can be in terpre ted  as a  higher-order a ttitu d e  th a t places a burden  
of proof on com plexity—we should assum e a sim pler model unless there is 
sufficient reason to  th in k  otherwise. Parsim ony can also be taken to  im ply 
th a t if we can explain an  event w ithout appealing to  an entity, we should, 
all o ther th ings equal.
So if higher-order a ttitu d es  are covertly determ ining where thinkers end 
on an issue, it would be a good idea to  exam ine these attitudes. Clearly 
some will be more ra tional th an  others, and  even if two of these a ttitu d es 
tu rn  out to  be equally rational, it would be good to  know th a t  the  disagree­
m ent am ounts to  these different and equally ra tional a ttitudes. I t m ay be 
th a t  much disagreem ent in philosophy is due to  differences in higher-order 
attitudes.
Furtherm ore, though first order a ttitu d es  do not seem to  be w ithin direct
3
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voluntary  control, higher-order a ttitu d es  do seem so— I have often decided, 
as an  act of conscious choice, to  be less skeptical and more open to  an  idea, 
and  I th in k  th a t  m ost people have sim ilar experiences. If I am  right, th en  we 
are m ore responsible for higher-order a ttitu d es  th an  we are tow ard first-order 
a ttitu d es , which is all the  more reason to  exam ine them . T his d issertation  
hopes to  help begin th is pro ject by offering B TR A  as a theoretical appara tus 
for evaluating evidential thresholds and burdens of proof.
1.2 A ssum ptions Regarding Bayesian  
D ecision Theory
In  th is  thesis I will be using Bayesian Decision Theory (BDT) to  explore 
ra tiona l belief. T hus it seems best to  first make explicit some distinctions 
and assum ptions regarding belief and  B D T  th a t  will apply th roughou t th is 
thesis.
F irs t is th e  distinction between degreed and non-degreed (categorical, 
b inary) belief. O ften w hat we m ean by “belief” is categorical— when I say 
th a t  I believe th a t P , I am  generally th ink ing  of my belief as an  all or nothing 
affair. However, we also speak of some beliefs being stronger th an  others, of 
varying levels of confidence between beliefs (however this is m easured). T he 
first ty p e  of belief I will refer to  as acceptance and the  second as subjective 
probability.
W hen epistem ologists speak of th e  doxastic a ttitudes, they  are usually 
referring to  one of the  set of affirming, denying, or suspending judgm ent 
on a  proposition. I refer to  the  a ttitu d e  of affirming P  as accepting P , and 
denying P  as accepting P  (where “P ” m eans “P  is false” ). T he th ird  a ttitu d e  
is represented as accepting neither P  nor P .
4
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We m ight define subjective probability  for P  as the  odds a t which one 
is willing to  bet on th e  tru th  of P . This is, of course, controversial. David 
C hristensen (2004, 124-135) argued th a t  it is a m istake to  identify degreed 
belief w ith willingness to  bet a t  certain  odds because there seems to  be 
m ore to  degreed belief th an  th is  (e.g., there is an  experiential elem ent to  
degreed belief, we can often tell introspectively w hether we believe P  or 
Q m ore strongly)— he disagrees w ith  th is behaviorist identification. Also, 
identifying subjective probability  w ith  ra tiona l b e ttin g  odds has th e  problem  
of identifying w hat it is th a t  one would be willing to  bet, if it is m oney the 
problem  of the  non-linearity of the  value of m oney arises (money is w orth less 
per un it as the  am ount one has increases). Furtherm ore, B D T doesn’t  say 
enough abou t how a  ra tiona l ag en t’s subjective probabilities should m atch 
up  w ith  evidence, as it only says how the  probabilities should be related  to  
each other.
B D T itself is controversial; Ellsberg, and Allias problem s regarding the  
Bayesian independence principle have been raised against th e  theory. For 
w hat I take to  be a successful defense of BD T against these and o ther c rit­
icisms, see M aher’s B etting on Theories, especially chapters one to  three. 
As I don’t  have anything to  add, and  as I am  no t aware of any successful 
criticism  of M aher’s defense, I ’ll sim ply assum e from here on th a t  B D T free 
enough from these problem s for my use of it.
R egarding subjective probabilities, I m ight bypass using them , for I am  
prim arily  concerned w ith  relating level of evidence to  acceptance. To do this 
I could su b stitu te  inductive probabilities for subjective probabilities. This 
concept refers to  a  type of objective probability, bu t not to  physical p rob­
abilities: it is a  scale of how m uch support a body of evidence gives to  a 
proposition. A lthough th e  concept of inductive probability  is also contro-
5
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versial, I will assum e th a t  a  satisfactory  account of inductive probabilities is 
possible.2
Thus in my theory  I am  using inductive probabilities as a m easure of the 
evidence for P  th a t  S  has. However, subjective probabilities do seem a p art of 
ra tional decision, and are th u s  im portan t, even if my goal is to  re la te degreed 
evidence w ith ra tiona l acceptance. Including subjective probabilities in an 
account of ra tional acceptance reflects the  in tu ition  th a t  a  person’s level of 
confidence is subject to  error, and th a t decisions based on th a t  error are not 
rational, even if the  choice is ra tional according to  inductive probabilities. 
Consider the  following example: Fred sees an  unusually good deal on a  car 
h e’s been wanting to  buy for some tim e. T he deal w on’t  last, and the  down­
paym ent is substan tial. Fred checks his bank account to  see if he has enough 
m oney for the  m onth  to  cover th e  down-paym ent and his o ther financial 
obligations, and as a result becomes confident th a t  he does. B u t to  be really 
sure he visits a psychic, she tells him  on the basis of his astrological sign 
not to  tru s t the  bank s ta tem en t. Yet she also tells him  th a t  there  is a very 
good chance th a t  buying th e  car will will be in his best in terest in the  long 
run, for a dead ancestor to ld  her so, and th a t ancestor is m ostly  right in his 
predictions. He th en  loses confidence in the  proposition th a t  he can afford 
th e  down paym ent, b u t gains g reat confidence (i.e., forms a  high subjective 
probability) regarding th e  advice of his dead ancestor, and on th a t  basis buys 
the  car.
C learly Fred is not ra tional in this choice because of his irra tional subjec­
tive probabilities. T he action  itself is rational, b u t Fred isn ’t. F red’s choice 
would be ra tional only if his subjective probabilities were rational.
P erhap s in d u ctive  p rob ab ilities (a lon g  w ith  u tilit ie s )  d eterm in e th e  ratio- 
2As with BDT, I turn to Maher (2006b) for this account.
6
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nality  of actions them selves, whereas subjective probabilities (properly con­
strained  by inductive probabilities) determ ine (along w ith  u tilities) w hether 
th e  agent is ra tional in choosing the  act.
T his distinction is also found in epistemology— one could speak of P  being 
epistem ically justified relative to  body of evidence E , and one can speak of 
S  being justified in believing P  relative to  evidence E  th a t  S  possesses. 
O ne could take th e  la tte r  to  be achieved ju s t in case the form er is true. Or 
one could say th a t m ore is required, th a t  the  evidence m ust be in a  correct 
psychological relationship  to  the  agent’s belief. I th in k  th a t the  second view 
is better, for reasons analogous to  th e  reasons subjective probabilities are 
p a rt of ra tional decisions.
However, questions rem ain regarding subjective probabilities: w hat ex­
actly  are they, and  why do we th ink  agents have them ? I don’t  have a  lot 
to  say abou t these two questions, except th a t  I can sense my own levels of 
confidence experientially (and so can o ther people), I can sense th a t  I be­
lieve one proposition m ore th a n  another, and th rough  com parisons of this 
sort I could rank  all of the  propositions I have in term s of com parative level 
of confidence. From  th is  a m easure could be derived, th a t  m easure being a 
m easure of subjective probability. T his way of describing subjective proba­
bilities avoids th e  difficulties m entioned above. However, even if it tu rn s  out 
th a t  th is view is also problem atic, B TR A  could still be fruitful by telling us 
which acceptances are rational, even if it couldn’t  tell us when agents are 
ra tional in m aking an  acceptance, as the  former doesn’t  require the  use of 
subjective probabilities, only th e  latter.
A nother assum ption should be m ade explicit: I am  not try ing  to  stipu­
la te  th a t  ra tiona lity  ju s t is m axim izing expected utility, b u t I do th ink  th a t  
m axim izing expected u tility  cap tures a t least an  im p o rtan t (if not the  m ost
7
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im portan t) p a rt of rationality. Therefore I will assum e this im portan t role for 
m axim izing expected u tility  th roughout th is thesis, and it is to  th is aspect 
th a t  I refer w hen I speak of rational acceptance. Also I am  not endorsing 
w hat m ight be called unqualified Bayesian decision theory  in which choice A  
is ra tional for a person iff A  maximizes expected u tility  given his subjective 
probability  and  u tility  functions, for, as noted above, it is possible for a per­
son to  have irra tional probabilities. I d on ’t  th in k  we would w ant to  say th a t  
a  decision th a t  is based on these probabilities m ust be ra tional (M aher 1993, 
29-33).
W hat I m ean by “irra tional” here obviously isn ’t  covered by the  aspect 
of ra tionality  I take Bayesian decision theory  to  explicate. I don’t  th ink  th is 
is a  problem  for m y view, as I ’m not claim ing th a t  Bayesian decision theory  
exhausts th e  concept of rationality, and there is room  for strong intuitions 
abou t the  ra tiona lity  of subjective probabilities or even of utilities. However, 
as I do no t have anyth ing  to  add about how subjective probabilities ought to  
be constrained by evidence, o ther th an  th a t  th ey  should be reasonably close 
to  inductive probabilities, I will defer th a t  p ro ject to  others.
One last Bayesian item: utilities. W h at exactly  are they, and why should 
we believe agents have them ? In order to  see w hat I m ean by utility, th ink  
of outcom es you like and  th ings you don’t  like, and  how m uch you like and 
d on’t  like them . U tility  describes these likes and  dislikes, and a unit of u tility  
could be devised to  describe how much you like one more th an  another.
Notice I am  n o t saying th a t  utilities are a way of in terpreting preferences, 
for we do no t need to  bring probabilities into account to  determ ine utilities. 
This approach sees u tility  as more th an  ju s t a way of explaining behavior 
(the sam e goes for subjective probabilities as well). Indeed, I ’m inclined to  
th ink  th a t there  is a psychological reality  to  u tilities, I can feel experientially
8
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th a t  I like being free more th an  being locked up in a room w ith  no windows, 
or sugar in my coffee ra th e r th an  catsup. I d on ’t  w ant to  get too  far afield in 
th e  philosophy of m ind, bu t a t the  sam e tim e I d on’t  see why a behaviorist 
approach m ust be applied to  describing utility, subjective probability, or 
any psychological s ta te  for th a t  m atter. M y view assum es th a t  there are 
psychological s ta tes  of liking and disliking, valuing and not valuing, and th a t  
we can speak of these w ithout having to  explain them  in term s of som ething 
em pirically observable (such as behavior).
1.3 M ethodology
In  th is thesis I will a t points be using w hat I call modest C am apianism  as 
m y methodology. M odest C arnapianism  am ounts to  using the  tool of expli­
cation, while a t the  same tim e holding back from a com plete ideal language 
approach to  philosophical problem s. I will provide more details for m odest 
C arnapianism  in chapter five, b u t as a  preview I w ant to  m ention some of 
th e  m otivations and justification for the  approach: I t is nice to  be clear and 
precise, and  som etim es i t ’s nice to  be m ore clear and precise th an  ordinary 
language allows. O n the  o ther hand, our basic philosophical questions s ta r t 
off in ordinary  language. T he classic ideal language response has been to  deny 
th a t  such problem s m ade sense. However, from th e  la tte r  half of the  20th 
century  until now m uch of the  philosophical com m unity (including myself) 
holds th a t th ey  do make sense, hence th e  revival of m etaphysics, epistemol- 
ogy, ethics, etc. These problem s seem genuine, and as explication seems a 
useful tool, I th in k  th a t  it is reasonable to  w ant to  apply the  la tte r  to  the
form er.
Furtherm ore, explication is am enable to  ordinary  language approaches to
9
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
philosophy in th a t, as C arnap (1950) required, explicata need to  resemble 
explicanda, and th a t the  explicanda them selves should be such th a t  they  are 
a t least p ractically  clear. O rd inary  language is often practically  clear (a t 
least when care is taken w ith it).
T hus I take explication to  be linked to  ordinary  language because of 
the  resem blance requirem ent betw een explicata and explicanda, and  w ith 
th e  o rd inary  language roots of th e  explicanda themselves. I t is th rough 
th is  relationship th a t  explication can be applied to  an ordinary  language 
approach.
1.4 Overview
Having laid out these assum ptions, here is an  overview of w hat is to  come. 
In  chap ter two I will explore in m ore d ep th  the  problem  of determ ining ra ­
tional evidential thresholds once it is accepted th a t  rational thresholds vary 
from person to  person, and from proposition  to  proposition. A rgum ents for 
why ra tiona l thresholds vary include w hat George M avrodes calls “th e  m eat- 
loaf factor” and  “valuational asym m etry,” lo tte ry  style paradoxes, and  the  
Jam esian observation th a t  there  are a t least two com peting epistem ic goals, 
believing tru th s  and avoiding error, w ith  th e  former moving us tow ard more 
skeptical higher order a ttitu d es, and th e  la tte r  tow ard less skeptical higher 
order a ttitu d es. I propose using Bayesian decision theory as th e  m ethod 
of determ ining these thresholds: th e  thresholds are the lowest probability  a 
proposition can have given S ’s evidence th a t  makes accepting it m axim ize 
expected utility, given w hat S  values. T he procedure is dubbed the  Bayesian  
Theory o f  R a tio n a l Acceptance  (B TR A ). I also consider th e  re la tio n sh ip  be­
tween epistem ic and practical values.
10
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In chapter th ree I consider an  objection to  using practical value in u tility  
calculations for BTRA: acceptance is irrelevant to  ra tional decisions. If this 
is so, th en  we shouldn’t  take practical consequences of basing decisions on 
acceptances into consideration when evaluating the  ra tionality  of these ac­
ceptances. Call th is th e  “Bayesian Challenge.” T he Bayesian Challenge also 
underm ines the  view th a t  b inary  beliefs derive their content from the  deci­
sions they  ground. M aher argued th a t belief is irrelevant to  ra tional decision 
because there is no satisfactory  way of m aking sense of how it would m atter: 
th e  two ways so far considered of m aking sense of it, acting as if a  belief is 
true, and acting as if a belief has a probability  over a threshold, do no t work. 
I argue th a t  it is som etim es ra tiona l to  act as if a proposition is tru e  even 
if it has a probability  of less th a n  1, as long as acting as if a  proposition is 
tru e  in  one decision doesn’t  im ply th a t he does in every decision, som ething 
I take M aher (and earlier, Jeffrey) to  falsely assume.
In chapter four I lay out th e  u tility  function to  be used in B TR A , b o th  its 
epistem ic and practical elem ents. In chapter five I offer m axim izing expected 
epistem ic u tility  as an  explication of epistem ic justification, arguing th a t 
there  is more th an  one legitim ate explication of th is  am biguous term , and 
m axim izing expected epistem ic u tility  is as useful and fruitful as any of the 
others.
In  chapter six I apply B TR A  to  the  problem  of skepticism. Along w ith 
S tephen Schiffer I argue th a t  because ordinary  language solutions to  skepti­
cism have deep and well-known problem s th a t  there probably is an  incoher­
ence in the  ordinary concept of knowledge, which is found in th e  concept of 
epistem ic justification. I also agree w ith  Schiffer th a t  there are replacem ent 
concepts available th a t do m uch th e  sam e work as th e  original. However, I 
th en  p a r t from Schiffer to  offer a  different replacem ent for knowledge th an
11
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his: knowledge on my view am ounts to  true  acceptances th a t  m axim ize to ­
ta l expected utility. I believe my concept works b e tte r  th a n  his in th a t it 
also accom m odates Jason S tan ley’s plausible claim  th a t ra tiona l knowledge 
a ttribu tions are partly  based on practical interests.
In  the  last two chapters I apply  B TRA  to  actual higher order attitudes. 
T he first is th a t  of burden  of proof: I argue th a t  burden  of proof is really ju st 
an  evidential threshold setting , and can be set or evaluated by BTRA. There 
I argue th a t a t least some forms of skepticism can be answ ered by considering 
th e  burden of proof settings im plied in the  debate. I also apply B TRA  to 
m ethodological naturalism , arguing th a t it is ra tiona l only for those w ith 
w hat I call “hum anist” preferences.
12
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C hapter 2 
The T hreshold  Problem
2.1 Introduction
W . K. Clifford to ld  us th a t we shouldn’t  believe anything on insufficient 
evidence. C ertain ly  common sense agrees. However, som ething crucial is 
m issing from th is principle—it says no thing abou t how to determ ine w hat a 
sufficient level of evidence is. T his omission is im portan t because th e  goal of 
form ulating such a  principle is to  inform  us abou t w hat we should or should 
no t believe, and w ithou t any way of determ ining w hat a  sufficient level of 
evidence is th is  principle is left im potent when applied to  real beliefs. Tradi­
tional epistem ology has done little  to  fill in th is gap. Theories of epistem ic 
justification often m ake use of some notion of a  sufficient level of evidence,1 
however, they  usually say little  or nothing ab o u t how to  go abou t deter­
m ining w hat th is level is. M aking th is problem  m ore difficult is th e  high 
probability  th a t  th is level varies between beliefs and  contexts. If th is claim is 
tru e  (and I will argue th a t  it is), th en  the  problem  of identifying a sufficient 
level of evidence cannot be solved by suggesting some a priori threshold. A 
more sophisticated theory  will be required to  determ ine these thresholds.
T here is a theory  th a t  can do ju st th a t— the Bayesian Theory  of R ational 
A cceptance (B TR A ). T he burden of th is  chapter th en  is to  in troduce this
1For example, Richard Feldman (1993, 555) uses the words “For any person S and 
proposition p  and time t, S  epistemically ought to believe p  if and only if p  is supported 
by the evidence S  has at t.”
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theory, and argue th a t  it is needed to  guide us in understanding w hat we 
should believe given th e  threshold problem.
T he stra tegy  of th is  chapter is to  begin w ith  a fairly rough and in tuitive 
description of th e  above issues, and move tow ard greater precision as the 
chapter develops.
2.2 The “M eatloaf Factor”
In “Intellectual M orality in Clifford and Jam es,” George M avrodes noticed 
the  above lack in C lifford’s principle. C lifford’s principle is abou t binary  
forms of belief, beliefs th a t  are “on” or “off,” these are the  acceptances I 
spoke of in the  last chapter. However, evidence comes in degrees. Thus any 
function re lating  th e  two m ust take th e  form of a  “threshold rule.” There 
is a threshold  value on the  evidential scale such th a t  all values below it 
should result in no acceptance, while all values a t or above it should result 
in acceptance. Sufficient evidence then  m eans a  level of evidence a t or above 
the  threshold  (1986, 207-219). W hat determ ines th is  threshold value? A clue 
m ay be found in w hat M avrodes called “valuational asym m etry.” Im agine 
the  following situation: you have in your refrigerator some m eatloaf th a t  has 
been there for several days. Consider the  proposition P  =  “T he m eatloaf is 
OK .” Assume th a t if you accept P , you will ea t th e  m eatloaf, and if you d on’t, 
you will toss th e  m eatloaf in the  trash . If you accept P , and you are right, 
then  you will get th e  good result of a cheap meal. If you accept P  and you 
are wrong, the  bad  resu lt of a serious illness obtains. And it seems th a t the 
la tte r result is m ore bad  th an  the former is good. T hus there is a valuational 
asym m etry— y ou  sta n d  to  lose m ore if you  are w ron g  th an  you  will ga in  if you  
are right. In  cases such as this, M avrodes claim ed th a t  one should dem and
14
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a higher level of evidence in believing P  th an  its  negation. W hat makes 
for th e  difference is th e  valuational asym m etry between being right abou t 
P  and being wrong. As such valuational asym m etries are a ttached  to  m any 
(perhaps m ost) acceptances, and as th e  degree of asym m etry varies from 
context to  context, som ething like the  m eatloaf factor is generally involved 
in determ ining evidential thresholds for ra tiona l acceptance.
M avrodes no ted  th a t  Clifford did  not m ention anything like th e  “m eatloaf 
factor.” However, he claimed th a t  th e  exam ples Clifford used to  argue for his 
principle illustra te  it as well. Consider C lifford’s unseaw orthy ship example:
A shipowner was abou t to  send to  sea an  em igrant ship. He 
knew th a t  she was old, and no t over-well bu ilt a t th e  first; and 
th a t  she had  seen m any seas and climes, and often needed re­
pairs. D oubts had been suggested to  him  th a t possibly she was 
no t seaworthy. These doubts preyed upon his m ind and m ade 
him  unhappy; he thought th a t  perhaps he ought to  have her 
thoroughly  overhauled and refitted, even though th is should p u t 
him  to  great expense. Before the  ship sailed, however, he suc­
ceeded in overcoming these m elancholy reflections. He said to  
him self th a t  she had gone safely th rough  so m any voyages and 
w eathered so m any storm s th a t  it was idle to  suppose she would 
not come safely home from th is  trip  also . . .  In such ways he ac­
quired a  sincere and com fortable conviction th a t  his vessel was 
thoroughly safe and seaworthy; he w atched her departu re  w ith 
a light heart . . .  and he got his insurance m oney when she went 
down in m idocean and to ld  no tales. W h at shall we say of him? 
Surely this, th a t  he was verily guilty  of the  death  of those men.
It is adm itted  th a t  he did sincerely believe in the soundness of 
his ship; bu t the  sincerity of his conviction can in no wise help 
him, because he had no right■ to believe on such evidence as was 
before him. (1993, 502)
Here valuational asym m etry is plainly present. T he cost of th e  shipowner 
being wrong abou t his acceptance is g reater th an  the  benefit of being right. 
T hus it seems th a t  a  fairly high level of evidence is required for the  ra tionality  
of th is  acceptance. I t also seems th a t  it is ju s t th is valuational asym m etry
15
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th a t  results in such a heavy blam e being placed on the  shipowner (M avrodes 
1986, 213-214).
O ne of th e  m ain im plications of th e  “m eatloaf factor” in th e  above exam ­
ple is th a t  practical and m oral considerations of w hat the shipowner stands 
to  gain and lose are w hat is determ ining where the  threshold should be. How­
ever, epistem ologists m ay shy away from using a  justification principle th a t 
involves practical considerations. For, after all, isn ’t  our goal as cognitive 
agents sim ply the  tru th ?  Isn ’t  th e  goal of epistem ology to  discover principles 
th a t  aid in us in our goals as purely cognitive agents?
In  fact, epistem ologists often distinguish th ree types of justification  ac­
ceptances m ay enjoy— practical, m oral, and  epistemic. The general question 
of w hat we should believe involves all th ree  aspects of justification. How­
ever, epistem ology is only concerned w ith  epistem ic justification— th e  above 
considerations seem to  apply to  m oral and practical justification. T hough 
the  m eatloaf factor m ay be involved in th e  m ore general question of w hat we 
should believe in the  end, it isn ’t  a  consideration th a t need concern episte­
mologists.
However, even if one restric ts oneself to  purely epistem ic interests, the  
problem  of determ ining a th reshold  for acceptance still rem ains, as it can 
vary here too, preventing the  sim ple solution of proposing a single threshold  
value for all acceptances. O r so I will argue in the  next section.
2.3 Two Epistem ic Values
T here is ra tiona l variation relevant to  epistem ic interests. To understand  this 
claim , consider the following stan d ard  epistem ic goals:
(1) We w ant to  believe tru th s .
16
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(2) We w ant to  avoid believing falsehoods.
As W illiam  Jam es observes in The W ill to Believe , these two goals are dis­
tinct, and their relative im portance varies:
T here are two ways of looking a t our du ty  in the m anner of 
opinion— ways entirely different, and yet ways abou t whose dif­
ference the  theory  of knowledge seems h itherto  to  have shown 
very little  concern. We m ust know the  tru th ; and  we m ust avoid 
error— these are our first and great com m andm ents as would-be 
knowers; b u t they  are no t two ways of s ta tin g  an  identical com­
m andm ent, they  are two separable laws . . .  Believe tru th ! Shun 
error!— these, we see, are two m aterially  different laws; and by 
choosing between them  we m ay end by coloring differently our 
whole intellectual life. We m ay regard the  chase for t ru th  as 
param ount, and the  avoidance of error as secondary: or we may, 
on the  o ther hand, tre a t the  avoidance of error as more im per­
ative, and let t ru th  take its chance. Clifford, in the  instructive 
passage which I have quoted, exhorts us to  the  la tte r  course. Be­
lieve nothing, he tells us, keep your m ind in suspense forever, 
ra th e r th an  by closing it on insufficient evidence incur th e  awful 
risk of believing lies. You, on the  o ther hand, m ay th in k  th a t 
th e  risk of being in error is a very sm all m a tte r when com pared 
w ith  the  blessings of real knowledge, and be ready to  be duped 
m any tim es in your investigation ra ther th an  postpone indefi­
nitely  the  chance of guessing true . I myself find it im possible to  
go w ith Clifford. We m ust rem em ber th a t  these feelings of our 
du ty  abou t either t ru th  or error are in any case only expressions 
of our passional life . . .  He who says, “B etter to  go w ithout belief 
forever th an  believe a  lie!” m erely shows his own preponderant 
private horror of becom ing a dupe . . .  For my own part, I have 
also a horror of being duped; b u t I can believe th a t worse things 
th an  being duped m ay happen  to  a m an in th is world . . .  (1993, 
509-510)
Here Jam es claims th a t  th e  relative im portance of these two d istinc t goals 
varies according to  th e  “passional life,” viz., our fear of error versus our fear 
of missing out on believing th e  tru th . Of course, th is is an  over-simplistic 
understanding  of th e  psychology of acceptance, s ta tes  o ther th an  fear are
17
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certain ly  involved. Perhaps a more general way to  p u t th is  would be to  say 
th a t the  relative im portance of the  two epistem ic goals for a person depends 
on the  com parative value th a t  she places on having tru e  acceptances and 
avoiding false ones. T his valuation  m ay involve fear or o ther factors.
It is easy to  see th a t  th e  threshold value for ra tional acceptance varies 
w ith  the  relative im portance of th e  two epistem ic goals— as th e  first goal be­
comes more im portan t, th e  threshold  decreases, for th e  surest way to  increase 
one’s to ta l stock of tru e  acceptances is to  believe everything. As the  second 
becomes more im portan t, th e  threshold  increases, as the  surest way to  avoid 
falsehood is to  believe nothing a t all. Because considerations of u tility  (in 
th is  case, epistem ic u tility ) affect th e  relative im portance of th e  above goals, 
th ey  affect the  threshold  as well.
However, even though all of the  above is true, w hat is it th a t  keeps us 
from saying th a t, epistem ically speaking, we have no reason for preferring 
either of th e  above goals, and  thus we should set th e  level as th a t  which 
favors bo th  goals equally. T hus we don’t  need a  sophisticated  theory  th a t  
will tell us w hat the  threshold  value is from acceptance to  acceptance, instead 
we can sim ply specify some a priori condition— say, th a t  th e  acceptance is 
ra tiona l if it is m ore likely to  be tru e  th an  not given the  curren t evidence, 
and  a ttach  it to  Clifford’s principle.2
However, consider th e  following argum ent. Let th e  level o f evidence for 
P  be the  inductive probability  of P  being tru e  given the  curren t available 
evidence. T he probability  of th e  conjunction of two propositions is less th an  
th e  probability  of either of th e  two (given their probabilities aren ’t  0 or 1 
and  th a t  neither entails th e  o ther). If th is is true , th en  regardless of where 
we set th e  threshold  for sufficient evidence, there will be the  possibility th a t
2C.A.J. Coady (1992, 108-113) seems to take this approach.
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one could hold two propositions w ith individual probabilities th a t  are higher 
th an  th e  threshold  while th e  probability of their conjunction is lower th an  
the  threshold. T hus one would be epistem ically ra tional in holding each in­
dividually, b u t would no t be justified in holding th e  conjunction. However, 
the  conjunction of th e  propositions follows im m ediately from holding each of 
them . T hus we m ust reject a t least one of th e  following: the  principle th a t  
we are ra tional in  holding the  conjunction of two propositions we are rational 
believing individually (a logical im plication of holding them  separately), the 
laws of probability, or th e  notion of a  single th reshold  applying to  all accep­
tances (including conjunctions of acceptances) in all contexts. I subm it th a t  
the  la tte r  is the  least supported  and should be rejected.
One could deny deductive closure. For example, in  an extended discussion 
of deductive constra in ts on acceptance, David C hristensen (2004, 33-105) 
argued th a t th e  principle of deductive closure should be rejected due to  issues 
raised in the  preface paradox and its lack of adequate independent support. 
However, M aher (2006a) criticized th is  argum ent, plausibly I th ink, because 
it ignores th e  d istinction  between “weak” and “strong” closure, where the 
form er restric ts the  constrain t to  acceptances w ithin a particu lar context 
of inquiry, the  la tte r  extends to  all acceptances in all contexts, and because 
weak closure is no t defeated by C hristensen’s argum ents. If M aher is correct, 
I th ink  th a t weak closure would apply to  my example.
T hus even from an epistem ic point of view no one threshold  will do, we 
will need a  m ore sophisticated theory  to  set evidential thresholds.
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2.4 The “Credulity K nob,” Practical and 
E pistem ic Values
One way to  th in k  of thresholds is as follows: On some stereos there is a “tone” 
knob. T urn it to  th e  right and the  higher frequencies are amplified, and the  
lower ones cut. T urn  it to  the  left and th e  reverse happens. T he result is 
overall control of th e  tone of the  sound coming ou t of the stereo— tu rn  it to  
the  right and a  brighter sound results, tu rn  it to  th e  left and a “bassier” sound 
results. We m ight say th a t  each of us has in our m inds a “credulity knob,” as 
we tu rn  the  knob clockwise we find ourselves increasingly credulous, while as 
we tu rn  it counterclockwise we become increasingly skeptical. T his setting  
reflects a  higher order a ttitu d e  of how skeptical or credulous we will be. B oth 
epistem ic and  practical values affect the  se tting  of the  credulity knob, the  
relative value of believing tru th s  versus avoiding errors for the  former, and 
valuational asym m etry  regarding practical decisions based on acceptances in 
the  la tter.
I ’d  like to  briefly consider a  question abou t th e  relationship between the 
“m eatloaf factor” and  epistem ic preferences: Should one influence th e  o ther? 
I t m ight seem th a t  from w hat has been said in th is  chapter th a t  Jam es 
and M avrodes th in k  it should, in th a t  it is th rough  the relative value one 
places on the  two epistem ic goals th a t  valuational asym m etry is felt, practical 
in terests indeed determ ine how skeptical we should be tow ard P,  and the 
mechanism  by which th is  shift in credulity is effected is th rough shifts in 
these relative epistem ic values. If th is is true , th en  practical in terests could 
influence epistem ic interests, and perhaps when beliefs count as knowledge.3
However, M avrodes a t least doesn’t  seem to  hold th is  view. Consider the
3Jason Stanley (2005) has argued that practical interests do partly determine what 
counts as knowledge. I discuss Stanley’s view further in chapter six when I apply BTRA 
to skepticism.
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following passage:
T he local new spaper has ju s t been delivered. How m any sepa­
ra te  sheets of paper are included in todays edition? It would take 
me only a few seconds to  spread the  paper on th e  floor and count 
the  sheets. I would thus acquire a belief, very likely a tru e  belief.
In  a couple of m inutes I could do the  counting several tim es, thus 
acquiring a highly reliable belief, one of the  m ost reliable in my 
repertoire. B ut I do not do it, and no t m any of us would do it. If 
t ru th  is all th a t  central to  the  cognitive enterprise th en  why do 
we no t im m ediately seize upon  th is  tru th , so readily and easily 
available?
In con trast, we m ay spend days, m onths, even a whole life­
tim e, searching for the  t ru th  ab o u t some profound m atter. And 
we m ay com m it tim e, effort, and  resources to  the  pro ject even 
though we believe, from th e  very beginning, th a t  we are unlikely 
to  achieve anyth ing  m ore th an  a  very ten ta tive  conclusion. W hy 
does it m ake sense to  struggle a t g reat length for a shaky grasp 
a t one tru th , when we could have instead, w ith  alm ost no pain 
or effort, a practically  certain  grip on a  different tru th ?
A t one level, of course, we know the  answer to  th a t  question.
Some tru th s  are im portan t, and  some are not. And we know, 
too, some  of the  things which go into m aking a  tru th  im portan t.
A t ru th  is im portan t if it has im p o rtan t consequences for our 
practice and our life. B ut one has th e  feeling th a t m aybe th a t  isn ’t 
the  whole story. M aybe there are tru th s  which have an  intrinsic  
im portance, an  im portance ap a rt from their consequences. And 
we don’t  have a t hand  a ready and  satisfying account of intrinsic 
im portance for beliefs. A nd (in some m oods a t least) we m ay 
also feel th a t  there is still som ething m ore unaccounted for in 
th is  area.
Once we recognize th a t no t all tru th s  are created equal, as 
it were, th en  it seems evident th a t  we cannot express the  goal 
for th e  cognitive life sim ply in term s of tru th . The im portance 
of w hat we believe m ust somehow be worked into it, and m aybe 
some other (and even more obscure) elem ents as well. A nd the  
form ulation of the  goal m ust m ake room  for the  fact th a t  a year of 
work for a ten ta tive  opinion ab o u t some th ings makes more sense 
th a n  a m inute spent for practical certain ty  about o ther things.
(1986, 218-219)
From  th is passage it looks like we have two ways to  account for the  differences 
in value between tru ths: th e  first is practical, some tru th s  are w orth more
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due to  how they  affect our actions. T he second is to  consider non-practical, 
purely  intellectual values o ther th a n  tru th  (or avoidance of error). M avrodes 
went on to  consider Jam es’s famous psychological aspects of cognitive options 
(live, dead, etc.) as a place to  s ta rt. I t seems from th is passage th a t  M avrodes 
is open to  th e  influence of valuational asym m etry on epistem ic goals, b u t th a t  
he also th inks there m ay be o ther non-practical values th a t are of epistem ic 
significance th an  tru th .
I th in k  th a t  bo th  of these options are plausible. We m ight ask ourselves 
why we value tru th . One answer th a t resonates w ith  philosophers is th a t  it 
is ju s t intrinsically valuable. A nother plausible answer is th a t  t ru th  helps us 
“get around,” to  achieve practical goals. If we suppose th a t t ru th  is valuable 
only for its  practical use, th en  our epistem ic goals are really only instrum en­
tal, and  thus should reflect our deeper practical goals. Then the  relative value 
of t ru th  versus avoiding error would reflect o ther values, and any valuational 
asym m etries in the  decisions th a t  will be based on propositions we accept.
However, I do n ’t  th ink  M avrodes would agree, for if there is an  intrinsic 
value to  t ru th  and to  avoiding error, there will be a ra tio  of th e  values of 
these goals th a t  will be independent of any practical valuational asym m etry. 
T he practical values will be felt in shifting thresholds th a t a ren ’t  based on 
any changes in in epistem ic values like t ru th  and accuracy. A nd it does seem 
plausible th a t  tru th  and accuracy have intrinsic value.
However, I th ink  th a t  practical valuational asym m etry and epistem ic val­
ues in terac t in a t least the  following way: suppose th a t  in term s of epistem ic 
values, S  has no preference betw een accepting, denying, or w ithholding judg­
m ent regarding P.  Suppose fu rther th a t  for S  there is a valuational asym m e­
try  regarding P  strongly favoring credulity. T hen  it is only practical value 
th a t is determ ining w hether or no t S  accepts P,  and she m ight accept P
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purely  on th is  basis. W hat th is says abou t the  in teraction betw een epistem ic 
and  practical values regarding acceptance is th a t, contrary  to  w hat we m ight 
call “in tellectualist”4 in tu itions th a t  epistem ic values are always w hat should 
determ ine w hether or no t to  accept a  claim, there are tim es when it won’t 
epistem ically m atte r one way or the  o ther to  S  w hether or no t she accepts 
P ,  b u t it will practically. In these cases practical considerations are w hat 
determ ines the  ra tional choice. W hen epistem ic choices are unclear, practical 
in terests take over.
2.5 A B ird’s Eye V iew  of B T R A
Now I am  ready to  in troduce BTRA. B TR A  sets up a  Bayesian decision 
problem  w ith  the  acts p artitio n  divided between accepting P ,  accepting P.  
and  suspending judgm ent on P ,  and  the  s ta tes  p a rtitio n  between P  being 
tru e  and P  being false. T he expected u tility  of an  act is the  subjective 
probability  weighted sum  of th e  general utilities of th e  consequences of th a t  
ac t given each state.
According to  B TR A  S  is ra tiona l in accepting P  iff:
1. .S’s subjective probability  for P  is rational, i.e., it is sufficiently 
close to  the  inductive probability  of P  given S”s evidence.
2. Accepting P  m axim izes expected u tility  for S.
T he first requirem ent reflects the  conclusions from the previous chapter th a t 
subjective probabilities can be irrational, th a t  they  should be considered in 
determ ining w hether S  is ra tional in  accepting P,  and th a t  inductive prob­
abilities are the  constra in t on ra tional subjective probabilities. If were are
4Jason Stanley (2005) uses this word to refer to the view that knowledge doesn’t involve 
practical interests.
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merely concerned w ith  w hether the acceptance itself is ra tional given the 
body of evidence possessed by S  we could remove subjective probabilities 
from the  set of criteria. T he set would be adjusted  to  ju s t take into consider­
ation  inductive probabilities: we remove “1” and use inductive probabilities 
in  the  expected u tility  calculation  instead of subjective probabilities.
Note th a t w ith  B T R A  we were concerned w ith  the  general ra tionality  of 
an  acceptance. T hus our u tility  function is also general. However, the  scope 
of th e  theory  can be focused by narrowing the  types of u tility  under consid­
eration. For instance, we could lim it ourselves to  purely epistem ic utilities, 
and thus beliefs th a t  are ra tiona l given th is u tility  function will be in a t least 
some sense epistem ically ra tiona l (in chapter five I argue th a t  ra tionality  w ith 
respect to  epistem ic u tility  is as good an explication of epistem ic justification 
as any). We also could focus on utilities based on m oral goals, or practical 
goals, or w hatever goals we wish.
2.6 Thresholds and B T R A
W ith  th is appara tus we can th ink  a  b it more precisely abou t thresholds, and 
th e  “m eatloaf factor.” Assum ing th a t S ’s probability  function is sufficiently 
close to  the  inductive probability  function for P  given the evidence he has, 
the  threshold value, call it r, will be the  lowest probability  th a t  S  can assign 
P  th a t  will render the  acceptance of P  ra tional given S ’s u tility  function. 
W hat the  m eatloaf factor claim s th en  is th a t  r  varies as a function of S ’s 
u tility  function.
So the  missing piece in Clifford’s principle is:
We should accept P  iff p ( P  \ E )  > r  as specified by B TR A , given 
our general u tility  function.
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W ith  BTR A , when it is rational to  accept P  depends a t least partia lly  on 
,S”s u tility  function. T his allows for practical, as well as epistem ic u tilities 
(such as the  value placed on the  two above epistem ic goals) to  affect w hether 
or not S  should accept P.
It seems good to  consider a simple example. L e t’s re tu rn  to  the  m eatloaf 
example of chap ter two. For sim plicity’s sake, we’ll ju st consider practical 
utility. Suppose th e  relevant utilities are given by th e  following table.
M eatloaf is good M eatloaf is bad
Serve m eatloaf 5 -1 0 0
D on’t  serve m eatloaf 0 0
These u tilities reflect the  fact th a t  there is a lot to  loose and relatively 
little  to  gain in serving the  meatloaf. Suppose th a t the agent will act as if 
P  is tru e  if he accepts P , where P  is “T he m eatloaf is good,” and th a t  if he 
doesn’t  accept P  he will toss the  m eatloaf in the  trash . T hen  the  expected 
u tility  of accepting P  will be the  sam e as serving the  m eatloaf, and th a t of 
no t accepting P  th e  sam e as not serving the  m eatloaf (assum ing th a t  this 
is the  only decision he will base on P ) .5 Then, given a  probability  for P,  
we can decide w hether or not to  accept P  in th e  sam e way th a t  we decide 
w hether or no t to  serve the  meatloaf. Also, we could calculate th e  evidential 
threshold  for accepting P,  as the  m inim um  probability  P  m ust have to  make 
the  expected u tility  of accepting it not less th an  th a t of not accepting P.
Suppose th e  available evidence allows him  to  assign p (P \E )  a value of 
0.6. T hen  w ith  th is probability, the  expected u tilities of accepting and not 
accepting P  are as follows (where “E U (P )” stands for the  expected u tility  
of accepting P ).
5For simplicity I am only considering two choices in this decision problem, accepting P  
and not accepting P. There are actually three possible options in any acceptance decision 
problem; accept P , accept P. or accept neither.
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E U (P ) =  -37
EU (P ) =  0
Clearly the  expected u tility  of not accepting is higher, given the  risks. In 
fact, th e  th reshold  probability, given th e  above utilities, can be obtained  by 
solving the  following inequality:
E U (P ) >  E U (P )
Since the  EU of not accepting P  is 0:
E U (P ) >  0
As E U (P ) is th e  probability  of P  tim es th e  u tility  of accepting P  if P  is tru e  
plus the  probability  of P  (which is 1 — p (P ))  tim es the u tility  of accepting 
P  if P  is false, solving for p(P )  we get:
p(P )  > 0.952
T hus th e  agent in  th is problem  should no t accept P  unless he has enough 
evidence to  m ake th e  proposition more th a n  95 percent likely.
One can expand th is  sort of analysis to  propositions of a  certain  class, 
given the  sorts of decisions th a t are likely to  be based on them ,' and evaluate 
the  im plied thresholds of inquirers. This, I believe, is the m ain fruit of the  
theory, it can be used to  evaluate higher order attitudes, including thresholds 
and burdens of proof regarding classes of beliefs. In a la ter chap ter I will 
re tu rn  to  th is  use of the  theory, applying it to  th e  higher order a ttitu d e , 
burden of proof.
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2.7 B elief and A ction
According to  my account, acceptances affect decisions, and because of this 
influence, the  decisions we will m ake based on an acceptance (and their con­
sequences) p a rtly  determ ine its  rationality. There are two m ajor problem s 
w ith  th is view. T he first has been raised by Bayesians, nam ely th a t  accep­
tances are not relevant to  ra tiona l action, because there is no plausible way 
to  m ake sense of how they  could be relevant (M aher 1986). T he second is 
expressed by these questions: Do we really m ake decisions this way, th a t  is, 
do we decide w hat to  do based on acceptances, acceptances th a t  we acquired 
only after deciding which propositions we should accept based on th e  deci­
sions th a t  could follow from them ? Is it reasonable to  do so? D oesn’t  it seem 
needlessly roundabout? Isn ’t  it m ore reasonable to  say th a t we decide w hat 
to  accept purely on evidence, and only th en  consider practical questions?
T he first problem  will be addressed in detail in the  next chapter. R egard­
ing th e  second set of difficulties, no te th e  following. F irst, evidence alone is 
not  enough to  decide w hether or no t accepting a proposition is ra tional. We 
need an  evidential threshold, and  these a ren ’t  determ ined by evidence, so we 
can ’t  ju s t decide w hat to  accept purely on evidence.
Second, regarding w hat we actually  do, i t ’s well known am ong psycholo­
gists th a t  people d on’t  in fact form beliefs purely on evidence. People tend  
to  consider only a subset of th e  available evidence, and in terp re t it in ways 
th a t are self-serving. This suggests th a t  people do take practical in terests 
into consideration (a t least subconsciously) when they  decide which evidence 
to  em phasize, or how to  in terp re t th e  evidence they  do consider. A nother 
avenue of th is influence is th rough  how skeptical or credulous we will be to ­
ward a  proposition— there is a  body  of research th a t  shows th a t  people are
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far m ore skeptical tow ard claims th a t  conflict w ith w hat they  already believe 
or w hat they  w ant to  believe th an  claim s th a t do not, and one can ’t  help but 
suspect th a t  th is bias is in some way self-serving, a t least subconsciously.6 
A lthough it m ight be hard  to  see how we m ight consciously factor practical 
in terests into belief form ation, th e  above research a t least indicates th a t  such 
considerations could be a profound influence on us a t a subconscious level.
Biases m ight seem inherently  irra tional, b u t given th a t  there  are always 
m ultiple ways of in terpreting  evidence, and th a t  how skeptical one is tow ard 
a claim  (or evidence supporting  a claim) can vary, a decision has to  be m ade 
regarding how to  respond to  evidence in these ways, and evidence itself can­
no t settle  th e  question. These different and necessary ways of responding 
to  evidence are in fact biases. T he goal of ra tionality  then  shouldn’t  be one 
of removing these biases, b u t of m aking sure the  biases are ra tiona l in th a t  
they  serve our epistem ic and  p ractical interests. If this is so, th en  biases 
are subject to  evaluation, and  B T R A  is a  tool to  aid in a t least p a r t of th is 
project. B TR A  is especially useful tow ard subconscious influences th a t  take 
th e  form of higher order a ttitu d es  involving how critical or accepting we are 
tow ard various claims.
T hird , regardless of how we form beliefs, we do make decisions based 
on acceptances (and probably can ’t  help doing so), and therefore the  con­
sequences of accepting a proposition will generally include practical choices. 
A nd since th e  ra tionality  of any decision depends upon all of the  consequences 
of th a t  decision, the  ra tionality  of acceptance depends upon the  consequences 
of th a t  acceptance, including any fu rther decisions m ade on th a t acceptance.
However, even if I ’m  right abou t th e  above, it m ay seem th a t I am  missing
6For an accessib le and in teresting survey o f  psychological research su pp orting  hum an  
biases of these sorts, see Thomas Gillovich’s Knowing What isn’t So (1991).
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a t least p a rt of the point of th e  objection, for using B TR A  to  evaluate beliefs 
in th e  above way is practically  impossible. L ater on I argue th a t acting 
on acceptances is ra tional because is a practical sho rtcu t tow ard m aking 
decisions th a t replaces calculating expected utility. However, th is appears to 
be no shortcu t a t all, for to  consider all the  actions th a t  m ight follow from 
an acceptance is an  im possibly com plicated task. B TR A  th u s defeats its 
purpose.
My reply is twofold. F irst, when I argue th a t  acting on acceptances is 
m ore felicitous th an  calculating expected utility, I do not deny th a t  m axim um  
expected u tility  is a  criterion  for ra tiona l decisions, in th e  sam e way the 
im practicality  of B T R A  doesn’t  prove th a t  B TR A  isn ’t  a criterion for rational 
acceptance. Second, given th e  com plexity of w hat practically  follows from 
an acceptance, th e  considerations inform ing these decisions will have to  be 
very general in natu re , we can ’t  predict exactly w hat we will do as a  result 
of m aking a choice. However, th is  generality applies to  any decision. Ju s t 
th ink  of all the different consequences th a t  could follow from a  decision as 
triv ial as choosing to  ea t a t th e  studen t union as opposed to  eating  a t home— 
who knows who one m ight run  into in public, or w hat fu rther decisions one 
will face given either choice, and how these contingencies m ight affect future 
events/decisions. T hus th is  problem  it is not a special problem  for BTRA, 
b u t for any decision. As th is  problem  doesn’t  keep us from using BD T in 
evaluating decisions in general, neither should it keep B T R A  from working 
here, as long as we allow sim plification and generalization.
However, I do n ’t  th in k  th a t  B T R A  is useful in actual application toward 
m ost everyday beliefs, where it becomes useful is in disputes regarding more 
general theoretical acceptances, and m ost especially tow ard higher order a t­
titu d es  th a t  influence them . Here it is w orth tak ing  th e  tim e to  apply B TRA
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in a relatively thorough way.
One m ight also object th a t  there is a big difference between practical 
decisions and w hat we believe: we don’t  really have th e  control over w hat we 
accept th a t  we have over our actions, th a t  is, one m ight appeal to  doxastic 
involunterism . If we can ’t  control our acceptances, then  in w hat sense is 
decision theory  relevant? W illiam  A lston (1989, 81-113) has argued for the 
involunterism  of belief. However, he also agreed th a t  we could still evaluate 
a belief in term s of its  desirability  (as opposed to  im posing blam e on its 
holder). Even if involunterism  is true, B TR A  could be applied to  a t least 
th is axis of evaluation. Also, even though it is probably  tru e  th a t a t the 
lowest levels we usually do n ’t  voluntarily  decide to  accept propositions, our 
voluntary  decisions could come in a t higher levels, decisions as to  w hether to  
be open or closed-minded, to  be skeptical or trusting , etc. And these sorts 
of decisions should be m ade by considering the  consequences of each choice, 
which would include acceptances and the  decisions th a t  follow from them . 
As sta ted  before, B TR A  applies to  these higher level decisions.
2.8 Conclusion
A t th is point I will sum m arize and draw  some im plications of w hat I have 
said so far. F irst, I have argued th a t Clifford’s notion of sufficient evidence 
for belief is itself no t sufficient— we need a  way to  determ ine w hat this level 
is. I also argued th a t th is level varies from belief to  belief. I have offered 
B T R A  as a theory  th a t can make these determ inations. I would also like to  
add th a t B TR A  has th e  additional feature of generality— it can be used for 
b o th  th e  questio n  of w h a t we shou ld  believe ev e ry th in g  considered , an d  as I 
argue in chapter five, w hether or not we are epistem ically justified in holding
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a particu lar belief.
A t th is po int I th in k  an  interesting question arises— is it the  business of 
epistem ologists to  be concerned w ith  the m ore general concept of w hat we 
should believe when we consider all our values (including practical values), 
as opposed to  epistem ic justification and knowledge? P ractically  speaking, 
when it comes down to  our actually  accepting propositions (and all the  prac­
tices associated w ith  th is  acceptance), the  m ore general concept seems im por­
tan t. Agreed, focusing on it would be a departu re  from the  norm al practice 
of epistemology, b u t as there isn’t  any field th a t is seriously tackling th is 
question (as far as I can tell), it seems th a t  epistem ology’s focus on rational 
belief makes it an  appropria te  discipline to  exam ine it.
However, there  is still the  first objection to  my version of B TRA  to  be 
answered, th a t  acceptances do not affect ra tional action— if th is objection is 
right, th en  p ractical in terests have no (or very lim ited) influence on w hat it 
is ra tional to  accept. To th is objection I now tu rn .
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C hapter 3
D ecisions w ith  A cceptances: 
A nsw ering the Bayesian  
C hallenge
3.1 Introduction
So far I have been assum ing th a t practical in terests influence w hat makes 
an  acceptance ra tiona l because we base decisions on these acceptances, and 
are ra tiona l in doing so. However, th is claim  is controversial: Bayesians have 
challenged it, arguing th a t  there isn ’t  a  way to  m ake sense of ra tionally  basing 
a decision on an acceptance. M ark K aplan  (1996) called th is The Bayesian  
Challenge. In  th is  chapter I will answer th e  challenge.
However, I first w ant to  say th a t  even if m y a ttem p t to  answer the  
Bayesian Challenge is unsuccessful, p ractical in terests still play a  role in 
ra tiona l acceptance, given the  psychological reality  th a t we do base deci­
sions upon acceptances. If we know we are going to  do this (and can ’t  avoid 
it, I d on ’t  th in k  we can), then  the  consequences of our acceptances should 
include these outcom es, w hether or no t they  are rational. In th is  way the 
consequences of acting on acceptances do play a  role in w hat it is ra tional 
for us to  accept. However, I hope for the  best regarding my answer to  the  
Bayesian Challenge.
I will consider two versions of the  challenge. T he first is from R ichard 
Jeffrey (1956). A few years before, R ichard  R udner (1953) had argued th a t  
because evidence is degreed, scientists m ust choose thresholds for accepting 
scientific hypotheses, and th a t  because these choices depend on th e  value of
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th e  practical consequences of decisions based on these hypotheses, scientists, 
as scientists, make value judgm ents when they  make these decisions. Jeffrey 
responded by arguing th a t  if we do base decisions on acceptances, th en  we 
shouldn’t  accept anything; th e  reason being th a t  basing decisions on accep­
tances does no t m axim ize expected utility. T his of course implies th a t  acting 
on acceptances is irrational.
Jeffrey’s argum ent for acceptance-based decisions not m axim izing ex­
pected  u tility  is th a t  it is equivalent to  acting as if the  claim is true. This 
im plies a  general decision m aking policy, for to  act as if a proposition is tru e  is 
to  give it a probability  of one, im plying a willingness to  risk th e  consequences 
of being wrong abou t the  acceptance for all our decisions. However, the  con­
sequences resulting from acting as if an  acceptance is true  vary from context 
to  contex t— th e  results of being wrong abou t a  hypothesis in some contexts 
are m ore/less dangerous th an  others, and thus w arrant m ore/less caution  
th a n  others. T hus acting on an  acceptance of P  is not rational, in th a t  bas­
ing decisions upon an acceptance is no t sensitive to  changing contexts— only 
m aking decisions using subjective probabilities are. Therefore, if we w ant to  
m axim ize expected utility, and  if accepting P  m eans th a t we will act on P , 
th en  we shouldn’t  accept P , th a t  is, we shouldn’t  accept anything.
T he second case comes from M aher, who argued th a t  acceptance is ir­
relevant to  ra tional action, due to  th e  lack of a plausible understand ing  of 
how th e  two are related. M aher m entioned some of the  consequences of this 
claim:
For one thing, the  view th a t  I am  advocating is incom patible w ith 
pragm atism . T he core idea of pragm atism  is th a t  a  belief can be 
ra tionally  justified by th e  p ractical consequences of holding th a t  
belief. T his assumes th a t  a person’s beliefs do have an  influence 
on his a tta inm en t of practical goals. B ut on my view, a person’s 
beliefs ought to  have no influence on th e  actions he chooses, and so
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a ra tiona l person’s beliefs will have no practical consequences. So 
in denying th a t the  ra tionality  of an  action depends on the  ag en t’s 
beliefs, we are removing one of th e  foundations of pragm atism .
(1986, 364)
A lthough my view isn’t  full p ragm atism  (I don’t  believe the  tru th  values 
or m eanings of m ost claims depend on their practical value), it does have 
a  p ragm atist elem ent in th a t  I claim  th a t  the  practical consequences of an 
acceptance are relevant to  its  rationality . If M aher is right, my view m ay still 
be tru e  (as m entioned earlier, psychologically we really can ’t  avoid m aking 
decisions based on acceptances, M aher him self seems to  acknowledge this 
(1986, 364)). However, as I d on ’t  th in k  he is, I will take on M aher’s argum ent. 
As Jeffrey’s case seems to  be a less developed version of M aher’s case, it makes 
sense to  focus on M aher first and  th en  re tu rn  to  Jeffrey.
According to  M aher, there  are two ways to  understand  th e  relationship 
between acceptance and ra tional action. Here is the  first:
By far the  m ost com m on view, I th ink, is th a t  a ra tional person 
ought on all occasions to  act “in accordance w ith his beliefs” , or 
“as if his beliefs were tru e .” According to  th is  view, a  person acts 
ra tionally  when he chooses an  ac t which would be optim al if his 
beliefs were true. (1986, 364)
According to  M aher, if th is view of th e  connection between belief and  ra tional 
action is correct, th en  a person ought to  be prepared to  accept any bet on 
th e  t ru th  of his beliefs; for a ra tional person is supposed to  ac t in  th e  way 
th a t  would be best if his beliefs are true, and if his beliefs are tru e  th en  he 
will win a  bet on those beliefs. B u t th is m eans th a t  a  ra tional person will bet 
on his beliefs a t any odds. However, it  would be irrational to  be willing to  
b e t on a proposition a t any odds unless one was certain  of th e  t ru th  of th a t  
proposition. So the  view th a t  a person ought always to  act in accordance
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w ith his beliefs has the  im plausible im plication th a t  a  person ought to  be 
certain  of the  t ru th  of all his beliefs (1986, 364-365).
Belief as high confidence is the  second:
Belief as high confidence, then , holds th a t  there  is some th resh­
old degree of confidence r, such th a t  a ra tional person believes all 
and only those propositions for which his degree of confidence is 
greater th an  (or not less th an ) r. T he sense in which th e  ra tional­
ity  of a person’s actions depends on his beliefs will th en  be this: 
a person is ra tional to  bet on a proposition A  a t odds greater 
th an  (or not less th an ) r : \ - r  ju s t in case he believes A  is true.
(1986, 373)
T he argum ent against th is second view involves th e  lo tte ry  paradox. Accord­
ing to  th is second proposal, for any proposition P , to  believe P  is to  assign 
it a  probability  of g reater th an  some fixed threshold  r. Suppose th a t for 
Bob th e  confidence th reshold  proposed is 0.99. T hen  he accepts all and only 
propositions th a t  he is a t least 99% confident are true. Also suppose th a t 
there  is a lo ttery  of 1000 tickets, of which only one will win. T he probability  
of any ticket loosing is thus 0.999. On th is view, Bob accepts th e  propo­
sition “Ticket num ber x  will lose” for each ticket in the  lottery. However, 
Bob also knows (and hence also accepts) th a t  a t least one ticket will win. 
T hus if Bob accepts all propositions w ith  a probability  over his threshold r, 
he will be accepting an  inconsistent set of hypotheses—th a t  each ticket will 
loose, and th a t  there  is a t least one winner. Therefore th e  high confidence 
view entails th a t  we accept inconsistent sets of propositions. T his example 
can be modified to  fit any threshold  by changing th e  num ber of tickets in 
the  lottery. T hus if we w ant to  keep the  laws of probability, and the  in tu­
ition th a t  a principle describing ra tional acceptance shouldn’t  im ply th a t we 
accept inconsistent sets of hypotheses, we should reject th e  high confidence 
view.
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Thus, according to  M aher, we have good reason to  reject th a t  acceptances 
can be identified w ith  either certain ty  or confidence above a set threshold. 
Since th e  above principles, th e  only principles so far considered th a t  link 
acceptance w ith  action, assum e th a t a t least one of these identifications can 
be m ade, we m ust reject them  as well. If we do th a t, th en  either we are 
forced to  accept th a t  it is no t ra tional to  base decisions on acceptances (as 
we can ’t  even make sense of the  notion), or th a t  there is some th ird  proposal 
yet to  be offered th a t  does m ake sense of ra tionally  basing decisions on them .
3.2 R esponse
At its  core my reply to  these argum ents is twofold: F irst I agree w ith  M aher 
th a t there is no set p robability  range (1 or otherw ise) for which we can 
associate acceptance (I argued for th is in the  previous chapter, and I also 
th ink  M aher’s case is plausible). Second, and th is where I differ from M aher 
and  Jeffrey, I claim th a t  S  ra tionally  acting as if P  is tru e  doesn’t  imply 
th a t S  give P  a  probability  of 1, as it is som etim es ra tional to  act as if P  is 
tru e  in a  particu lar decision, even if P ’s subjective probability  is less th an  1, 
provided th a t th is  doesn’t  im ply th a t  S  act as if P  is tru e  in all his decisions. 
Thus I offer a th ird  proposal relating  acceptance and ra tional action: I t is 
som etimes ra tional to  ac t as if P  is tru e  locally, th a t  is, in a  single or lim ited 
num ber of decisions, and  th is  is w hat it m eans to  act on an  acceptance. I 
will now try  to  support th is  proposal.
To begin I will po int ou t th a t  it doesn’t  always m axim ize expected u tility  
to  perform  u tility  calculations in actual decisions, which shows th a t accuracy 
in choosing th e  a c t w ith  m ax im um  expected  u tility  isn ’t  th e  only th in g  to  
consider in choosing a decision m aking m ethod. If th a t  is so, th en  other
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less accurate  options in decision m aking m ethods som etimes have a higher 
expected u tility  th a n  calculating expected utility. I will argue th a t acting as 
if P  is tru e  is one of these, even if the  probability  of P  is less th an  1. T hen  
I will argue th a t  som etim es ra tional agents act as if P  is true.
T h a t it isn ’t  always ra tional to  calculate expected u tility  is acknowledged 
by Bayesians. Consider the  following quote from Maher:
In  m any cases it would not be ra tional to  bo ther doing a cal­
cu lation to  determ ine which option m axim izes expected utility.
So if Bayesian decision theory  held th a t  a  ra tional person would 
always do such calculations, the  theory  would be obviously incor­
rect. B u t th e  theory  does not im ply this.
To see th a t  the  theory  has no such im plication, note th a t  doing 
a  calculation to  determ ine w hat ac t m axim izes expected u tility  
is itself an  act; and this act need no t m axim ize expected utility.
For an  illustra tion , consider again th e  problem  of w hether to  take 
an  um brella. A fuller representation  of th e  acts available would 
be th e  following:
t : take um brella, w ithout calculating expected u tility  
t': go w ithou t um brella, w ithou t calculating expected 
u tility
c: C alculate the  expected u tility  of t  and  t' (w ith a view 
to  subsequently  m aking a choice th a t  is calculated to  
m axim ize expected utility)
Because th e  calculation takes tim e, it m ay well be th a t  t  or t' has 
higher expected u tility  th an  c; and if so, th e  Bayesian decision 
theo ry  itself endorses not calculating expected utility. Conversely, 
if c has higher expected u tility  th an  t  or i. th en  the  theory  holds 
th a t  it is irra tional to  do the  calculation.
If we w anted to, we could do an  expected u tility  calculation 
to  determ ine which of t, t, and c m axim izes expected u tility  . . .
(1993, 5-6)
He th en  form ulated the  decision problem  as follows:
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R ain  an d  c —* t R ain  a n d  c —* t N o ra in  and  c —* t No ra in  an d  c —* t
t C onsequence =  
ra in  an d  um bre lla  
U tility  =  2
C onsequence =  
ra in  an d  u m b re lla
U tility  =  2
C onsequence =  
no  ra in  and  um ­
b re lla
U tility  =  3
C onsequence =  
no ra in  an d  u m ­
b re lla  
U tility  =  3
t C onsequence =  
ra in  a n d  no  u m ­
bre lla
U tility  =  0
C onsequence =  
ra in  and  n o  u m ­
b re lla  
U tility  =  0
C onsequence =  
no  ra in  and  no  um ­
bre lla
U tility  =  4
C onsequence  =  
no ra in  a n d  no  u m ­
b rella  
U tility  =  4
c C onsequence =  
ra in  an d  um bre lla  
U tility  =  2 -  x
C onsequence =  
ra in  an d  no  um ­
b re lla
U tility  =  0 — x
C onsequence =  
n o  ra in  and  um ­
b re lla
U tility  =  3 — x
C onsequence =  
no ra in  a n d  no  u m ­
b re lla
U tility  =  4 — x
Here the  far left column represents possible actions, the top  row lists 
possible s ta tes  of th e  world th a t are relevant to  th e  decision, and th e  squares 
indicate the  consequence of perform ing th e  ac t in th a t  row given the  s ta te  in 
th a t  column, and th e  u tility  of th a t  consequence for the agent in question, 
“c —> t ” m eans calculating results in tak ing  the  um brella, “c —> ? ’ m eans 
th a t calculating will lead to  not tak ing  an  um brella.
Also, let:
x  =  cost of calculation 
p (ra in  and c —> t) — 0.4 
p (ra in  and c —> t) =  0.1 
p(no ra in  and  c —> t) =  0.1 
p(no ra in  and  c —> t) — 0.4
These probabilities reflect th a t  the  agent is 80% m ore likely to  have chosen the  
act w ith  the  best outcom e given each s ta te  (call these fortuitous decisions) 
if he calculates th a n  no t (this is th e  point of calculating). W ith  th e  num bers 
chosen as above, we get the  following expected utilities:
E U (t)  =  2.5 
E U (t)  =  2
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EU{c)  =  2.7 -  x
M aher concluded th a t  it is ra tional to  calculate only if the  cost of calcula­
tio n  is less th an  0.2, otherw ise t  is th e  ra tional choice. T hus if th e  cost of 
calculation is more th an  0.2, it would be irra tional to  calculate.
Two th ings are affecting w hether or not it is ra tional to  calculate, th e  cost 
of th e  calculation, and the  advantage calculating brings. T he more likely th a t 
calculating will lead to  a fortu itous decision, the  more it can cost.
To illustra te  this, suppose we change th e  probabilities to:
x  — cost of calculation 
p (ra in  and c —>t) — 0.49 
p (ra in  and c —> t) — 0.01 
p(no rain and c —> t) =  0.01 
p(no ra in  and c —> t) =  0.49
These changes reflect th a t  calculating is 98% likely to  lead to  a  fortu itous 
decision. T hen  using the  values from th e  first table:
E U {t)  =  2.5 
E U (t)  =  0.2 
E U (c) =  2.97 -  x
Here a  ra tional calculation can cost as m uch as 0.47.
T hus it isn’t  always ra tional to  calculate MEU, and w hether it is ra tional
or n o t depends on the  trade-off betw een the  cost of the calculation and the
advantage it brings. W hat does th is  m ean for my claim abou t acting on 
acceptances? This: even if an  agent assigns a proposition a  probability  of 
less th a n  1, we know th a t  if acting as if P  is true  in a  decision costs less or
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has com parable advantage in leading to  a fortuitous decision, th en  it m ay 
be more ra tional th an  calculating MEU as a decision m aking m ethod. As it
is invariably less costly th an  calculating, and as sometimes the  advantage in
m aking a  fortu itous decision by calculating M EU isn ’t  great enough to  offset 
th is  difference, we should expect th a t  som etimes it will be m ore ra tiona l to  
ac t as if P  is true.
To illustrate , le t’s include “acting  as if an  acceptance is tru e” in an  “um ­
brella” decision problem. Suppose th e  agent either accepts th a t  it will rain 
today, or th a t  it won’t. We can take th e  sam e tab le  used above to  show th a t 
calculating MEU isn’t  always ra tional and substitu te  acting as if an  accep­
tance is tru e  in its  place. Here I in terp re t acting as if an  acceptance is tru e  as
choosing in th is decision (and th is decision only) the  act th a t  has th e  highest
u tility  given th a t  the  acceptance (whichever acceptance the  agent holds) is 
true. T he result is th a t  would be th a t there would be a num ber, call it “y” 
th a t  will be the  cost of acting as if a acceptance is true  (here th e  acceptance 
will be either th a t  it will ra in  or th a t  it won’t). Call th is  act “a .” T hen  
suppose th a t:
p (ra in  and a —> t) =  0.35 
p (ra in  and a —> t) =  0.15 
p(no rain and a —> t) — 0.15 
p(no ra in  and a —> t) =  0.35
These changes reflect th a t  a is 70% likely to  lead to  a fortu itous decision (less 
th an  calculating MEU, b u t higher th an  ju s t random ly chosing t  or t). Then:
E U (t)  =  2.5 
E U (t)  =  0.2 
EU {a)  =  2.55 — y
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Here a can cost as m uch as 0.05. Suppose fu rther th a t  a costs less th an  
calculating, th a t  its  cost is, say 0.03, and th a t  calculating costs 0.55, and 
th a t  calculating is 80% likely to  lead to  a fortu itous decision (as in M aher’s 
version of th e  problem ). T hen  it would be m ore ra tional to  act as if an 
acceptance is tru e  th an  to  calculate MEU, or sim ply chose t  or t. And since 
these acts are also available to  the  agent, the  act w ith  MEU m ight be to  act 
as if an  acceptance is true. Notice also th a t the  P  need not have a probability  
of 1, ju s t as long as P ’s probability  is high enough to  make th e  probability  of 
a  fortuitous decision from  acting as if P  is tru e  (which sim ply the  probability  
of P ) high enough to  com pete w ith  calculating MEU, given th e  costs of bo th  
m ethods.
If the  above is true, th en  it is m ore ra tional to  base a t least some decisions 
on acceptances th a n  on a u tility  calculation (the num bers chosen do seem 
to  reflect possible um brella decisions). This doesn’t  show th a t  it is ra tional 
to  act as if P  is tru e  however; for acting as if P  is tru e  to  be rational, not 
only m ust it have as least as g reat an  expected u tility  as calculating MEU, 
it m ust have as least as great an  expected u tility  as any available choice. 
However, there are an  infinite num ber of different decision m aking m ethods 
(M inimax, flipping a  coin, flipping two coins, etc), m aking it impossible to  
rule out th a t  there isn ’t  ano ther m ethod w ith  higher expected u tility  th an  
acting as if P  is true. To answer the  question of w hether it is ra tional to  act 
as if P  is true, probably  th e  best we can do is com pare the  expected u tility  
of it versus o ther choices th a t  are likely to  come to  mind. However, th is also 
can get ra th e r com plicated, as there  are m any alternatives th a t  m ight come 
to  m ind, even if the  num ber is no t infinite.
Instead, I propose the  following argum ent:
(1') I t is ra tional for S  to  use a commonly used decision m aking
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m ethod in a decision, given th a t this m ethod is not defeated 
(where “defeated” m eans S  has reason to  believe th a t it won’t 
m axim ize EU) for th a t  decision.
(2') A cting as if P  is tru e  is a  common decision m aking m ethod.
(3') Therefore it is ra tional to  act as if P  is true , given th a t  th is 
m ethod is no t defeated for th a t  decision.
T he argum ent is valid. Is it sound? (1') seems plausible— we need to  make 
decisions in real tim e, and th is premise allows for this, while a t th e  sam e tim e 
allows for a decision-m aking process to  evaluated and  defeated. I believe th a t 
it follows from the  principle of placing the  burden  of proof on those who would 
deny common practice— which seems reasonable as change is costly, and there 
should be some good reason offered for change to  be im plem ented. In fact, it 
seems it would m axim ize expected u tility  to  choose an  undefeated commonly 
used m ethod of deciding instead of suspending a decision to  look for some 
other m ethod (as th e  search itself m ight be costly and  the  advantage gained 
m inim al— this definitely seems th e  case in m any of th e  everyday decisions we 
m ust make quickly).
One m ight ob ject th a t  there are com m only used decision m ethods th a t 
are clearly no t ra tiona l— for instance, people often base decisions upon ad­
vertising, an  often un trustw orthy  source of inform ation. A dm itted ly  the 
ra tionality  of th is practice is questionable, however, whenever th is m ethod 
is not rational, it is also defeated. People who are irra tional to  use this 
m ethod are people who irra tional because they  have reason to  th ink th a t 
acting on advertisem ents often doesn’t  m axim ize expected u tility  (a t least 
for the  consum er). T here is readily available inform ation th a t  indicates th a t 
advertising is often unreliable— in fact, m ost people do realize this, th a t  ad­
vertisers as in form ation  bearers have a  con flict o f  in terest th a t  is likely to  b ias  
their p resentation— and th a t  th is unreliability of advertiser’s claims results
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in lower expected utility. And I th ink  th a t o ther questionable commonly 
used decision m ethods will also have th is characteristic of being defeated.
(2') seems true, as indicated  by the  w idespread belief of philosophers and 
laym en alike th a t  we, as a fact, act on our categorical beliefs. (3') th en  
follows. T hen  if we accept:
(4') T here are m any decisions where acting as if P  is tru e  is 
undefeated.
T hen  we should accept:
(5') T here are m any decisions where acting as if P  is true  is 
rational.
As (4') is relatively obvious, (5') is well supported . Thus it is a t least some­
tim es ra tiona l to  ac t as if P  is true.
W hat th is  result m eans is th a t  som etim es it is ra tional to  act as if an 
acceptance is true. A nd we avoid the  objection  th a t  th is implies th a t  the 
agent be willing to  b e t on it a t any odds because th e  agent doesn’t  have to  
assign the  proposition he accepts a  probability  of 1. This, of course, assum es 
th a t th is  is a genuine option, for ju s t because one could construct decision 
problem s w ith  it as an  option doesn’t  prove th a t  it actually  is one. So is it?
I th ink  it is, for several reasons. F irst it is logically possible. I th ink  th a t 
M aher and others have shown th a t  acceptance isn ’t  linked to  any probability  
range— th a t I can ra tionally  accept P  doesn’t  by itself determ ine th e  proba­
bility of P , and if I also assum e th a t I can ac t as if P  is tru e  in some decisions 
and not others, th en  there is nothing incoherent abou t acting as if P  is true  
when P  is no t certain . It is simply to  choose th e  act th a t has th e  highest 
u tility  in th e  s ta te  where the  acceptance is true.
So, logically i t ’s a  possible option. Is it psychologically? I th ink  so, for 
we do act as if acceptances are tru e  all the  tim e, and  we rarely, if ever, assign
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these acceptances a  probability  of one. For instance, I accept th a t  I will be 
giving a  final exam ination  in one hour. So I decide to  leave for th e  exam  
location in 45 m inutes (I also accept th a t  it will take about 5 m inutes to  get 
there). O f course, I w ouldn’t  bet on either of the  above propositions a t any 
odds, nor do I assign either of them  a probability  of one. B ut in my decision 
I sim ply chose th e  act th a t  to  me seems to  result in the  highest u tility  given 
their tru th . I could th ink  about how probable these propositions are, and 
th ink  abou t th e  consequences of various actions if they  are true, and if they  
are false, and th ink  abou t which action  has th e  highest MEU, bu t who in 
real life would do such a  thing? F urther exam ples like th is one are easy to  
make.
3.2.1 D ecision  Levels
Consider ano ther quo tation  from M aher:
T he second objection I wish to  address is this: Suppose ac­
ceptance of A  maximizes expected utility, and  th a t I do accept 
it. T hen  according to  the  theory  I have outlined, I have done the 
ra tiona l thing. B ut suppose th a t I accepted A  for some irrele­
vant reason; perhaps I ju s t picked it random ly and it was a  fluke 
th a t  I happened to  pick the  proposition th a t maximizes expected 
cognitive utility. Then, the  objection claims, my acceptance of A  
was irra tional, even though it m axim izes expected u tility  . . .  Let 
us suppose th a t I can choose w hat to  accept by a process th a t  I 
regard  as random . I hold th a t th is  would no t be irrational unless 
the  random  process had some positive chance of resulting in me 
accepting som ething w ith lower expected u tility  th an  A. B ut in 
th a t  case, th e  expected u tility  of random ly choosing w hat to  ac­
cept is less th an  the  expected u tility  of d irectly  accepting A.  T his 
is so even if, as luck would have it, th e  random  m ethod results in 
me accepting A.  For the  expected u tility  of random ly deciding 
w hat to  accept is a  m ixture of the  expected utilities of the  various 
propositions th a t  I m ight accept by th is m ethod, and in the case 
we are dealing w ith, th is m ust be less th an  th e  expected u tility  
of A.  Thus m y theory  of ra tiona l acceptance adequately explains
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the  irra tionality  involved in accepting A  as the  result of a  random  
process. (1993, 148-149)
Here M aher is responding to  an  objection to  his version of BTR.A, b u t his 
observations apply to  decisions in general. According to  M aher, Bayesian 
decision theory  (here applied to  ra tiona l acceptance) need not say th a t  th is 
person is ra tional because th e  choice itself maximizes expected utility, for his 
method  of choosing is not ra tiona l— it is unlikely th a t random  selection will 
lead to  choosing the  action w ith  MEU.
W h at the  above indicates is th a t  a description of a decision isn ’t  com plete 
until it considers all the  available choices, and some of these will include 
different m ethods of m aking decisions. Turning back to  M aher’s um brella 
decision problem , we see th a t  th e  choices th a t the  agent has a ren ’t  lim ited 
to  tak ing  or not tak ing  an um brella, b u t also include calculating MEU and 
choosing the  option th a t  procedure recommends.
“A cting as if an  acceptance is tru e” is ano ther of these m ethods. T hus it 
could be com pared to  calculating M EU, and if its  expected u tility  is greater 
th a n  calculating MEU, or any o ther available option, then  it would be ra tio ­
nal to  act as if an  acceptance is true.
A way to  describe the  above is to  speak of decision levels. O ne can make 
a  decision, and one can make a  decision abou t how to  make a  decision. Let 
us call th e  first type first order decisions, and th e  second ty p e  second order 
decisions.1 Corresponding to  decision levels are levels of rationality , to  be 
first, order rational is to  m ake a  first order decision w ith first order MEU, 
to  be second order rational is to  m ake a  second order decision w ith  second 
order M EU, and so on, where:
An action A  has n-Order M E U  = * ,/ T here are no o ther avail- 
T will be using “order” and “level” interchangeably.
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able choices in th e  n-order decision problem  w ith higher expected 
u tility  th a n  A.
W ith  these definitions I can describe w hat is going on in M aher’s exam ple— 
the  person is indeed first order rational, b u t he is no t second order rational. 
In his second order decision he chose a m ethod w ith  less th an  M EU, the 
random  selection m ethod. I t would have been b e tte r  for him  to  have not 
m ade th e  second order decision in th e  first place, and went directly  to  the  
first order decision.
Of course, w hat I m ean by “no t have m ade the second order decision” is 
to  no t have consciously m ade th is decision— a decision is always im plied in 
th a t  even if he directly decided to  accept th e  proposition, it would be im plied 
th a t  he decided not to  choose a  random  m ethod. In o ther words, his choice 
of acts a t th e  second level could be described as w hether or no t to  use a 
random  m ethod to  decide w hether to  accept A.  One can evaluate decisions 
th a t  are m erely im plied as well as those consciously made.
One can always speak of fu rther levels of decisions, one can decide how to 
decide, and one can decide how to  decide how to  decide, etc. I th in k  th a t  it 
is intuitively correct to  say th a t  higher order rationality  trum ps lower order 
ra tionality  (th a t is, if an  agent perform s th e  higher order decision, ra tionality  
a t th a t  level trum ps conflicting decisions a t lower levels), for th e  higher the 
order of rationality, the  g reater the  im pact the  decision will have, as higher 
order decisions are decisions abou t how to  make lower order decisions. This 
ordering of priority  explains why we would say th a t  the  agent in th e  previous 
quote is irrational, for he is irra tional a t a  higher level, even though  he is not 
a t the  lowest. T he priority  of higher levels implies th a t  MEU a t lower orders 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality.
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I can th ink  of two objections to  in terpreting  decisions in term s of decision 
levels. T he first involves an  infinite regress of levels. If any decision D  implies 
th a t  there is ano ther decision D'  regarding how to  make it, th en  an  infinite 
regress th reatens.
T his regress is apparen tly  analogous to  the  epistem ic regress problem: if 
we require th a t  each justified belief be supported  by another justified belief, 
th en  the  support chain will go on to  infinity. A nother apparen t analogy re­
lates to  goals, if we require th a t  there be a ra tional purpose for every rational 
goal, then  as purposes are  th e  sam e as goals, each ra tional purpose will re­
quire a further ra tiona l purpose, im plying an infinite regress. R egarding the 
regress of goals, A risto tle argued th a t to  avoid th is regress there m ust be 
an  u ltim ate goal th a t  is th e  goal of all o ther goals (E N  20). O f course, we 
need not assum e th a t there  is only one u ltim ate  goal, there m ay be m ultiple 
u ltim ate goals. B u t th e  solution th en  denies th a t  all justified goals m ust have 
fu rther goals a t which th ey  are aimed. So A risto tle’s solution is to  deny th a t 
each goal m ust be aim ed a t a  fu rther goal.
In epistemology there is an  analogous solution, which is to  deny th a t 
every justified belief m ust be supported  by ano ther justified belief: the foun-  
dationalist solution. A risto tle’s solution to  th e  regress of justified goals could 
also be called a foundationalist solution.
There are o ther possibilities as well, there is the  fam iliar coherentist so­
lution, where justified  beliefs or goals are justified because th ey  are placed 
in a circle or web of coherent beliefs/goals.
R ather th an  engage in th is ra th e r long and well-known debate, I suggest 
th a t  the  regress of decisions levels, if it is a  real problem  (which depends, as I 
will argue, upon it really being analogous to  the  epistem ic regress problem), 
isn ’t  a special problem  for m ulti-level decision theory. And if either of the
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above solutions work for goals or beliefs, th en  we have some reason to  th ink  
th a t it could work for decision levels as well.
B ut there is a disanalogy between the  regress in decision levels and the  
regress in justified beliefs/goals, justification. B oth  the  epistem ic and the 
goal regress problem s are generated because of th e  justification requirem ent, 
which in these two problem s involves support of o ther justified beliefs or 
goals. Thus for a  person to  have a justified belief/goal, we end up w ith  the  
em barrassing requirem ent of an infinite series of justified supporting  goals 
and beliefs. This seems to  be the  problem  w ith  these two regresses.
However w ith  th e  decision level regress, we do no t require th a t each de­
cision be justified because it has MEU for a higher level decision. All th a t  
I claim is th a t  higher order M EU trum ps lower order MEU, not th a t  ra tio ­
nal (rational being th e  analogous term  to  justification  in the  epistem ic/goal 
regresses) lower order decisions m ust be supported  by actual ra tional higher 
order decisions. W h at I m ean by th is is th a t  if an  agent considers a higher or­
der decision, th e  choice a t th a t  decision, if it is ra tional a t th a t  level, trum ps 
conflicting decisions a t lower levels.
Notice th a t  a m ere logical regress isn’t  a problem , we could always th ink  
of another belief th a t  could support a  particu lar belief, or another goal th a t  
could justify  ano ther goal, th is doesn’t  seem problem atic. In the  same way 
th e  fact th a t  we could th in k  of fu rther decisions a t higher levels isn’t  itself 
problem atic. I t becomes problem atic when we m ake being ra tional a t these 
levels depend upon m aking ra tional higher order decisions.
Yet even if th e  regress rem ains a problem , we could still borrow  from the 
foundationalists: for a  “foundationalist” solution we could say th a t there is 
a  highest order choice th a t  is not justified by having MEU for a still higher 
decision. Perhaps th is  would be a  very general decision, related  to  perhaps
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ultim ate  goals (e.g., to  act in a way th a t  is m ost rational, or the  best, e tc).2
T he second problem  is th a t  according to  Bayesian decision theory, deci­
sion problem s need to  include all the available decisions. However n-level 
decision problem s only include decisions a t a level n.  T he reason for th is 
requirem ent is th a t  we consider a person ra tiona l when he chooses the  best 
option ou t of all available options.
To avoid th is  problem , why not th in k  ab o u t it in term s of th is question: 
O f n-level decision options A, B, and C, which of them  is the  m ost rational? 
T he answer doesn’t  tell us th a t  A, for instance, is rational , bu t it does tell us 
th a t  it is m ore ra tional th an  B or C. Isn ’t  th a t  an  interesting result? W hen 
we refer to  n -o rder rationality, we are not saying th a t the choice is ra tional 
in an  unqualified way. T he requirem ent th a t  all available acts be in th e  acts 
p artitio n  is only for ra tionality  th a t  isn ’t  qualified in this way.
3.2.2 C om paring D ecision  M aking M eth od s U sin g  
H igher Order D ecisions
L et’s reconsider th e  um brella decision problem , where there is the  choice 
between tak ing  an  um brella, not tak ing  an  um brella, and calculating expected 
utility  w ith  th e  in ten tion  of choosing th e  act w ith  MEU. L et’s also again 
assum e th a t:
2The “coherentist” solution, that higher order levels are justified by cohering with a 
network of other decisions at various levels, doesn’t seem to work. By “cohering” I mean
th a t  ea ch  d e c is io n  d o e s n ’t  im p ly  th a t  th e  a g en t ch o se  so m e th in g  in  a  d ifferen t d e c is io n
that doesn’t have MEU. I don’t think this solution works because it seems there can be 
and are rational level conflicts (like the one in the quote), and in these conflicts higher 
order decisions trump lower level decisions.
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x  — cost of calculation 
p (ra in  andc —> t) =  0.4 
p (ra in  and c—> it) — 0.1 
p(no ra in  and c —» t) =  0.1 
p(no ra in  and  c —> t) — 0.4
T hen  th e  expected utilities are:
EU{t )  =  2.5 
E U ( t )  =  2 
EU(c)  =  2.7 -  x
It would be ra tiona l to  calculate ju s t in  case th e  cost of calculation is equal 
to  or less th a n  0.2.
These results are more general— we could su b stitu te  any m ethod for c, 
ju s t as long as we ad justed  the  probabilities of m aking the best decision to  
fit th a t  m ethod. In an earlier section we su b stitu ted  acting as if P  is tru e , 
and supplied some relatively a rb itra ry  values. We th en  com pared m ethods. 
T here is ano ther way to  express th is com parison— as a second order decision. 
We could set up  a  decision problem  where first order choices (such as t  and  t) 
are excluded. T he relevant sta tes here would be w hether or not each m ethod 
leads to  m aking a  first order choice w ith  M EU .3 If we were to  com pare the  
m ethods of calculating MEU and acting as if P  is tru e  in this way, we would
3 One could also use in place of MEU the utility of making a fortuitous decision—it was 
likelihood of making fortuitous decisions that was the basis for the “advantage factor” used 
by Maher and myself (for the sake of continuity) in the last section. To remind ourselves, 
a fortuitous choice is the choice that is best given the state that actually obtains. Thus 
which choice is fortuitous depends on which state actually obtains. MEU doesn’t have this 
dependence. Because of this, I prefer using MEU. I don’t think anything in my argument 
turns on this difference—similar results obtain from calculating either way.
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have a tab le  like the  following: As before, let “c” =  calculate M EU, “a” =  
act as if P  is true.
Si
c leads to  M EU  
a  leads to  M EU
S2
c leads to  M EU  
a  d o e sn ’t  lead  to  
M EU
S3
c d o e sn ’t  lead  to  
M EU
a  leads to  M EU
s 4
c  d o e sn ’t  lead  to  
M EU
a  d o e sn ’t  lead  to  
M EU
c M E U - x M E U - x M E U - x - I M E U - x - I
a M E U -y M E U —y — m M E U - y M E U —y  — m
Here “Z” and “to” stand  for th e  loss of not m aking a decision w ith  MEU 
(for c and a respectively), “x ” is th e  cost of calculation, “y” is th e  cost of 
acting  as if P  is true. Then:
E U ( C )  =  p(S i  V S 2) ( M E U  -  x ) + p ( S 3 V S 4) ( M E U  - x - I )  
E U ( A ) =  p (S i V S 3) ( M E U  -  y ) + p { S 2 V S 4) ( M E U  - y - m )
T hen  it would be ra tional to  ac t as if P  is tru e  iff (some algebra allows for 
th e  term  MEU to  drop out):
y  +  (p{S 2) +  p ( S 4) ) m  < x  +  (p ( S 3) +  p (S 4))l
Using th e  disjunct rule we have:
y  + p ( S 2 V S 4)m  < x  +  p ( S 3 V S 4)l
Here p ( S 2 V S 4) is ju s t the  probability  th a t  acting as if P  is tru e  won’t 
lead to  an  first order choice w ith  MEU, and p ( S 3 V S 4) is th e  probability  
th a t  calculating won’t  lead to  a  first order choice (choices in th e  first order 
decision) w ith  MEU. Thus acting as if P  is tru e  will have M EU a t th e  second 
level if and only if its cost plus th e  product of the  probability  th a t this 
m ethod  won’t  lead to  a  first order choice w ith  MEU and w hatever loss th a t  
involves is less th an  or equal to  th e  cost of calculating MEU plus th e  product 
of th e  probability  th a t  calculating M EU won’t  lead to  a first order choice 
w ith  M EU and w hatever loss th a t  involves. As before, we notice th a t  the
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situations where acting as if P  is tru e  is more ra tional th an  calculating MEU 
are those where the  cost of acting as if P  is tru e  is low, the  probability  of 
m aking th e  choice w ith M EU is high w ith  th is m ethod, the  cost of calculating 
is high, and the  likelihood of choosing an act w ith  MEU given th e  calculation 
isn ’t  m uch higher th an  acting  as if P  is true . Also, the cost of calculating 
M EU (which will v irtually  always be higher th an  acting as if P  is true) will 
p rohib it calculating when th e  decision is so triv ial th a t  any advantage gained 
by calculating is more th an  offset by th e  cost of calculating.
W ith  th is way of deciding a person m ay rationally  choose to  act as if 
P  is tru e  ra th e r th an  calculating M EU, even if doing so actually  leads to  
choosing a first order action th a t  doesn’t have first order M EU—ju st as the 
ac t w ith  first order M EU m ay not be th e  ac t th a t  is best given the  s ta te  
th a t  ac tually  obtains. R ational second order decisions are ra tiona l decisions 
under uncertainty, ju s t like first order decisions are.
Perhaps a useful way to  th ink  ab o u t th e  above com parison is to  consider 
it analogous to  act and rule u tilitarian ism . Rule u tilitarian ism  som etim es 
indicates an  action th a t  will not, in th e  short term , lead to  th e  greatest 
aggregate happiness, ju s t as long as the  act is perm itted  by rules th a t, if 
followed, m axim ize aggregate happiness in the  long run. T his seems plausible 
because sometimes there are conflicts between w hat is best in th is particu lar 
case, and w hat is best in th e  long run. Second order ra tionality  is akin to  
rule u tilitarian ism  and first order ra tionality  is akin to  act u tilitarian ism  in 
th a t  second order ra tionality  governs m any decisions over tim e, first order 
ra tionality  governs only specific decisions.
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3.2 .3  T he Significance o f Level C onflicts
Strictly  speaking, th e  position th a t it is som etimes ra tional to  ac t as if P  is 
tru e  isn’t  incom patible w ith  Jeffrey’s position discussed in an earlier section— 
Jeffrey could agree th a t  acting as if P  is tru e  is ra tiona l if doing so leads to  
an  act w ith M EU, it is only irra tional when acting as if P  is tru e  doesn’t. 
Thus acting as if P  is tru e  across the  board  is irra tional because it will likely 
lead to  decisions where acting as if P  is tru e  w on’t  lead to  an  ac t w ith  first 
order MEU. If th is is true , th en  Jeffrey’s objection to  R udner would stand, 
for the  only tim e it is ra tiona l to  act on an  acceptance are tim es when it 
would lead to  the  sam e choice as calculating M EU. If th is is the  case, then  
one m ight argue th a t  w hat we ra tionally  do doesn’t  really depend on w hat 
we accept, b u t on w hat action has th e  MEU. However, if it is ra tional to  act 
as if P  is true, even when it doesn’t  lead to  an  act w ith first order MEU, 
then  the  ra tional significance of accepting P  would obviously be greater, and 
w hat we rationally  do does depend on w hat we accept (and not ju s t on w hat 
act has highest first order M EU).
If the above is true, th en  our ra tional decisions depend a t least partly  on 
w hat we accept, th a t  is, our acceptances affect the  ra tionality  of our decisions. 
It then  follows th a t  deciding w hat we accept implies th a t  we make specific 
choices in o ther decisions. W hen one decides to  accept P ,  one is m aking a 
host of o ther decisions a t the  sam e tim e. If th is  is so, then  it seems obvious 
th a t  a ra tional person would consider the  effect accepting P  will have on 
her o ther decisions when she decides w hether or no t to  accept P . T his was 
the  basic in tu ition  behind M avrodes’ m eatloaf exam ple in  chapter two, arid 
behind R udner’s claim  th a t  scientists make value judgm ents when they  offer 
propositions for acceptance.
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T here is a resulting com plication th a t should be addressed: If B TRA  
dem ands th a t  we exam ine the  behavioral consequences of w hat we accept in 
deciding w hether or no t to  accept P,  w ouldn’t  the  decision m aking procedure 
of “acting as if P  is tru e” be even m ore tim e consum ing th a t calculating 
MEU. If th a t  is so, th en  th e  argum ent th a t calculating M EU is too  costly to  
be ra tional could also be applied to  “acting as if P  is tru e .” Isn ’t  the  above 
even more tim e consum ing?
In  reply, I do no t claim  th a t an  acceptance of P  is ra tional only if an  agent 
considers all th e  consequences th a t accepting P  will have on his decisions. 
B TR A  isn’t  a  decision m aking procedure, i t ’s a criterion for the  ra tionality  
of acceptances. However, one could reply, “All th a t  Bayesians are claiming 
is th a t  MEU is a  criterion  for the  ra tionality  of decisions, no t a procedure for 
m aking them , yet you argue th a t  accepting P  as tru e  is ra tional because of the 
irra tionality  of ac tually  calculating MEU in decisions. C ouldn’t  Bayesians 
apply the  sam e reasoning to  escape your argum ent?”
Of course M EU isn’t  a  decision m aking procedure, i t ’s a criterion. B ut 
th a t  is com patible w ith  all th a t  I have argued, for th e  Bayesian Challenge 
implies a  denial th a t  it is reasonable to  act as if an  acceptance is true. My 
reply th a t calculating M EU isn ’t  always ra tiona l is aimed a t answering the 
im plication of th e  Bayesian Challenge regarding acting  on acceptances, it 
doesn’t  in any way im ply th a t  MEU isn ’t  the  criterion  for ra tional decisions. 
In the  sam e way, ju s t because it isn’t  always ra tional to  consider all the 
im plications of holding P  doesn’t  im ply th a t B T R A  isn’t  th e  criterion for 
ra tional acceptance.
T hen where does B T R A  come in practically? It comes in when there is 
an  im portan t acceptance under consideration, and  when we are exam ining 
the  ra tionality  of im p o rtan t higher order a ttitu d e s  (more on the  la tte r in
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the  last chapter). W hen we are discussing w hether accepting P  is rational, 
understanding  th e  criterion for ra tional acceptance aids in judgm ent, ju s t 
as understand ing  M EU aids in the  judgm ent of the  ra tionality  of im p o rtan t 
decisions.
Having defended acting on acceptances, m y next task  is to  fill in my 
account of the  u tility  function to  be used in B TRA ; to  this I tu rn .
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C hapter 4 
U tility  Functions
In th is chap ter I take up the  task  of distinguishing epistemic and practical 
utility, and offer an account for the  general ra tionality  of belief.
4.1 Epistem ic U tility
An epistem ic u tility  function assigns epistem ic u tility  values to  outcom es of 
acceptances. M ost of the  decision theorists who have tried  to  form ulate such 
a function considered only two outcom es for acts of acceptance, perform ing 
the  act w hen P  is true, or when P  is false (these include those of Hempel, 
Levi, Lehrer, and others developed from these functions). This is too  simple, 
for false beliefs can vary in value, depending on how far they  are from being 
true. For instance, th e  false belief th a t  7r =  3.15 is surely of g reater epistem ic 
value th an  th e  belief th a t  n  =  22. T hus the  relevant states of the  world which, 
given th e  acts, generate the  consequences, will include m ore th an  ju s t the 
tru th  or falsity of P — they  will include a  s ta te  for each distance P  is from 
the  tru th .
M aher (1993) used the  term  “cognitive u tility ” to  refer to  the  u tility  as­
sociated w ith  acceptances. However, as he held th a t  acceptance is irrelevant 
to  ra tional action, the  consequences of acceptances are not practical (except 
for th e  ra re  occasions w here p rac tica l u tility  is d irec tly  tied  to  h o ld ing  a 
belief—suppose someone pu ts  a  gun to  m y head and th rea tens to  kill m e if
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I d o n ’t  believe in G od), and cognitive u tility  will generally exclude practical 
utility. However, as I do th ink  acceptances are relevant to  ra tiona l action, 
and  will be discussing b o th  practical and epistem ic u tility  for acceptances, it 
seems more felicitous to  ju s t use these two term s and omit use of “cognitive 
u tility .”
W illiam  A lston (1989, 83-84) concisely sum m arized th e  trad itio n a l view 
of epistem ic value when he described the  “epistem ic point of view” which 
“is defined by the  aim  of m axim izing tru th  and minimizing falsity in a  large 
body  of beliefs.” I ’m not sure how im portan t the  last requirem ent is, for 
having a  large body of beliefs would only be valuable if th e  beliefs were by 
and  large true. Perhaps he m eans th a t if one had to  chose betw een two belief 
system s w ith  the  same tru th  to  falsehood ratio , w ith one containing more 
beliefs th an  the  other, we should choose the  larger system, all o ther th ings 
equal. However, th is is ju s t ano ther way of expressing the value of believing 
tru th s . I propose th en  th a t  it is sim pler and ju s t as comprehensive to  restric t 
ourselves to  th e  two goals of m axim izing tru th s  and minimizing falsehoods.
T his way of defining th e  goals needs some refinement. F irst, beliefs vary 
in  the  am ount of content they  possess. Suppose I accept bo th  P  and  Q, 
which are bo th  true. Suppose Fred accepts the  conjunction P.Q.  Here I 
accept two tru e  beliefs, whereas Fred accepts one. Yet our acceptances are 
logically equivalent. C learly m y epistem ic situation  isn ’t superior to  F red’s.
W h at makes one belief w orth  as m uch as two is th a t  the  single belief th a t  
Fred has contains the  sam e content  as my two beliefs p u t together. T hus we 
need a  way to  m easure the  content  of beliefs. Beliefs w ith higher content are 
w orth  more when true.
T he epistem ic u tility  of P  in  each s ta te  varies w ith the  content level of 
P — if P  is true, the  content value of P  determ ines the u tility  of P,  whereas if
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P  is some distance from th e  tru th , the  content value, along w ith  th e  d istance 
P  is from the  tru th , determ ines the  epistem ic value of P.
4.1 .1  C ontent 
Probability and Content
C ontent m ight be quantified by m easures of inform ation. T he stan d ard  ac­
count is to  th ink  th a t  th e  inform ation content of a proposition varies inversely 
w ith  its  probability. Two possible functions th a t describe th is  relationship 
are (M aher 1993, 234):
C ( P )  = l - p ( P )
C ( P )  =  - lo g  2p(P )
These functions reflect th e  in tu ition  th a t lower probability  propositions 
tell us more th an  those of higher probability— th e  m ore a  proposition specifies 
the  exact s ta te  of th e  world th e  lower its probability  m ust be, and vice versa.
M aher (1993, 234-237) offered reasons against th is view. If these func­
tions use objective probabilities, th en  they  are subject to  th e  sam e difficulties 
th a t  accounts of objective probability  face.1 However, if they  use subjective 
probabilities they  would com m it a  ra tiona l person to  assign lower content val­
ues to  propositions as he gains evidence th a t confirms them — a resu lt th a t  
seems counter-intuitive a t best. Also, if we adopt either of these functions 
the  axioms of probability  entail th a t  th e  inform ation content of th e  conjunc­
tion  of two propositions never exceeds the  sum  of the  individual inform ation 
contents of these propositions. M aher argued th a t th is isn’t  always th e  case,
1 When Betting on Theories was written, Maher agreed with the general consensus 
that prospects for a measure of logical probability were poor. He no longer shares this 
pessimism, however, this doesn’t eliminate other arguments against using probabilities as 
a measure of content.
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and th a t som etim es th e  inform ation in a conjunction is greater th an  the  sum  
of inform ation in each of the  conjuncts taken  separately— suppose th a t a 
physicist is in terested  in th e  d istance between two bodies, th e  inform ation 
contained in the  conjunction of the  positions of the  bodies is w orth m ore th an  
th e  sum of the  inform ation of each of the  positions taken  separately. M aher 
concluded th a t a  m easure of inform ation shouldn’t  involve probability.
I ’d  like to  add to  th is  th a t  it seems th a t  content is a different sort of 
th ing th an  probability, probability  is e ither an epistem ic (inductive) or psy­
chological (subjective) notion, content is a sem antic one.2 R egarding induc­
tive probabilities, although propositions th a t say a  lot abou t the  world are 
usually less justified th a n  those th a t  say less, th is relationship isn’t  a logi­
cal necessity. And th e  sam e seems even more obviously tru e  for subjective 
probabilities: propositions th a t  say m ore aren ’t  always believed less strongly. 
T hus high content can ’t  ju s t m ean merely a low probability. To say th a t it is 
would be to  conflate e ither epistem ic or psychological and sem antic concepts. 
Given these objections I suggest looking elsewhere for a content measure.
L ev i
Levi (1967, 68-74) offered an  alternative account of content. In th is account 
an  investigator considers w hat he takes to  be m axim ally specific (and mu­
tually  exclusive) answers to  his question. From these answers he constructs 
an  u ltim ate p artitio n  U  of which the  m axim ally specific answers are ele­
m ents. He then  considers as answers to  his question hypotheses (H ) th a t  are 
disjuncts of these elements.
Levi argued th a t th e  content value of each of th e  elem ents of the  partition
2Unless one is speaking of even more controversial physical probabilities, then the 
notion is a physical one, which doesn’t really avoid the difficulty, physical is not the same 
as semantic.
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is equal, as no elem ent has more content th an  ano ther if these elem ents are 
all m axim ally specific answers to  the  question. T he content of H  then  varies 
inversely w ith  the  num ber of disjuncts it contains. If H  contains them  all, 
then  it is a tautology, and  has no content. If it contains a contradiction, it 
has, by convention, a content value of 1. Generally, th e  content of H  will be 
(when H  is not a contradiction):
co n t(if)  =  (n  — m ) / n  , where n  is the  num ber of to ta l elem ents
in U, and m  is the  num ber of elem ents th a t  are disjuncts in / / .
T hus the  content of a proposition on Levi’s view is a  function of w hat an 
investigator considers to  be the  strongest (m ost specific) answers to  his par­
ticular question— it becomes investigation-relative. T his p artitio n  will be 
constructed  relative to  the  dem ands of the  investigator for inform ation in 
that  investigation. Levi th en  proposed a decision theoretic account of ra­
tional acceptance in which a  person should believe so th a t  he maximizes 
expected epistem ic utility, where the  epistem ic u tility  of a  proposition is a 
function of its content and  tru th  value.
M aher (1993, 156-157) claimed th a t  Levi’s m easure implies th a t  a  person 
could accept two contradictory  propositions: it m ight be th e  case th a t  rela­
tive to  the  p artitio n  in  one investigation S  should accept H,  while relative 
to  th e  p artitio n  of a  different investigation S  should accept H .  As M aher 
holds th a t an  account of ra tional acceptance should not im ply th a t we should 
accept contrad ictory  propositions, he rejects th is  account . However, some­
th ing  of th is account can be saved from th is objection: we could say th a t 
a cognitive agent has a  ultimate partition , a single p artitio n  th a t  applies to  
all cognitive decisions for S.  S”s general dem ands for inform ation are taken 
into account for th is  partition . Of course, specifying th is p a rtitio n  would be 
an  alm ost im possible project, b u t in its sp irit is a sim pler one: construct
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partitions as Levi proposes, and when contrad ictory  acceptances arise, one 
reopens th e  investigations, and considers a  p a rtitio n  to  be used for bo th  th a t  
includes all th e  strongest answers to  b o th  questions (relative to  his dem ands 
for inform ation). This process will involve, of course, a revision of w hat S  
considers im p o rtan t in his dem and for inform ation, for it is u ltim ately  con­
flicts in these dem ands th a t  lead to  such contradictions in the  first place. As 
th is  process continues, S  develops more and  m ore general partitions, and a 
m ore coherent general system  of dem ands for inform ation.
To illustra te , suppose we take Levi’s exam ple in which the  investigator 
is in terested  in th e  results of an  election w ith  th ree  candidates, X, Y, and 
Z (1967, 56ff.). In th is example the  investigator considers the  m axim ally 
specific answers to  be the  partition  {X wins, Y  wins, Z wins}. Hypotheses 
will take th e  form of disjuncts of th e  elem ents of th is partition . However, 
in ano ther context the  investigator m ight only care abou t w hether or no t 
X wins, in  th is  case his partition  would be (X  wins, X doesn’t  win}. On 
Levi’s view, th e  content of the  s ta te  “X wins” is higher th an  its negation “X 
doesn’t  win” (which is the  disjunction of th e  last two elements in th e  first set) 
in the  first partition , b u t not in the second. T hus w ith  the same probabilities 
for X winning, it m ight tu rn  ou t th a t  th e  investigator accepts th a t  X wins 
in the  first instance, and accepts th a t  X doesn’t  win in the  second, due to  
differences in utilities.
P resum ably  one of the  above investigations occurs before th e  o ther— let 
us suppose th a t  they  occur in the  order th ey  appear in the  above paragraph. 
If th is is so, th en  the  second investigation will cause the  investigator to  
exam ine w hat values are really im portan t to  him  in the  long run, come up 
w ith  a single s ta tes  partition  th a t  works for b o th  investigations and best 
serves these values, and decide w hat to  accept accordingly. T hrough th is
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revised s ta tes  p artitio n  the  contradiction would be resolved. And over the  
course of tim e the  ag en t’s set of sta tes partitions will become more and  m ore 
coherent, approaching an u ltim ate partition  containing all th e  different sta tes  
of in terest to  the  agent. I t would be th rough  th is partition  th a t  th e  agent 
could hope for a com pletely coherent set of beliefs. I th ink  th a t th is  approach 
fits w hat we do in ordinary  practice— we all have contradictions in our belief 
system s, and only gradually  do we resolve some of them . As we do th is  we 
understand  m ore clearly w hat we value intellectually, as these goals direct 
the  investigations th a t  bring contradictions to  light in the  first place.
Maher
M aher (1993, 231-233) used verisim ilitude to  m easure content— the content 
of proposition A  is th e  verisim ilitude A  would have if A  were true. In  ex­
p licating verisim ilitude, M aher rejected previous a ttem p ts  a t specifying a 
single verisim ilitude function for propositions.3 Instead  he proposed th a t we 
adop t a  subjective approach tow ard verisim ilitude, as how close to  th e  whole 
t ru th  a proposition is depends on th e  aspects in which a  proposition differs 
from th e  tru th , and how im portan t those aspects are to  us relative to  o ther 
aspects. These in tu rn  will depend on each of our sets of intellectual values.
His subjective approach is sim ply to  identify verisim ilitude w ith  a norm al­
ized scientific u tility  function, which, in tu rn , depends on a person’s cognitive 
preferences. Here the  content of P  is identified w ith  the  cognitive u tility  of 
P  if it were true. A scientific u tility  function  is a cognitive u tility  func­
tion  th a t  represents scientific values. As cognitive u tility  functions are taken  
to  include any u tility  function th a t can be used to  represent cognitive acts 
(w hether or not th is  function represents scientific values), scientific u tility
3These include the Popper’s measure (1993, 220-227).
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functions include only a subset of cognitive u tility  functions.
According to  M aher, scientific u tility  functions m ust respect scientific 
values. T he constrain ts include not placing more value on th e  consequence 
of accepting a contradiction th a n  on a tautology, of the  value of a  proposition 
being th e  same for each of the  possible ways it is true, th a t  m ore inform ative 
tru th s  are w orth m ore th a n  less inform ative ones, and th a t  t ru th  is w orth 
m ore th an  falsehood (1993, 210-216). These, along w ith  th e  constrain ts 
required by his representa tion  theorem  for cognitive utility, are the  only 
constra in ts on scientific u tility  functions described by M aher. T his allows 
for scientific u tility  functions to  vary (w ithin these constrain ts), which is 
plausible on M aher’s view, as he doubted  th a t  “any conditions on a  scientific 
u tility  function could be so strong  as to  identify an  essentially unique u tility  
function as scientific.” W hat I m ean by “epistem ic u tility  function” is m ore 
or less the  same as w hat M aher m eant by “scientific u tility  function.” T he 
above values are the  values of scientific investigations, bu t th ey  are also th e  
values of serious intellectual inquiry as well.
I th ink  th a t  there is an  advantage and  a  disadvantage to  th e  verisimili­
tu d e  approach for defining content. T he advantage is th a t  it allows for false 
propositions to  have different epistem ic values (through factoring in d istance 
from  tru th ) . T he use of verisim ilitude accom m odates th is reasonable vari­
ability. T he disadvantage is th a t  it leaves no way of assigning content values 
w ithou t already speaking of th e  epistem ic u tility  of a proposition as a  whole. 
I prefer an  approach th a t allows for a content assignm ent th a t  could be m ade 
independently, m y reason being a desire for m ore of a “ground u p ” approach 
th a t  allows the  elucidation of a t least some of the  com ponents of th e  func­
tio n  separately. Also th e  notion of content seems to  make sense ap a rt from 
th e  notion of epistem ic utility. T hus I th in k  th a t  though M aher’s view isn’t
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incorrect, more can be added.
Levi proposed a system  th a t allows for content to  be determ ined ap a rt 
from epistem ic utility. His system  doesn’t  have th e  weaknesses th a t caused 
M aher to  reject o ther objective notions of content: it is no t based on proba­
bility, and it doesn’t  assum e one content m easure for every person. N either 
is it syntactical (avoiding objections leveled a t syntactic a ttem p ts  a t defining 
co n ten t). It has a subjective com ponent th a t  allows for individual differences 
in epistem ic values. And as I argued before the  objections to  it from M aher 
are a t least p rim a facie answerable. For these reasons I propose th a t  we 
adop t Levi’s content m easure.
However, Levi’s m easure of epistem ic u tility  is not acceptable by itself in 
th a t  it doesn’t  allow false theories to  vary in epistem ic value. For th is I ’ll 
re tu rn  to  M aher.
Corpora
However, there is one last th ing  I should include before leaving content, th a t  
is the  notion of corpora. M aher (1993, 142-143) argued th a t as the  content 
of a  conjunction of beliefs m ay not be sim ply th e  sum  of the  contents of 
th e  conjuncts taken separately, it is more accurate  to  refer to  a  person’s 
system  of acceptances as a  whole: we can th ink  of all of th e  acceptances in 
a person’s belief system  as one long acceptance, th a t  is, as a conjunction 
of all the individual acceptances in the  system. Call th is conjunction K ,  
which is the  corpus of all th e  beliefs he has. W hen a person either accepts 
a new belief or rejects a belief already accepted, we can say th a t the  person 
has replaced K  w ith  ano ther acceptance, H,  th a t  includes th e  new belief or 
excludes the  rejected belief. T he corpus approach can of course be applied 
to  B TR A  (M aher applied it to  his version of BTRA ).
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4.1 .2  D istan ce  from  Truth
Verisimilitude, as defined by Popper (1972), is th e  d istance a proposition is 
from the  whole tru th , th a t  is, its  d istance from a  proposition th a t  com pletely 
and correctly describes all th a t  is true. However, th is  notion overlaps w ith 
th a t of content in th a t  it is concerned not only w ith  to  w hat degree a s ta te ­
m ent is false, b u t also w ith  how much  of the  t ru th  is captured. We w ant a 
way to  describe distance from tru th  ap art from content th a t  we can add to  
our account of content. How could we m easure d istance from tru th ?  If we 
adopt Levi’s use of u ltim ate  partitions, propositions will be disjunctions of 
elem ents of the  partitio n , w ith  true  propositions including th e  tru e  element of 
the  partition . False propositions won’t  include it, so th e  m easure of distance 
from being tru e  will be an  ordering of these disjunctions th a t  don’t  include 
the  tru e  element. In  some cases th is ordering would be fairly straightforw ard: 
suppose the investigation is abou t a num erical value, say the  charge of an 
electron. T he u ltim ate  p artitio n  will be com posed of possible values, and 
propositions will be d isjuncts of these states, th a t  is, ranges th a t  the value 
can take. A p roposition’s d istance from the  tru th , when false, will be the 
d istance between th e  tru e  value and the  closest value in th e  range. However, 
when investigations are no t abou t a num erical value we no longer have a sim­
ple way to  characterize distance from tru th . For instance, if th e  investigation 
were abou t th e  chemical s tru c tu re  of a particu lar digestive enzyme, it would 
be hard  to  produce an  ordering th a t would have any objective value a t all.
M aher (1993, 237) claim ed th a t distance from tru th  is a  subjective notion, 
for the  sam e reasons th a t  he claimed th a t verisim ilitude is a  subjective notion. 
His system  has d istance from tru th  defined in term s of verisim ilitude, which 
ultim ately  makes it a function of cognitive utility. Again, th is  is a top-down
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approach, the  preferences determ ine the  function as a  whole, and as long as 
m inim al requirem ents of ra tionality  are m et, th is  function determ ines not 
only the  content of th e  proposition for S,  b u t its  d istance from tru th .
One insight from th is  approach is th a t  d istance from tru th  is w hat causes 
the  epistem ic u tility  of a false proposition to  vary w ith  changes in which s ta te  
is the  tru e  s ta te  (the content of a  proposition is constan t regardless of which 
s ta te  is tru e ) . If one were to  ask an  investigator why a proposition would be 
m ore or less valuable given different sta tes of th e  world, th e  reasons he gives 
will be a ra tionale for ordering propositions according to  d istance from tru th . 
I th in k  th a t  th is is as abou t as far as can be determ ined generally. Thus 
it seems th a t  M aher was right abou t the  subjective na tu re  of d istance from 
tru th . However, my approach isn’t  a com pletely top-dow n approach: content 
does have a m easure th a t is independent of the u tility  function, though it 
too  is u ltim ately  subjective, and given th is  and one’s cognitive preferences, 
d istance from tru th  can be determ ined.
Given the  above, I propose th e  following epistem ic u tility  function:
Ue{P)  =  fccont(P) -  d{P)
This form ula is essentially the  same as M aher’s, except th a t  the  content 
m easure is determ ined independently  using an  u ltim ate  partition  U , where 
proposition P  is expressed as a  disjunction of elem ents of U , and its  content 
is given by:
co n t(P ) =  (n  — m ) / n
where n  is th e  num ber of to ta l elem ents in U  and m  is the num ber of elements 
th a t  are disjuncts in P.
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4 .1 .3  V alues O ther than  C ontent and D istan ce from  
Truth
Sim plicity
Sim plicity has long been a  desideratum  for scientific hypotheses, and presum ­
ably, all hypotheses. It can be considered an  intellectual blessing either as an 
indication of t ru th  or as som ething of value independent to  its  relationship 
to  tru th , or both. If taken m erely as an  indication  of tru th  it would factor 
into ra tiona l acceptance through the  probability  function— simple theories 
will have higher probabilities. If it is valuable for o ther reasons it would be 
included in th e  u tility  function. T hus w hether or no t it should be included 
depends upon  w hat it is th a t  makes sim plicity desirable.
T his question won’t be answered here, though  my own in tu ition  is th a t  
sim plicity is largely of practical value— sim ple theories are easier to  work 
w ith, and  seem more satisfying psychologically, more aesthetic (e.g., Q uine’s 
ta s te  for desert landscapes can carry  into epistem ology and m etaphysics). 
We feel b e tte r  w hen we can get our m ind around things, and simple theories 
help, and the  sim pler the  theory, the  easier it is to  understand  and work w ith  
it. T hus th e  sim plicity of a theory  would be factored into the  practical u tility  
function. However I th ink  this is a m inority  view— m ost probably see it as 
either t ru th  conducive, or of o ther epistem ic value, or both. As I am  not 
prepared to  defend my view here I will briefly consider w hat the  epistem ic 
u tility  function would look like w ith  sim plicity included.
If someone were to  th ink  of sim plicity as an  epistem ic value, ap a rt from 
tru th  conductiv ity  or practical felicity, a  fu rther question arises— could we 
characterize th e  value of sim plicity in term s of content or d istance from tru th , 
or would we need a separate function or it?  Some have tried  to  say th a t
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sim plicity and content are related: Popper, Kemeny, Sober, and R osenkrantz 
take sim plicity to  be equivalent to  the  content of the  theory.4 If th is  is the  
case, th en  no new term  would be needed in the  epistem ic u tility  function. 
If it has a value separate  from content, th en  a new term  would have to  
be included in the  epistem ic u tility  function. I ’m not sure how one would 
m easure simplicity, bu t if there were a clear m easure, we could include a 
function s ( P ) th a t  indicates th e  sim plicity of P . along w ith a weight a  th a t  
indicates how im portan t sim plicity is com pared w ith  o ther epistem ic values.
However, for felicity sake I will assum e th e  view th a t  sim plicity is valuable 
due to  either t ru th  conductivity  or practical in terests and isn ’t  a p a r t of the  
epistem ic u tility  function.
Place in the Structure of B elief
T he long running debate between foundationalists and coherentists in epis- 
tem ology is expressible in term s of BTRA. Thom as Paxson (1980, 608-610) 
has suggested th a t not only does th e  cognitive value of a proposition depend 
on its  content, b u t also on its  place in a person’s system  of beliefs. In par­
ticular, if th e  belief occupies a foundational role in th e  s tru c tu re  (he term s 
these “criterial beliefs” ), it  is m ore im portan t, and  its  value will be greater.
Paxson assigned different epistem ic u tility  functions to  criterial beliefs 
and non-criterial beliefs. T he function for criterial beliefs is sim ply K eith  
L ehrer’s epistem ic u tility  function w ith  th e  ad ap ta tio n  th a t the  probabilities 
are conditional upon the  set of all the  o ther criterial beliefs th e  agent has. 
T he form ula is:
ec(h) =  p(h,  C)  -  p ( h *, C)
4From (Maher 1993, 215).
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where p(h,  C ) is the  level of confidence of h given the  set of o ther criterial 
beliefs (C)  the  agent has (excluding h*),  and h* is A s strongest com petitor 
(presum ably the  hypothesis o ther th a n  h  w ith the highest probability) (Pax­
son 1980, 611), (Lehrer 1982, 206). N ote th a t  th is is actually  an  expected 
epistem ic u tility  function, represented by “ec(/i)” . W hy th is  form ula is used 
to  represent expected epistem ic u tility  of criterial beliefs is best explained by 
showing how it was derived. Lehrer (1982, 206) claimed th a t  th e  epistem ic 
u tility  of a  false belief h  is:
v f ( h )  =  —p(h*)
(where “w /” stands for the  epistem ic u tility  function of a  false belief) be­
cause accepting a false belief h  rules out accepting its com petitor h*, and its 
epistem ic value is its probability. A nd for a tru e  belief:
v f ( h )  =  1 - p ( h * )
because accepting the  tru e  belief h  m eans losing w hatever epistem ic value 
false belief h* had. S ubstitu ting  these functions into the  form ula for expected 
u tility  w ith  the  probabilities of h  being p(h)  and h  being 1 — p(h)  yields:
e(h) = p(h)  — p(h*)
N ote th a t the  epistem ic u tility  of holding h  depends upon th e  probability  of h. 
P axson’s m odification of m aking th e  probabilities of h  and h* be conditional 
upon  C  has the  effect of m aking b o th  th e  probability  function and  th e  u tility  
function in the  expected u tility  calculation reflect the  foundationalist notion 
of criterial beliefs depending on only o ther criterial beliefs (if on any other 
beliefs a t all)-—to  obtain  th is  resu lt from L ehrer’s formulas one would have to  
apply  th e  condition on C  to  th e  probabilities th roughout L ehrer’s derivation.
69
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I don’t  th ink  th is function is desirable for a two reasons. T he first is th a t  
I d on ’t  th ink  th a t  epistem ic u tility  should be dependent on probabilities be­
cause probability  is already represented in the  calculation of expected utility. 
In o ther uses of decision theory  the  high probability  of a particu la r s ta te  oc­
curring doesn’t  figure into the  u tility  of th a t  s ta te  given certain  choices, b u t 
in the  calculation of th e  expected u tility  of the choices them selves. I don’t 
see why epistem ic decision problem s should be different. We can represent 
the  foundationalist in tu ition  by sim ply factoring the  conditioning on C  into 
th e  probability  function for h. T he appearance of probabilities in the  u tility  
function is a  weakness of L ehrer’s original form ula as well.
T he second is th a t  the  criterial belief function does not take into consid­
eration  the  content of the belief (as content is not adequately  represented by 
probabilities), yet I th in k  we would assign higher value to  a  criterial beliefs 
w ith  m ore content th an  those w ith  less, and it is reasonable to  assum e th a t 
criterial beliefs do in fact vary in  content, e.g., the  criterial belief th a t  “I see 
red and some o ther color” has less content th an  the  criterial belief “I see red 
and blue.”
His expected u tility  function for non-criterial beliefs involves tak ing  into 
account the  am ount of content in th e  belief. Paxson adopted a m easure of 
content from K em eny-O ppenheim  (in terpreted  by Jakko H intikka). Here he 
assum es an in terp re ta tion  of content of h as 1 — p(h).  T he formula th a t 
Paxson ultim ately  adopted  for the  expected u tility  of h  is:
/ l \  - , / u  n M d > h )  ~ v { d , h )‘*m = p(k.c)p{dJt)+p{i-h)
In th is formula d  s tands for all of th e  su b jec t’s beliefs, representing the  foun­
dationalist in tu ition  th a t non-criterial beliefs are unlike criterial beliefs in
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th a t  they  are supported  by b o th  criterial and non-criterial beliefs.
As someone w ith  foundationalist sym pathies I agree w ith  Paxson th a t it 
is desirable to  have a decision theoretic account of epistem ic justification th a t 
can distinguish betw een foundational and superstructu re  beliefs. However, 
B TR A  can do th is sim ply by conditioning th e  probabilities of the  beliefs 
in question on th e  relevant subsets of beliefs in the  probability  function in 
the  way th a t Paxson describes. Is there a reason to  factor th is distinction 
into the  u tility  function as well? I don’t  th ink  th e  way th a t  Paxson did it 
will work because his u tility  function is based on probabilities. However, 
a u tility  function th a t  isn ’t  based on probabilities could also take account 
of th is d istinction, perhaps by introducing ano ther term  th a t  specifies the 
place of a proposition in  th e  s tructu re  of an  ag en t’s beliefs, one th a t makes 
foundational beliefs have a  higher u tility  th an  superstructu re  beliefs. T he 
epistem ic u tility  function I offered earlier could be supplem ented to  become:
E ( P )  =  kcont (P )  -  d(P)  + f L ( P )
where “L ( P ) n is a  function describing the  location in  the  su b jec t’s belief sys­
tem  th a t  the  proposition  occupy if accepted, and “/ ” is a weighting factor for 
location in th e  belief system . Upon reflection I d on ’t  see any compelling rea­
son for th is addition, as we can represent the  basic foundationalist in tu ition  
regarding the  su pport s tru c tu re  w ith  the  probability  function alone. The 
reason foundational beliefs are m ore im portan t is precisely because of th is 
support s tructure . T hus I recom m end an epistem ic u tility  function w ithout 
th e  addition.
Of course, B T R A  isn ’t  a  foundationalist theory  per  se, the  point here is 
to  show  how it could  b e  a d a p te d  to  a  fo u n d a tio n a lis t view.
71
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4.2 Practical U tility  Function and General 
E xpected U tility
T he practical u tility  function uUp(P, x ) ” describes th e  u tility  of the conse­
quence of accepting P  for each s ta te  of th e  world x  for S.  W hat more could 
be said abou t it?  T his function is very complex, as it includes not only the 
consequences of each choice th a t  will have th e  acceptance of P  as its base, 
bu t the  in teractions of the  u tility  of these choices on each other— one m ight 
value one outcom e “C ” more th an  “D” given th a t  one has chosen “A” ra th e r 
th an  “B” previously. Thus there can ’t  be a reduction of w hat goes into the 
practical u tility  of acceptance into neat com ponents like there is of w hat goes 
into epistem ic utility. Judgm ents regarding the  practical u tility  function m ay 
ju s t have to  be m ade on an individual basis, considering, as m uch as on one 
can, the  outcom e of choosing to  accept P  on one’s practical life. We can 
make such judgm ents, and do so (e.g., people try  to  get others to  accept 
optim istic sta tem en ts w ith  th e  hope th a t it will help encourage them  to  act 
in a  beneficial w ay).
Now I can propose a general form ula for th e  expected u tility  of accepting 
a  proposition. Let E U g(P)  equal the  expected general u tility  of the  act of 
accepting P:
E U g(P)  -  X > t / e(P, x) + Up(P, x)  + 5Ud{P, x ) f
xeX
where X  stands for the  sta tes partition , x  s tands for a s ta te  in X ,  and u  
is the  weight a person places on epistem ic utility. Ud{P, x)  is the  function
th a t describes any practical u tility  associated directly  w ith  accepting P  ap art
5 As a matter of convention I’ll be using “EU” to stand for expected utility functions, 
and “U” to stand for utility functions by themselves.
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from any decisions based on P  (suppose S  is th rea tened  w ith a gun to  believe 
in  G od), and  S is th e  weight placed on th is function. O ften th is will be zero.6
^H ow ever, th e re  a c tu a lly  m ay  b e  m ore in sta n c e s  o f  th e  d irect u tility  o f  b e lie f  th a n  
we might initially expect. Think of the effect beliefs have on mood, depressing thoughts 
may depress, optimistic thoughts might lift moods. These utilities would be expressed by 
Ud{P, x).
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C hapter 5 
E pistem ic Justification
So far I have offered a theory  of ra tional belief th a t  involves m axim izing 
expected utility. T his involved an epistem ic u tility  function. Decisions m ax­
im izing expected epistem ic u tility  would presum ably be ra tional from an 
epistem ic point of view. Thus it seems n a tu ra l to  identify epistem ic justifi­
cation  w ith  m axim izing expected epistem ic u tility .1
Alvin G oldm an (1986, 102-103) objected  to  th is identification for a t least 
two reasons. T he first is cognitive decision th eo ry ’s use of subjective prob­
abilities, in th a t  there  is no restric tion  on these probabilities. If a belief 
m axim izes expected epistem ic u tility  for S  when th e  subjective probabili­
ties used to  m ake the  calculation are com pletely irrational, th en  we cannot 
consider th a t  proposition epistem ically justified for S . G oldm an adm itted  
th a t  additional ra tionality  constra in ts could be added to  subjective proba­
bilities (e.g., m ake them  responsive to  relative frequencies), however, th is is 
unsatisfactory  because:
. . .  now a new  theory  is required, which m ay have little  or nothing 
in com m on w ith th e  in itial epistem ic decision motif. One then  
wonders w hether some entirely  different criterion isn ’t  needed—  
for example, an  objectively verific criterion— to  fill ou t the  ap­
proach. A t a  m inim um , th is supplem ent would destroy any sem­
blance of a unified  approach to  doxastic justifiedness. (1986, 102- 
103)
P hilip  Percival (2002, 136) observed, rightly  I think, th a t  th is argum ent
1Paxson (1980, 606) in fact did.
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leaves open the  possibility of m axim izing expected epistem ic u tility  being a 
necessary condition for epistem ic justification, even if it isn’t  a  sufficient one.
G oldm an’s second argum ent, however, removes even th is possibility (Per- 
cival 2002). For here he rejects th e  very notion of taking content as a part 
of epistem ic value.
Aside from the difficulties of content m easurem ent, I do no t think 
th is is an  appropriate  determ inan t of value for th e  theory  of jus­
tification. I t m ay be appropriate  for o ther epistem ic term s of 
appraisal, b u t no t for justifiedness. Consider two J-ru le system s 
[systems th a t allow for rules of belief form ation in such a way 
th a t  beliefs produced following these rules are aim ed a t being 
epistem ically justified] R i  and R 2. Conform ity w ith R i  would 
yield tru e  beliefs w ith  greater content th a n  conform ity w ith  R 2, 
b u t in o ther verific respects (such as tru th  ratio) the  rule system s 
are equivalent. I t is unclear to  me th a t the  processes licensed by 
R 2 are justificationally in ferior  to  th e  processes licensed by R i.
R 2’s processes m ay be inferior on other dimensions of appraisal, 
b u t not on the  dim ension of justifiedness. (1986, 102-103)
I find th is argum ent unconvincing. Let us take G oldm an’s suggested 
determ inan t of the  epistem ic value of a  J-rule system , high t ru th  ratio . This 
concept cannot be applied w ithou t th e  use of content. C onsider two sets of 
propositions, F  and G , where F =  {X will finish th e  m ara thon  and Y will 
finish th e  m arathon, Z will no t finish the  m arathon} and G  — {X will finish 
th e  m arathon , Y  will finish th e  m arathon , Z will no t finish th e  m arathon}. 
Also suppose th a t  it is the  case th a t  all three, X, Y, and Z finish th e  m arathon. 
T hen  th e  tru th  ra tio  for F  is 1:1, while for G  it is 2:1. However, bo th  of 
these belief system s are logically equivalent. Thus on G oldm an’s view, G  is 
superior to  F  even though  G  is logically equivalent to  F . T his is counter­
intuitive, to  say the least. To avoid these difficulties we need to  bring in the  
concept of content. T hough F ’s t ru th  ratio  is lower, the  proposition  it is 
right abou t has the  sam e logical content as bo th  the tru e  beliefs in G . Taken
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th is  way we can see th a t  th e  ra tio  of tru th  content to  falsity content is the 
sam e.2
My point w ith  th e  above is th a t  we have no way of m easuring of “verific 
respects” such as tru th  ra tio  in a  set of beliefs w ithout tak ing  content into 
consideration. As G oldm an’s argum ent against tak ing  content into consid­
eration  uses t ru th  ratio , it underm ines itself. As epistem ic desiderata are 
all regarding these tra its  of sets of beliefs, content is indispensable for any 
evaluation of epistem ic value.3
Thus I th ink  G oldm an’s second argum ent is answerable. T he first is as 
well, once we consider m ore closely w hat it is th a t  we are doing when we 
explicate epistem ic justification. To th is I now tu rn .
5.1 M ethodology: A M odest Carnapianism
In  th is section I w ant to  describe an  approach to  the  question of w hat epis­
tem ic justification is th a t  will use C arn ap ’s m ethod of explication, while at 
the  same tim e re ta in ing  som ething of the  ordinary  language approach to  
epistem ic concepts.
2Popper’s (1972) use of truth and falsity content foresees this problem, which seems 
right as the two sets are logically equivalent.
3Percival (2002, 137) offered an additional argument against Goldman’s rejection of 
content. On Goldman’s view the choice of processes is determined by the theories of current 
social sciences. As content does play a role in scientific theory acceptance (Goldman 
cannot reject this, even if content isn’t a part of purely epistemic value), whether or not a 
particular system of J-rules is right will depend on these acceptances. If that is the case, 
then the evaluation of whether or not a belief is epistemically justified will at some level 
depend on an acceptance that was recommended to the scientific community, at least in 
part, by its content. Though Percival argues (I think persuasively) that content must then 
be involved in epistemic valuation, there are more direct ways content is involved.
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5.1.1 E xp lication
C arnap  (1950, 3) understood  explication to  be th e  process of “transform ing 
a given more or less inexact concept into an  exact one, or ra ther, in replacing 
the  first by th e  second.” T he concept th a t  is getting  transform ed or replaced 
is referred to  as th e  explicandum, and the  concept th a t  is the  finished product 
is the  explicatum.
This process begins w ith the  identification of an  explicandum. D uring 
th is step the  prescientific concept is m ade “a t least practically  clear,” where 
to  be practically  clear is defined as: “W h at X m eans by a certain  term  in 
contexts of a certain  kind is a t least practically  clear to  Y if Y  is able to  
predict correctly X ’s in terp re ta tion  for m ost of th e  simple, ordinary  cases of 
the  use of the  te rm  in those contexts.” (1950, 4).
C arnap com plained, and  I th ink  rightly  so, th a t  philosophers often do not 
pay enough a tten tio n  to  th is  im portan t step:
It seems to  me th a t, in raising problem s of analysis or explication, 
philosophers very frequently violate th is requirem ent [that the  ex­
plicandum  be practically  clear]. T hey ask questions like: “W hat 
is causality?,” “W h a t is life?,” “W hat is m ind?,” “W h a t is jus­
tice?,” etc. T hen  th ey  often im m ediately s ta r t  to  look for an  an­
swer w ithout first exam ining the  tac it assum ption th a t  th e  term s 
of the  question are a t least practically  clear enough to  serve as a 
basis for an  investigation, for an analysis or explication. (1950,
4)
W hy th is step  is im p o rtan t is easy to  see— different explicanda allow for 
different explicata. Typically w ith prescientific concepts, m ultiple explicanda 
can be identified th a t  go under the term  being investigated, and depending 
on which explicandum  is chosen, different explica ta  are possible. Using one of 
C arn ap ’s own examples, im agine we wanted to  explicate th e  concept a ttached  
to  “salt.” Here we could m ean a t least two th ings, the  broad scientific use
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of salt, which would include sea salt, Epsom  salt, etc., or we could m ean 
the  ordinary  household use, th a t  is, tab le  salt. D epending on which one of 
these explicanda we in choose, our explicata will vary, in the  first case it 
will include in general all com pounds w ith  ionic bonds, in the  la tte r  sodium  
chloride.
T he second step  in th e  process of explication is form ulating an  explica­
tum  to  replace the  explicandum . In th is  step  a precise concept is chosen to  
replace the  explicandum  th a t m eets th e  following requirem ents: I t m ust be 
sim ilar to  the  explicandum , it m ust be exact, it m ust be fruitful, and sim­
ple. T he first requirem ent is obvious, for if an  explicatum  doesn’t  resemble 
its  explicandum , th en  it is difficult to  see how it is an  explicatum  for that 
explicandum . However, the  resem blance need not be exact, indeed, it cannot 
be, for th e  explicandum  is not as precise as th e  explicatum , and its  exten­
sion will necessarily become m ore narrow  th rough  th e  process of explication. 
T his is im portan t, for it implies th a t  m ultiple explicata are available for a 
single explicandum . For instance, using ano ther of C arn ap ’s own examples, 
suppose we have the  concept behind th e  old use of “fish” as an explicandum. 
T his concept includes v irtually  any anim al th a t  lives in th e  sea. We could 
explicate th is  te rm  in m ultiple ways, one way would be to  let the  extension of 
the  concept denoted by “fish” include only cold-blooded sea creatures w ith 
gills all their lives, ano ther would be to  let it also include sea creatures w ith 
fins/flippers (such as whales, sea lions, etc.). O thers are readily available. 
T hus not only do we generally have m ultiple explicanda available for a  given 
term , bu t for each explicandum , m ultiple explicata.
C arn ap ’s additional criteria help narrow  down th e  field of available ex­
plicata. T he explicata needs to  be exact, “so as to  introduce the  explicatum  
into a well-connected system  of scientific concepts” (1950, 7). This exactness
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is given by a definition of the explicatum  in term s of this system  of scientific 
concepts. T he next criterion is th a t  th e  explicata be fruitful, in th e  sense 
th a t  it aids th e  form ulation of universal sta tem ents and laws. C arnap  ob­
served th a t  th e  current use of “fish,” in which the  extension is lim ited to  
cold-blooded sea creatures w ith  gills all th e ir lives allows for m ore universal 
s ta tem en ts  th an  explicata th a t  are closer to  the  original m eaning in th a t  the  
objects in its  extension have much m ore in com m on th an  those in the  earlier 
concep t’s extension. Finally, the  explicatum  should be simple. This require­
m ent, however, is lowest in priority— only when all other th ings are equal 
should th e  sim plest explicatum  be chosen m erely because of its simplicity.
5 .1 .2  E xp lication  o f O rdinary Language
A nalytic philosophers have approached philosophical problem s in two ways, 
the  first being to  tre a t the  problem s as a  sym ptom  of a confused language, 
th e  rem edy being to  adopt an ideal language th a t  is free from these confu­
sions. T he second is to  see the  answer in  understanding  the  concepts th a t  
are expressed in ordinary  language.
Explication can be seen as following th e  first approach, especially since it 
was first form ulated and used by C arnap, a  proponent of the  ideal language 
m ethodology. However, its  application isn ’t  lim ited to  the  ideal language 
approach. We could th ink  of ordinary  language as sometimes denoting con­
cepts th a t  can be m ade precise in any num ber of ways, and th a t the  point of 
explication is to  find useful explicata of these explicanda. Furtherm ore, ex­
p licanda them selves are supposed to  be ord inary  concepts found in ordinary  
language.
C arnap  him self required th a t explicata resemble their explicanda. I th ink  
th a t  th e  difference between the  ord inary  language approach and ideal lan-
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guage approach regarding explication could be thought of as a  m a tte r of 
the  degree of th is resem blance th a t  is sought, w ith the ord inary  language 
approach striving for greater resem blance th an  the  ideal language approach.
M ust a  philosopher choose one approach over the  o ther and stick w ith  it? 
I do n ’t  see why she m ust, for does she have to  say th a t  ord inary  language 
and  th e  concepts it represents are either com pletely confused or are clear and 
precise (if understood  properly)? Surely it is m ore reasonable to  say th a t  
there  are p arts  of ordinary  language th a t are clear, and p arts  th a t  a ren ’t. 
O f those p arts  th a t  aren ’t  some p a rts  are unclear because of some defect 
th a t  cannot be rem edied— the concept should sim ply be replaced w ith  a 
new and  precise (albeit stipu la ted) concept. O ther unclear p a rts  are able 
to  clarified sufficiently given enough a tten tion . Explication can be used for 
either project.
Saying th a t a language picks out a  “reality,” w hether th a t  language is 
ord inary  or ideal, involves m etaphysical com m itm ents such as th a t there  are 
such th ings as na tu ra l kinds. I th ink  th a t  th e  ordinary language approach 
is m ore closely tied  to  th is assum ption th a n  th e  ideal language approach— 
philosophers such as J.L. A ustin, and more recently B arry  S troud and  M ark 
K aplan, speak of the  ordinary  concept of knowledge, im plying th a t  there 
could really be such a th ing  as knowledge. How realist one is regarding a 
particu la r topic or concept will also determ ine which approach to  choose— if 
a  person is no t a realist regarding, say, the  concept of fish (he th inks i t ’s a 
confusion), perhaps he m ight construct a  lim ited ideal language th a t plays 
th e  sam e practical role th a t  the  concept of fish used to  play, b u t b e tte r  
and  m ore precisely. Here an explication of th e  concept of fish is along th e  
ideal language approach. However, if a  person is a  realist regarding, say, 
justice, she m ight try  to  clarify w hat th ing  the concept ac tually  denotes. I
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d o n ’t  th ink  th a t a  person needs to  be a com plete p ragm atist to  adopt an ti­
realism  locally in the  form of a lim ited reconstructive ideal language around 
a  p articu lar word or conversational context.
W ith  th is said I want to  tu rn  to  the  phrase “epistem ic justification ,” and 
th e  word “knowledge.” W hich view is better, a realist view where these 
term s pick out real things, and  th a t  our job as epistem ologists is to  figure 
ou t and clarify w hat these th ings are, or an  anti-realist one in which they  
are confused concepts th a t  play a  practical role th a t  could be b e tte r  played 
by a  reconstructed  concept in an  ideal language?
A gainst the first approach is th e  fact th a t  th e  question “W h a t is epis­
tem ic justification?” could be added to  the  list in C arnap ’s com plaint about 
skipping the  identification of explicanda th a t  I m entioned earlier. Epistem ic 
justification, as an explicandum , is generally not m ade practically  clear, and 
im m ediate jum ps to  an  explicatum  are common. This is an  im p o rtan t defi­
ciency, for there are m ultiple possible explicanda th a t could be identified for 
epistem ic justification. In fact, judging by the  use of the te rm  in epistem o- 
logical literature, a t least th ree  different explicanda for epistem ic justification 
are readily identified, all of which seem to  have different extensions: Accord­
ing to  these, epistem ic justification  is:
1. Fulfilling in tellectual duties.
2. Value from an in tellectual perspective.
3. W hat makes tru e  belief knowledge.
T h e  first is probably th e  oldest and  m ost commonly discussed explicandum . 
It is th e  backbone to  deontological views of epistem ic justification. An early 
expression is found in th e  W .K. Clifford passage I quoted in th e  second chap­
ter. A more recent version is defended by R ichard Feldm an (1985), (1993)
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and Earl Conee (1985). T his view holds th a t we have certain  intellectual 
obligations regarding our beliefs. For example, Feldm an holds th a t we have 
an  obligation to  believe only on sufficient evidence.
T he second can be found in th e  w ritings of W illiam  Alston. A lston (1989, 
97) rejects deontological views of epistem ic justification  because we have little  
or no control over w hat we believe (directly or indirectly  through m odification 
of belief forming p ractices), therefore we cannot be held to  du ties regarding 
belief. However, he does hold th a t  the  judgm ent of w hether a belief is epis- 
tem ically justified is a  norm ative one. T hus he proposes th a t  the  norm ative 
judgm ent here is no t a deontological one, b u t one of how “good, favorable, 
desirable, or a p p ro p ria te ... ”
T he th ird , like th e  first, goes back a  long way, and is as w idespread as the 
justified tru e  belief view of knowledge. Lawrence Bonjour endorses it here:
W h a t th en  is th e  differentia which distinguishes epistem ic ju s­
tification, th e  species of justification appropriate  to  knowledge, 
from these o ther species of justification? T he answer is to  be 
found, I subm it, by reflecting on th e  im plicit ra tionale of the  
concept of knowledge itself. W hat after all is the  point of such 
a concept, and w hat role is epistem ic justification supposed to  
play in it? W hy should we, as cognitive beings, care w hether 
our beliefs are epistem ically justified? W hy is such justification 
som ething to  be sought and valued? (1985, 7)
Here B onJour is no t ju s t claim ing th a t  epistem ic justification figures into the  
concept of knowledge, b u t th a t  th e  concept of knowledge somehow provides 
content for the  concept of epistem ic justification.
These th ree explicanda have different extensions: it isn’t  hard  to  see how 
a  belief could be epistem ically justified in the  first sense and no t in th e  second 
and vice versa, as it is easy to  see how a  belief could be epistem ically valuable 
(say, in G oldm an’s sense) and not m eet epistem ic obligations (e.g., a belief 
th a t  was formed by a  reliable process, yet was not consciously based on th a t
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process, bu t as an  inference from another irra tional belief, as in B onJour’s 
clairvoyant example, (1985, 38-45)). T he th ird  explicandum  has instances 
th a t are not instances of th e  first two, e.g., th e  G ettier counterexam ples are 
reasonably taken  to  be instances of the  first two explicanda, yet we w ouldn’t  
consider them  knowledge. T here are also those who hold th a t  epistem ic 
justification is no t necessary for knowledge a t all, from their point of view 
the  extension of th e  first two explicanda is different th a n  th a t of th e  th ird  
in th a t th e  th ird ’s extension is th e  em pty set, while the  extensions of the 
first two are not. Even if one were to  resist th e  claim  th a t these explicanda 
have different extensions, surely it is obvious th e  different explicanda have 
different intensions: th ey  m ean different things.
D epending on which of these th ree explicanda is chosen (and I don’t im ­
ply th a t the  possible explicanda are lim ited to  these three), different sets of 
explicata are available. For instance, if one were to  explicate the  first, one 
m ight arrive a t Feldm an’s explication, and chances are w hatever explication 
is chosen would be in ternalist. However, those who begin w ith  the  second ex­
plicandum  m ight choose a  reliablist explication, and  externalist explications 
become more likely (or “in ternalist-ex ternalist” explications such as those 
th a t  A lston form ulates). T he th ird  explication m ight favor an  explication 
given in causal term s (to  m atch, say, a causal theo ry  of knowledge). Thus 
the  possibilities m ultiply.4
Sometimes epistem ologists conflate these th ree  explicanda. Im m ediately 
following the  passage I quoted earlier B onJour w rote th a t we care abou t the 
concept of epistem ic justification  because we care ab o u t tru th , and as there 
is no im m ediate connection between us and tru th , we desire our beliefs to
4A  u sefu l ta x o n o m y  o f  c o n c e p ts  o f  e p is te m ic  ju s t if ic a t io n  ca n  b e  fou n d  in  A ls to n ’s 
“The Concept of Epistemic Justification,” and in his “Internalism and Externalisin in 
Epistemology.” (1989)
83
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
have characteristics such th a t  beliefs w ith  these characteristics tend  to  be 
tru e  over th e  long run. Prom there  he concluded th a t we are epistem ically 
irresponsible if we believe propositions th a t  do not have these characteristics. 
For him  th is means, roughly, th a t  beliefs are epistem ically responsible only 
if our beliefs are ones we have good reason to believe are true  (1985, 7 -  
8). Here we see elem ents of all th ree explicanda, his initial grounding in the 
concept of knowledge, his desideratum  th a t  beliefs are fortuitous in th a t  they  
are connected w ith  tru th , and his notion th a t we have an obligation to  make 
sure our beliefs are so. Unlike B onjour, I d on ’t  th ink  these explicanda can be 
com bined in such a way, they  represent different, and som etimes conflicting 
(given the  different extensions discussed above) intuitions regarding w hat we 
w ant for our belief system s.
T his is by no m eans an  a ttem p t a t a com plete analysis of all th e  possible 
explicanda associated w ith  epistem ic justification  and their possible expli­
cata . T he point I am  try ing  to  make is th a t  given even th is cursory survey 
of th e  concept, one can ’t  help b u t wonder w hether it even m akes sense to  
speak of the concept of epistem ic justification. I t seems th a t  we m ust speak 
of a  family of concepts of epistem ic justification.
T his problem  arises a t least p a rtly  because epistem ic justification  is not 
a  term  in ordinary  language and thus doesn’t  serve as readily as an  expli­
candum  as term s th a t  are in ordinary language.5 Instead it appears to  be 
an  explication of several genuinely prescientific concepts, such as the  intel­
lectual w orthiness of a  belief, responsible belief, and  w hat it is th a t  m akes a
5However, the term “justifcation” is found in ordinary language, and is sometimes 
applied to evidence, e.g., “Is your accusation really justified, given the evidence?” However, 
how this is understood in ordinary practice varies between the explicanda I mentioned 
earlier, rendering it practically unclear. Thus a term like “epistemic justification,” a term 
we really don’t find in ordinary practice, is bound to be practically unclear as it could be 
identified with a number of prescientific concepts, making it unusable as an explicandum 
just as it is.
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tru e  belief knowledge. In addition to  prescientific concepts, C arnap  spoke of 
th e  explication of concepts in an  earlier scientific system. Perhaps epistem ic 
justification could be thought of as one of these la tte r cases. However, I 
th in k  th a t  it is b e tte r  to  th ink  of it as a  failed explicatum  (failed because it 
is too  imprecise, and needs explication itself—a fact m ade obvious by all the  
various a ttem p ts  by epistem ologists to  do ju s t th a t).
R egarding th e  explicanda m entioned earlier, there are reasons for ad o p t­
ing each of them . We are interested in fulfilling intellectual obligations, and 
we all feel them . We are also in terested  in our beliefs having positive in tel­
lectual value (w hether th is value is given in term s of tru th  or content), ap a rt 
from any obligation we m ay have for believing. We all want to  increase our 
body of knowledge, and are in terested  in understanding w hat counts as an 
instance of knowledge and w hat doesn’t. For th is reason I suggest expli­
cating  all of them , producing a set of explicata. T hen  we have a spectrum  
of legitim ate concepts of epistem ic justification , each one reflecting different 
concerns in belief formation.
Epistem ologists often adm it th a t  there  are different possible ways to  epis­
tem ically  evaluate a belief. In an  earlier quo ta tion  Goldm an adm itted  th is in 
his rejection of considering content in judgm ents of epistemic justification; he 
suggested th a t  o ther dimensions of epistem ic evaluation m ight consider con­
ten t. M y feeling here is th a t  G oldm an has h it upon the  fact th a t  “epistem ic” 
can cover qu ite  a broad territory , and th a t  epistem ic evaluation can take 
on different dimensions, depending on w hat is of interest to  th e  inquirer. 
Feldm an (1993, 552) m ade a sim ilar adm ission when responding to  Alvin 
P lan tin g a’s objection to  views of epistem ic value th a t restric t them selves to  
believing tru th s  and  avoiding falsehoods. Q uoting P lantinga, “Obviously, 
som ething m ust be said abou t other epistem ic values: the im portance of
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considering im portant propositions, of having beliefs on certain  topics, of 
avoiding unnecessary c lu tte r and triv ial d ilettantism , . . . Fel dman agreed 
th a t  such values do exist, b u t claims th a t  they  are irrelevant to  epistem ic 
obligation, and therefore to  epistem ic justification.
B onJour m ade sim ilar rem arks abou t externalism  in th a t  externalism  is 
an a ttem p t to  replace trad itio n a l notions of knowledge and epistem ic justifi­
cation  w ith  their externalist counterparts, th is new way is a way to  evaluate 
beliefs (and perhaps a  legitim ate one), b u t it isn ’t  an  explication of his expli­
candum . Here, bo th  Feldm an and  B onJour are taking the  first explicandum , 
th a t  of fulfilling epistem ic obligation, to  be th e  prim ary one for epistem ic 
justification. G oldm an, A lston, P lan tinga, and others s ta rt w ith  a  different 
explicanda.
However, all of these epistem ologists (w ith the  exception of P lantinga, 
who uses “w arran t” ) reserve “epistem ic justification” for their  concept, and 
no t the  others. Epistem ic justification is often considered one of th e  m ost 
(if no t the  m ost) im portan t concept in epistemology. Thus when epistem ol­
ogists speak of o ther dim ensions of epistem ic evaluation th an  those involved 
in “epistem ic justification” (as characterized by them ), and o ther a ttem p ts  
produce a concept of justification  in those o ther senses (bu t not w hat they  
would consider “epistem ic justification” ), w hat they  should really be say­
ing is th a t  though there are o ther concepts of epistem ic justification, their 
explication clarifies the  m ost im p o rtan t one.
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5.2 Comparing Explications of Epistem ic  
Justification
In com paring different explications of epistem ic justification, we have to  first 
understand  which explicandum  is being explicated in each account. If the 
differing explications stem  from different explicanda, th en  all of them  m ay 
be considered legitim ate explications of different concepts th a t  fall under 
th e  general um brella of epistem ic justification, which concept we will use to  
evaluate a belief will th en  depend on which concept best serves the  purposes 
of th a t  evaluation. If differing explications seem to  stem  from th e  same 
explicandum , then  th ey  can be com pared using C arn ap ’s criteria. Again, 
m ultiple explications are possible, as th e  explication process is th e  sharpening 
of a vague concept— sharpening can occur in m any ways, each serving some 
purposes b e tte r th an  others.
In  light of th is discussion, I will try  to  answer G oldm an’s first objection to  
cognitive decision theory, and  in th e  process show how B TR A  is a legitim ate 
explication of epistem ic justification. I d on ’t  th ink  it would be a  radical de­
p artu re  from cognitive decision theo ry  to  include constrain ts on probabilities, 
and there are currently  a ttem p ts  to  work out a theory  of logical probability  
th a t  avoids the  pitfalls of earlier theories (such as th a t of C arn ap ).6 If they 
are successful, then  cognitive decision theory  would involve m ultiple stages 
of evaluation—the evaluation of subjective probabilities, th e  evaluation of 
epistem ic u tility  functions, and th e  evaluation of decisions based upon these. 
G oldm an’s com plaint is th a t  such m ultiple stages of evaluation ru in  a unified 
approach to  epistem ic justification , presum ably because there  is no single 
dim ension of evaluation com m on to  these stages.
Percival responded to  th is  argum ent by claiming th a t such an  evaluation 
6Maher (2006c) has begun such an attempt.
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m ay be unavoidable. I th in k  his m ain reason is as follows:
There is such a th ing  as theoretical ‘deliberation .’ W hatever the 
m erits of an  ex ternalist approach to  epistem ic justification, theo­
retical deliberation is largely a m atte r of reflecting on and weigh­
ing (w hat is taken  to  be) available evidence, and any o ther cogni­
tively relevant m atters. T he viewpoint of epistem ic consequential- 
ism— and hence of G oldm an’s version of it— accords “cognitive 
value” a  role and significance which tu rn s  th is into th e  pursu it 
of value under u n ce rta in ty ... the  cognitive values of one’s cogni­
tive options’ possible outcom es m ust be weighed against one’s 
uncertain ty  regarding them . At least if cognitive voluntarism  is 
true, th e  advent of decision-theoretic considerations is th en  in­
evitable: for the agent is left pursuing some quan tity— cognitive 
value-under uncertainty. T he situation  is a  little  different if cog­
nitive voluntarism  is incorrect. B ut decision-theoretic considera­
tions m ight still be expected to  play a role. (2002, 137-138)
I th ink  th a t  th e  above paragraph  suggests ano ther explicandum  for epis­
tem ic justification, one th a t  respects cognitive agents as decision-makers, and 
rewards beliefs th a t  are a result of ra tional cognitive decision m aking w ith 
the  s ta tu s  of epistem ic justification.
As cognitive agents we place im portance upon m aking good cognitive de­
cisions, and we w ant our acceptances to  be the  resu lt of such practice. There 
are strong in tu itions indicating th a t  w hether or not the  belief actually  has 
high epistem ic value (as th e  second explicandum  requires) isn’t  as im portan t 
in th is  context as to  w hether or not we m ade a  good decision given the  un­
certain ty  th a t  we face. If one does decide well in a  cognitive decision w ith 
w hat inform ation one has, there is a sense th a t th is belief has some sort of 
positive epistem ic sta tu s.
Of course, “positive epistem ic s ta tu s” isn ’t  necessarily epistem ic justifi­
cation. However, if th is is enough to  justify  a  cognitive decision, and the 
justification is along th e  axis of epistem ic evaluation, th en  it seems th a t  this 
“positive epistem ic s ta tu s” is indeed a  species of epistem ic justification—
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justification for a cognitive decision in term s of epistem ic values.
I t is th is explicandum  th a t B TR A  uses as a base, and I don’t  see any 
reason why it is any less useful or im portan t th a n  any of the  o ther explicanda 
available. R egarding B TR A  as an  explicatum , I th in k  it scores well. It is 
sim ilar to  the  explicandum , it is precise, form ulated in exact term s using 
the  well developed corpus of decision and probability  theory, it is fruitful in 
th a t  it allows for principles of belief form ation to  be developed based on this 
principle, and though  it m ay no t be as simple and  unified as Goldm an would 
like, it is as simple as an  explication of th is explicandum  can be, given the 
different necessary dim ensions of evaluation for cognitive decisions.
T hus my answer to  G oldm an is th a t  the  explicandum  B TR A  explicates is 
an im portan t epistem ic concept, no less im portan t th a n  any explicandum  he 
or o thers offer, and  as B TR A  fares well as an  explicatum , G oldm an’s concerns 
abou t a unified approach do not seem to  poin t to  a significant problem.
T he conclusions ab o u t epistemology (and its  cen tral concept of epistem ic 
justification) offered in th is section are adm itted ly  th e  result of a som ewhat 
cursory view of a b road  and complex field. Therefore I offer them  in the 
spirit of a  suggestion of how to  go abou t doing epistemology, and I th ink  I 
have given a t least enough of a case to  take B TR A  as a  prim a facie legitim ate 
explication of epistem ic justification.
I have offered in th e  last two chapters an  explication of epistem ic utility, 
practical utility, and  a t least one kind of epistem ic justification. T he next 
th ree chapters will be devoted to  a ttem p tin g  to  apply  the  above sketch to  
real philosophical problem s.
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C hapter 6
K now ledge, P ractical Interests, 
and a M ildly U nhappy-Face  
Solution  to  Skepticism
6.1 Introduction
T he point of th is  chapter is to  show how B T R A  applies to  skepticism. My 
view is th a t  it applies to  an explication of knowledge as rational true belief, 
where “ra tiona l” m eans maximizes general expected utility. W ith  th is  con­
cept of knowledge, the  external world skeptic can be answered. However, 
ra tional tru e  belief is only p art of our ord inary  concept of knowledge, and it 
m ay be in conflict w ith  o ther p arts  of th e  ordinary  concept. Thus th e  ordi­
nary  concept of knowledge is probably incoherent, requiring a  replacem ent 
concept. In th is chapter I offer my explication as a  replacem ent.
T he incoherence of the  ordinary  concept of knowledge is m ade visible by 
th e  problem  of external world skepticism  in th a t  ordinary  language solutions 
to  th is  problem  seem (to me a t least) to  fail. T his incoherence is highlighted 
in  M ark K ap lan ’s response to  B arry  S tro u d ’s version of skepticism , and in 
bo th  S tephen Schiffer’s and Jason S tan ley’s response to  K eith  DeRose’s con- 
textualism . So I will begin by discussing these debates.
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6.2 The Incoherence of Knowledge
6.2 .1  Skepticism  D em on strates Incoherence  
Stroud and Kaplan
It is custom ary to  begin w ith  D escartes’ fam iliar dream ing argum ent, which 
m ay be reconstructed  as [A].
[A]
1. If I d o n ’t  know th a t  I ’m  not dream ing a t tim e t, th en  I don’t 
know anything abou t the  the  world outside of my m ind on the  
basis of sensory perceptions received a t  tim e t.
2. I d on ’t  know th a t  I ’m  no t dream ing a t any tim e t.
3. Therefore I don’t  know anything abou t the  world outside of 
my m ind on th e  basis of sensory perceptions.
A gainst it we have J.L . A ustin ’s claim  th a t  the  ordinary m eaning of “know” 
involves these two claims:
1) T h a t there  is a specific reason to  doubt.
2) T h a t th e  question can be answ ered “by m eans of recognized 
procedures.” (S troud 1984, 42 ff.)
These lead us to  the  objection th a t the  use of “know” throughout [A] doesn’t  
reflect o rd inary  usage, for the  requirem ent th a t  we know th a t we are not 
dream ing to  know basic em pirical propositions, while conforming to  th e  first 
principle (the possibility of dream ing is a  specific reason to  doubt), doesn’t  
conform to  th e  second— there are no recognized procedures th a t  will be ac­
cepted by th e  skeptic to  tell w hether or no t we are not dream ing. Therefore, 
in th e  o rd inary  practice of a ttrib u tin g  knowledge we would not accept a chal­
lenge to  an  em pirical knowledge claim  th a t  is based on the m ere possibility of 
dream ing. T h e  ordinary practice o f  k n ow led ge a ttr ib u tion  con sid ers it le g it­
im ate to  a ttr ib u te  knowledge of em pirical propositions to  people even when
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they  cannot rule ou t th a t  they  are merely dream ing th a t those propositions 
obtain . T hus D escartes’ requirem ent does no t m atch ordinary  practice.
B arry  S troud (1984, 48 ff.) objected  th a t  A ustin ’s claims are ab o u t the 
appropriateness of knowledge attribu tions, and not their tru th  conditions. 
Even if it  is appropriate  to  a ttr ib u te  knowledge, the  a ttrib u tio n  m ay still be 
false. S troud adap ted  th e  following exam ple to  support his po int— suppose 
th a t it is wartim e, and people are being tra ined  to  spot different kinds of 
enem y aircraft. In their tra in ing  m anuals there are rules for distinguishing 
different types of enemy planes; planes th a t are type E  have tra its  x, y, and 
w, and  those of type F have tra its  x, y, and  z. Ju s t given th is  inform ation, 
we would say th a t a sp o tte r knows th a t an  approaching enemy plane is an 
E  ju s t in case he can clearly discern th a t  it has x, y, and w, and  th a t it is 
an  F  if it has x, y, and z. A nd if a careless sp o tte r claims to  know th a t an 
approaching plane is an  F  when he has m erely observed th a t it has x  and y, 
a careful sp o tte r would reject his claim  to  knowledge, for all he knows, the 
plane could be an  E.
However, unknow n to  th e  spo tters  there  is another plane, type G, th a t  
also has tra its  x, y, and z. T he experts who w rote th e  m anual d id n ’t  include 
it because, relative to  th e  goals of th e  war, distinguishing planes of type F 
and type G is un im portan t, and it is sim pler for th e  spo tters if they  only had 
to  worry abou t E ’s and F ’s. W ith  th is  additional inform ation, we who know 
b e tte r  th a n  the  spo tters see th a t  even the  careful sp o tte r doesn’t  know the 
approaching plane is an  F  because he sees th a t it has x, y, and z, for it could 
also be a G. However, for th e  purposes of th e  war effort, th e  careful sp o tte r 
has done his job, and it is w arran ted  and appropriate  on his p a r t to  assert 
th a t  he knows th a t  th e  approaching plane is an  F if he sees th a t  it has x, y, 
and z.
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Stroud drew an analogy between the  sp o tte r’s claim to  know th a t the 
approaching plane is an  F  on th e  basis of it having x, y, and z to  everyday 
claim s to  know propositions abou t our environm ent based on inform ation 
from the  senses. W hen we claim  to  know th a t  we have hands as a  result of 
d irect sensory observation, we are in th e  same position as the  careful spotter, 
for we would appropriately  a ttr ib u te  knowledge of th a t  claim  to  ourselves 
(and anyone else m aking such a  claim  as a  result of such direct observation), 
yet we would be wrong, for ju s t as th e  careful sp o tte r doesn’t  know the  plane 
is an  F  because he cannot rule ou t th e  possibility th a t  it is a G, so we do not 
know we have hands because we cannot rule out the  possibility th a t  we are 
dream ing th a t we have hands. Since these possibilities are incom patible w ith 
our knowledge of either of these situations, we don’t  have th is  knowledge. 
T hus we can be perfectly w arran ted  in asserting th a t  we know these basic 
th ings even when we do n ’t. A nd ju s t as th e  spo tter, if appraised of the  G ’s, 
would tend  to  agree w ith  th e  judgm ent th a t  he doesn’t  know th e  approaching 
plane is an  F because he cannot rule ou t th a t  it is a G, so we, when appraised 
of th e  dream ing possibility, feel th e  pull of the  argum ent th a t  we don’t  know 
em pirical claims because we cannot rule out th a t  we are dream ing. T hus we 
do no t know em pirical propositions, even though it would be inappropriate 
under m ost circum stances to  deny th is  knowledge. This is, of course, true 
regarding the  ordinary m eaning of “know,” a fact th a t  is m anifest bo th  in 
our and  the sp o tte r’s feeling th e  intu itive pull of the  respective skeptical 
argum ents. Thus it seems th a t D escartes’ argum ent stands.
However, K aplan (2000) persisted  in resisting th e  skeptical conclusion 
on A ustin ian  grounds. He argued th a t  S troud’s case fails because he has 
not provided sufficient justification  to  support th a t  the  skeptic’s assertion 
th a t we don’t  know em pirical propositions is w arranted. K ap lan ’s objection
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is “higher order,” for he isn’t  asking w hether or no t we do know em pirical 
propositions, b u t w hether we are w arranted  in saying th a t we d on’t  on the  
grounds th a t  S troud offers. T his is clearly a  burden  of proof argum ent, h e ’s 
p u ttin g  the  burden  of proof on S troud, and arguing th a t  S troud doesn’t 
discharge it. I take K aplan to  place th is burden on him  because the  skeptical 
position would resu lt in our having to  tell scientists th a t  their “knowledge” is 
no t really knowledge a t all, th e  skeptical position requires a radical revision 
of all of our belief system s.1
S troud supplied reasons th a t  m ight m eet K ap lan ’s burden  from three 
sources: th e  p lane-spo tter example, th e  in tu itive pull of the  dream ing a r­
gum ent, and the  basic n a tu re  of the  philosophical enterprise. Regarding 
the  plane sp o tte r example, K aplan m aintained th a t  all S troud has shown is 
th a t  ordinary  s tandards of knowledge a ttrib u tio n  need not im ply standards 
of tru th  for knowledge claims (which are, presum ably, the  standards of w ar­
ran ted  assertion in philosophical contexts), b u t th is isn ’t  enough to  show th a t  
the  skeptic’s s tan d ard s really are o rd inary  standards. In  fact, the  airplane 
sp o tte r actually  serves as an  exam ple of A ustin ian  standards: note th a t  the 
careful plane sp o tte r, when appraised of the  G ’s, had  a  specific reason to  say 
th a t  he d idn’t  know a plane w ith  x, y, and z was a  G— the inform ation about 
th e  m anual’s in tentional lim itation. T his isn ’t  so regarding skeptical claims 
th a t we d on’t  know th a t  P  unless we rule out all incom patible propositions.2
R egarding th e  in tu itive pull of the  dream ing argum ent, K aplan acknowl­
edged it, b u t did no t th in k  it provides sufficient reason to  believe the  argu­
m ent, for we often encounter argum ents th a t  on first blush seem reasonable, 
b u t after reflection don’t. This seems to  be the  case w ith  th e  dream ing
1S ee  th e  se c t io n  o n  b u rd en  o f  p r o o f  a n d  sk e p tic ism  in  th e  n e x t  ch ap ter .
2Stroud could reply that lie has provided a specific reason, namely the dreaming pos­
sibility. Kaplan seems to have missed this.
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argum ent, especially when we appreciate the  in tu itive pull in the  opposite 
d irection to  deny its  conclusion. Thus in tu itive pull is not enough to  dis­
charge S troud’s burden.
R egarding th e  n a tu re  of the  philosophical enterprise, its goal is a com­
pletely general account of w hat we know. Philosophers have m ade the  dis­
tinction  betw een inner and outer reality, w ith  our consciousness coming in 
direct contact only w ith  sense data , ideas, images, qualia, and other things 
found in th e  inner world, which are supposed to  represent physical objects in 
the  external world. We are sure (arguably) of our sense data , b u t can we be 
sure of w hat th ey  represent? T he philosophical p ro ject th en  becomes one of 
justify ing beliefs abou t th e  external world using prem ises th a t  are restric ted  
to  w hat we know abou t the  inner world— any com pletely general account 
of knowledge m ust be able to  do this. And since th e  tru th  of any of those 
premises does no t guarantee the  tru th  of any conclusions abou t the  external 
world— for all we know we could be m erely dream ing these sense d a ta , e tc.— 
thus arises the  philosophical problem  of th e  ex ternal world. And if premises 
abou t sense d a ta  and the  like are all we have to  go on, th en  we would have to  
rule ou t th a t  we are dream ing if we are to  know anything abou t the  external 
world.
K aplan (2000, 295-300) agreed th a t  if th is  is w hat is behind th e  philo­
sophical question abou t w hether we know anyth ing  abou t th e  external world, 
and if th is question determ ines the conditions for th e  appropria te  a ttr ib u ­
tion  of the  word “know,” then  we would have to  be able to  rule ou t th a t  
we are dream ing to  say th a t  we know anyth ing  abou t the  external world. 
However, K aplan also pointed ou t th a t  th is  is only one way to  construe the 
philosophical pro ject, there are a host of others, for instance, one could also 
construe the  philosophical project as one th a t  tries to  square as m uch as pos-
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sible w ith  ord inary  practice, perhaps clarifying it. Again there is a burden  of 
proof on S troud (given the  costs m entioned earlier) to  show th a t his notion 
of th e  philosophical quest is the  only legitim ate one (as opposed to  K ap lan ’s 
alternative), and he h asn ’t  discharged th is burden.
I th in k  th a t  K ap lan ’s response to  S troud  is less indicative of a m istake on 
S tro u d ’s p a r t as it is of the  incoherence of th e  ordinary  concept of knowledge. 
Consider th e  following quote:
[Stroud] seems to  th ink  th a t, by focusing our a tten tion  on certain  
aspects of our ordinary  practice, his skeptic can convince us to  
see in them  a com m itm ent to  adhering to  the  C artesian  require­
m ent in th e  philosophical context. Resourceful as he is, S troud 
is able to  find aspects of our ord inary  practice th a t su it his skep­
t ic ’s purposes: for example, the  fact th a t  we distinguish between 
w hat we stric tly  speaking know and  w hat we merely know by 
th e  book, th e  fact th a t  we feel the  tu g  of th e  dream  argum ent, 
the  fact th a t  our practice is rich w ith  cases in which our claims 
to  knowledge are legitim ately challenged by the  raising of pos­
sibilities incom patible w ith  our knowing w hat we claim to. B ut 
th is  s tra tegy  is doom ed to  failure. T he aspects of our ordinary  
practice S troud would have us focus upon are, after all-, aspects 
of a  practice which is, regarded in full face, quite hostile to  the 
C artesian  requirem ent. In asking us (in effect) to  focus on these 
aspects to  the  exclusion of the  rest— in asking us to  acquiesce in 
his picking from the  aspects of our ord inary  practice ju st those 
th a t  are  favorable to  the  skeptic’s hypothesis abou t th e  n a tu re  
of knowledge— Stroud is asking us to  conspire in the violation of 
an  elem entary  rule of sound inquiry: th a t  one should evaluate an  
hypothesis on all the  evidence. T he policy of counting only such 
evidence as supports one’s favored hypothesis can no m ore deliver 
w arran t in th is  case th an  it does in any other. (2000, 300-301)
Here K aplan adm itted  th a t a t least some aspects of ordinary practice support 
S troud, even if o thers m itigate against it. W h a t I take this to  m ean is not th a t  
the  ordinary  practice is generally ou t of line w ith  S troud, as K aplan claimed, 
b u t th a t  th e  concept really is confused. We do feel the  pull of th e  skeptical 
argum ent, and we really do hold back from knowledge claims if we can ’t
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rule ou t hypotheses incom patible w ith  th a t  knowledge. And, in add ition  to  
th e  aspects of ordinary  practice th a t  S troud and K aplan considered, there 
is another, th e  closure principle. S tro u d ’s version of the skeptical argum ent 
d id n ’t  use it, b u t there are others th a t  do. A nd if closure is also a p a r t of 
o rd inary  practice regarding knowledge claims, then  there is m ore evidence 
still of o rd inary  practice supporting  skepticism , a t least in some of its moods.
C onsider a m ore general form of th e  skeptical argum ent, dubbed  by K eith  
DeRose th e  A rgum ent from  Ignorance (AI) (1995, 1-2):
1. I d on ’t  know th a t no t-H .
2. If I d on ’t  know th a t  no t- H ,  th en  I d on’t  know th a t O.
So, I don’t  know th a t  O.
Here “/ / ” s tands for a  skeptical hypothesis th a t  underm ines ord inary  per­
cep tual beliefs, symbolized by “O .” Inserting  “I am  a brain  in a  v a t.” (BIV) 
for H , and “I have hands.” for O  yields th e  following argument:
1. I d on ’t  know th a t I am  not a BIV.
2. If I d on ’t  know th a t  I am  not a BIV, th en  I don’t  know th a t  I
have hands.
So, I d on ’t  know th a t  I have hands.
Notice th a t  the  second premise requiring knowledge of th e  falsity of a 
skeptical hypothesis is m ore general th a n  th e  requirem ent th a t  we know 
th a t  we are no t dream ing—th e  C artesian  premise is an in stan tia tion  of the  
second premise of AI, however there are m any instan tia tions of th is  premise, 
and  some of those m ay enjoy additional support relative to  th e  C artesian  
in stan tia tion . T he BIV instan tia tion  above is one of them , and it enjoys th e  
fu rther sup p o rt of the Closure Principle: if S  knows th a t P , and knows th a t  
P  im plies Q, th en  S  knows th a t  Q. Being a  BIV is incom patible w ith  having 
hands, th u s having hands implies th a t  th e  BIV hypothesis is false, and  we 
know this. T hus if we know th a t we have hands, then  we know th a t  the
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BIV hypothesis is false. This implies th a t  if we do n ’t  know th a t the  BIV 
hypothesis is false, th en  we do n ’t  know th a t we have hands. To reject this 
in stan tia tion  of the  second premise in AI violates closure.3
However, there is an  ordinary  language a ttem p t to  defeat th is version 
of skepticism: DeRose (1995, 3-5) believes the  skeptical puzzle (in th e  very 
general form, which would include even instan tia tions involving closure) is 
dissolvable w ithout having to  com pletely cap itu la te  to  skepticism. His solu­
tion  is contextualist— contextualist solutions solve the  puzzle by a ttrib u tin g  
th e  plausibility of each of th e  propositions in th e  set to  changing standards 
of knowledge— th a t is, sentences th a t  use the  word “know” express different 
propositions in different conversational contexts; these propositions vary in 
term s of the  evidential s tandards th a t  m ust be fulfilled to  count as knowing. 
Everyday uses of “know” im ply a lower s tan d ard  of knowledge, according to  
which we count as knowing propositions like “I have hands.” However, when 
th e  skeptical argum ent is offered, the  context changes and th e  s tandards for 
knowledge are raised so th a t  we d on’t  count as knowing th a t  we have hands. 
T hus in the  context of th e  skeptical argum ent the  skeptical conclusion is 
true , b u t in ordinary  contexts we tru th fu lly  accept its negation. A nd when 
we hear it we feel the  pull of th e  argum ent because the conclusion really is 
tru e  in th e  context of AI due to  the  rise in standards. Yet we resist accept­
ing th e  conclusion in th is context because we don’t  fully recognize th a t  the
3Philosophers sometimes reject closure, as David Christensen does, but the objections 
offered by him and others seem answerable with the distinction between strong and weak 
closure, weak closure implies that if S  knows P , and knows that P  implies Q, and both 
P  and Q are contextually related, then S knows Q (See pages 20-21 of this thesis). 
Perhaps the mentioning of skeptical hypotheses contextually relates them to perceptual 
propositions. This view of closure could be part of what is behind the relevant alternative 
versions of the solution to skepticism—only relevant alternatives to P  need to be ruled out 
to know P  because on weak closure knowing P  implies only that we know that incompatible 
propositions that are contextually related to P  are false. However, DeRose (1995) attacks 
this solution on the grounds of the circularity of “ruling H  out,” “knowing H  is false,” 
etc: these grounds don’t seem to be affected by the plausibility of weak closure.
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stan d ard s have been raised.
Steven Schiffer and Jason  Stanley have criticized this version of contex- 
tualism . Schiffer (2004, 325-328) claimed th a t DeRose’s sem antic theory  is 
incom plete in th a t  it doesn’t  explain why a seemingly non-indexical sentence 
such as “Fred knows th a t  he has hands” is indexical (in th a t th e  stan d ard s of 
knowledge are context re la tive). He lists three ways the  account can be filled 
in, all th ree of which conflict w ith  DeRose’s error theory. T he first is the 
hidden indexical theory  where there are unarticu la ted  constituents, “propo- 
sitional constituents th a t  a ren ’t  the  sem antic values of any of the  term s in 
th e  u tte red  sentence.” These constituen ts take on the  role of providing the 
indexicality of the  proposition to  which they  belong. An exam ple of such a 
sentence would be “I t ’s ra in ing ,” in which there is an unspoken and context- 
relative im plied location, e.g., “in London.” A dopting th is theory  would have 
“relative to  s tandard  N” as u narticu la ted  constituents of knowledge claims.
Schiffer’s problem  w ith  th is  account is th a t  in propositions of th is  type 
th e  speaker knows w hat th a t  indexical means, he isn’t confused abou t it. 
Someone u ttering  “I t ’s ra in ing.” in London would know th a t “in  London” is 
the  u narticu la ted  constituent, he w ouldn’t  be confused abou t it and th ink  it 
was “in San Diego.” However, according to  the  error theory  of DeRose, we 
are confused abou t th is  constituen t when “I know I have hands” is u ttered  
in th e  presence of the  BIV form of AI. Schiffer th inks th is ignorance is very 
im plausible.
T he second way is to  allow th a t  “know” itself is indexical. T hus when one 
uses the  word “know” he really m eans knowe, where “e” specifies a  stren g th  of 
epistem ic position requirem ent. T he skeptical paradox is solved by claiming 
th a t  we th ink  the  conclusion of AI is false because we m istakenly believe th a t 
“know” m eans knowe, where e specifies a  low value, when it really specifies
99
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
a  high value. Schiffer’s objection to  th is approach is th a t  it falls into the 
tra p  of the  first approach— we norm ally know in w hat sense we are using an 
indexical expression.
T he th ird  way is to  appeal to  the  vagueness th a t  any word or expression 
natu ra lly  has. T his vagueness m ay be such th a t  w hen “know” is used it can 
have broader or narrow er extensions, given th e  conversational context. In 
AI the conclusion uses “know” w ith  a  narrow  extension so th a t  it renders 
the  conclusion true , b u t nonetheless we m istake “know” to  have a broader 
extension when we see the  argum ent, producing an  in tu ition  against the  con­
clusion. Schiffer (2004, 327-328) again objected  th a t  we norm ally know w hat 
sense we are using a word, even w ith  its n a tu ra l vagueness. T hus the  theo­
ries th a t  can explain th e  indexicality of sta tem en ts abou t knowledge imply 
th a t  we w ouldn’t  m ake th e  m istakes th a t DeRose’s error theory  (nam ely th a t  
we m istakenly do no t realize th a t the  evidential s tandards are raised when 
skeptical argum ents are offered) requires.
S tanley’s criticism  focused on differences betw een how “know” and term s 
th a t  are accepted as contextual are used, “know” doesn’t  seem to  fit the  
p a tte rn s  these o ther words follow. T his com bined w ith  an  alternative expla­
n ation  for why epistem ic s tandards seem to  shift between contexts, viz., th a t 
the  shifts are due to  changes in w hat is practically  a t stake, provides another 
case against D eRose’s version of contextualism  (see section 6.2.2 for further 
discussion).
T his brief trea tm en t of some of the  skeptical debate doesn’t  establish th a t  
an  ordinary  language solution to  it hasn ’t  been found or won’t  be found. Nor 
does it establish th a t  th e  above a ttem p ts  to  resist skepticism  are doom ed to  
failure. However, th e  back and forth  of th is debate is typical of discussions of 
skepticism, and I am  unaw are of any solutions to  th e  problem  of skepticism
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th a t  don’t  have deep problems. Given th is  and the  fact th a t  the  skeptical 
debate has continued for centuries w ithout any widely accepted solution, 
there is substan tia l evidence th a t the  problem  of skepticism  doesn’t  have an 
ordinary  language solution. T his suggests an  incoherence in the  concept of 
knowledge.4
For consider th e  following: according to  our ord inary  concept of knowl­
edge, we do n ’t  know th a t we have hands, because we d o n ’t  know th a t we 
aren’t  brains in vats, and  because single-prem ise closure (a t least regarding 
premises th a t  are w ith in  the  sam e conversational context) is im plied by the 
ordinary  concept of knowledge. However, “know” has an  im portan t role in 
how we in teract w ith  our environm ent— th e  practical uses of “know” are so 
comm onplace as to  no t need elaboration. If we accept th a t  we d on’t  know 
propositions like “I have hands,” then  “know” becomes a v irtually  useless 
concept in practical life. If we also accept th a t  th e  m eanings of words are 
a t least p a rtly  determ ined by their practical use, and  we find skeptical argu­
m ents, while being faithful to  the  ordinary  m eaning of “know” underm ine its 
practical use, th en  there is good reason to  believe th a t  “know” is somehow 
incoherent.
T he claim  th a t  th e  m otivation and sup p o rt behind rejecting skeptical 
conclusions is largely practical is supported  by how K aplan argued against 
S tro u d ’s skepticism . K aplan w rote th a t accepting skeptical conclusions would 
im ply th a t scientists have no knowledge, and a radical revision of all our be­
lief systems. And K aplan  and S troud agreed th a t  ord inary  practice of knowl­
edge a ttrib u tio n  is heavily dependent on practical exigencies (K aplan 2000, 
286-289). Schiffer observed th a t we couldn’t  stop believing th e  perceptual 
propositions, and claim ed th a t it would be “unthinkable” th a t  we should (see
4 Schiffer (2004) argued along similar lines.
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quotation  below). These aren’t  refu tations of the  skeptic, b u t they  do point 
to  the  practical bind we would be in if we seriously accepted th e  skeptical 
conclusion. Again, inasm uch as the  m eaning of “know” is determ ined by i t ’s 
practical use, these considerations point to  a conflict w ithin th e  concept of 
“know” itself: between these considerations and the  plausibility of closure.
To illu stra te  my point, suppose th a t skeptical argum ents win th e  day, and 
not only w ith  philosophers, bu t w ith  th e  general public. In fact, skeptical 
argum ents are a p a r t of all children’s education, w ith  the  result th a t  everyone 
knows th a t no one knows th a t they  have hands. T hen  suppose there a  m urder 
tria l, and  there  is an  eyewitness on th e  s tan d  who saw the defendant shoot the 
v ictim  in th e  head, killing him. O n cross exam ination the defense a tto rney  
asks, “b u t you d on’t  really know  th a t  th e  defendant shot the  victim , for 
you could be a  bra in  in a vat, or you m ight have been dream ing all of your 
life.” A nd everyone, including th e  eyewitness, judge, and jury, agrees th a t  
he d id n ’t  know th a t  the  defendant shot th e  victim , for he couldn’t  rule out 
these a lternative  hypotheses. W h at then? T he court still needs to  get on 
w ith  th e  case, and  they  don’t  w ant to  let th e  defendant go free on such a 
defense. I can im agine someone on the  ju ry  saying, “OK, he doesn’t  really 
know, stric tly  speaking, bu t his evidence is good enough for me to  convict the  
guy.” T his though t experim ent is no t really th a t  far fetched, for skeptics do 
th in k  th ey  are right, and would like to  convince as m any as they  can th a t we 
d on’t know th a t  we have hands. Suppose th ey  get their way, then  we m ight 
have a situ a tio n  like the  above. Yet w hat is m ade clear is th a t  the  concept 
of knowledge fills some practical role. A nd if th a t  role at least partly  defines 
th e  concept, th en  th e  concept of knowledge a t least defeats its purpose, if it 
is not incoherent, given th a t its role also involves closure.
Schiffer has sim ilar thoughts. C onsidering an argum ent he labeled “[B],”
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(1) I ’m not justified in believing th a t th e re ’s a blue cube before 
me unless I have a justification for believing th a t  I ’m  not a BIV 
which goes beyond w hatever justification is provided by my cur­
ren t sensory experience.
(2) I have no such justification.
(3) Therefore, I ’m  no t justified in believing th a t  th e re ’s a  blue 
cube before me.
Schiffer wrote:
Here is w hat I th ink  is going on w ith  the  skeptical paradox [B] 
provides. T here is a glitch in our concept of epistem ic justifica­
tion. One aspect of the  underived conceptual role of th a t  concept 
tells us th a t  ordinary  perceptual beliefs are a bench m ark for jus­
tified belief. B u t another aspect tells us th a t  a perceptual belief 
is justified only if the believer is independently  justified in dis­
believing defeating hypotheses, hypotheses th a t are incom patible 
w ith  one’s perceptual belief b u t such th a t  one would have ex­
actly  the  sense experience leading to  one’s perceptual belief even 
if th e  hypotheses were true. We th en  realize th a t we can have 
no such independent justifications for th e  all-embracing skepti­
cal hypotheses; hence the  skeptical paradox [B] provides. B ut 
i t ’s unthinkable to  us th a t  we should stop  believing and asserting  
propositions like the  proposition th a t  th e re ’s a blue cube before 
m e or th e  proposition th a t  I have hands, and we’re so built as 
inform ation-processing m achines th a t  i t ’s doubtful th a t  we could 
stop  having those beliefs if we w anted to. We also recognize th a t 
i t ’s absurd  to  suppose th a t  we can be justified in believing th a t 
we have hands while not being justified in disbelieving th a t w e’re 
handless brains in vats. Finally, there  is nothing in our concept of 
epistem ic justification or elsewhere th a t  resolves these conflicts.
T here is no conceptual court of appeals. (2004, 180-181)
Speaking of th e  skeptical argum ent [B], Schiffer claimed th a t it is th e  con­
cept of epistem ic justification, presum ably as a com ponent of th e  concept of 
knowledge, th a t  is causing the  paradox. T he incoherence of th is  com ponent 
m akes knowledge an incoherent concept.
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6.2 .2  S tan ley ’s In terest R elative Invariantism  
Suggests Incoherence
I th in k  th a t  the  incoherence in the  concept of knowledge is m ade even more 
visible by S tan ley’s In terest Relative Invariantism . According to  Stanley, 
th e  m eaning of “know” includes a  “stakes” variable, the  higher the  practical 
stakes involved in basing decisions upon a  proposition, the  m ore evidence 
is required to  know it. He m ade his case by considering several scenarios 
where th e  evidence available for the  proposition “T he bank will be open 
Saturday.” is constan t for a  subject, b u t the  practical stakes vary: in low 
stakes situations we a ttr ib u te  knowledge to  the  subject “H annah ,” and in 
high stakes situations we d on’t.
S tan ley’s view is inconsistent w ith  w hat he called intellectualism, th e  view 
th a t knowledge, as an  epistem ic concept, cannot have a  practical com ponent. 
According to  Stanley, intellectualism  is a  “wide orthodoxy,” and  to  accept 
his thesis would blur lines trad itionally  thought to  be clear.
I th ink  th a t  S tan ley’s observations point m ore to  an  incoherence in knowl­
edge th an  tow ard a coherent concept th a t  includes practical interests. For the  
intellectualist in tu ition  is, as he adm its, wide orthodoxy. T he case for p rac­
tical in terests factoring into knowledge adm itted ly  stem s from th e  ordinary 
exam ples he uses, and straightforw ard in tu itions regarding them . B u t also a 
p a rt of ordinary th inking is a revulsion tow ard wishful thinking, or believing 
th ings ju s t because they  are useful as opposed to  justified by evidence, etc. 
Com bine th is w ith  th e  force of the  skeptical argum ents given closure, the 
pull of th e  dream  argum ent, th e  requirem ent th a t  we rule ou t incom patible 
claim s before we have knowledge, and the  very anti-practical im plications of 
th e  resulting skepticism , th en  we it looks like we really do have aspects of 
th e  ordinary  concept of knowledge th a t m itigate against S tan ley’s view. T his
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isn ’t  to  weaken the  force of S tan ley’s case so m uch as to  highlight th e  tension 
between very legitim ate and incom patible aspects of the  ord inary  concept of 
knowledge.
6.3 A M ildly Unhappy-face Explication of 
the Concept of Knowledge
Schiffer (2004) distinguished two types of solutions to  paradoxes, “happy- 
face” and “unhappy face” solutions. Happy-face solutions single out the 
offending proposition(s) in th e  inconsistent set as false, and explain why it 
seemed plausible, in spite of its  falsehood. An unhappy-face solution doesn’t 
do these things, b u t explains th e  paradox by specifying concepts in th e  para­
dox th a t are incoherent. Schiffer th inks th a t [B] has no happy-face solution, 
m ainly because th is paradox shares a property  w ith  o ther non-happyface- 
solvable paradoxes, it has defied an agreed solution to  intelligent would-be 
solvers working hard  over m any centuries. Schiffer th en  blam ed th e  paradox 
on th e  concept of epistem ic justification— it is incoherent because it implies 
th a t  typical perceptual beliefs are justified while also im plying closure.
Schiffer further distinguished weak (mildly) unhappy-face solutions and 
strong unhappy-face solutions (W UFS and SUFS respectively). SUFS end by 
saying th a t th e  offending concept cannot be replaced w ith  ano ther coherent 
concept th a t  fills the  sam e conceptual role it once had. W U FS deny this, 
claim ing th a t there are o ther concepts th a t  are coherent and do fill th is role, 
for th e  m ost part. Schiffer believes th a t  although only SUFSs are available 
for free-will paradoxes and sorites, a  W UFS is available for th e  skeptical 
paradox.
Schiffer recom m ended replacing epistem ic justification w ith  epistem ic jus-
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tification*. T his concept:
1. C ounts beliefs th a t  P  based on sensory experiences of P  in 
norm al circum stances as a priori justified.
2. R espects closure under known entailm ent.
Schiffer’s ra tionale for justification* is th a t  we can ’t  help b u t form beliefs 
based on sensory experience, and the  need for a  concept of justification th a t 
approves of these beliefs— it m ust do so in order for it to  be of any use to  us 
in distinguishing beliefs th a t  are likely to  be tru e  from those th a t  aren ’t. We 
also m ust recognize the  absurdity  of not believing w hat we know is entailed 
by w hat we already believe. This conjunction implies th a t  we are justified in 
believing skeptical hypotheses to  be false. According to  Schiffer, justification 
as it now stands cannot rule out (2) of [B]. Justification* of perceptual beliefs 
can.
The im plication for skepticism  (though no t m ade explicit by Schiffer) is 
th a t  knowledge be replaced by knowledge*. I presum e th a t th is would m ean, 
on Schiffer’s account, justified* tru e  belief. For example, I know there is 
a  coffee cup on my tab le  (or a t least an object w ith  its shape and colors) 
because th is  belief is im m ediately based on sensory perception, because such 
beliefs are a priori justified, and because the  ob ject is really there (supposing, 
of course, th a t  it  is).
Schiffer blam ed th e  incoherence in th e  concept of knowledge on the  con­
cept of epistem ic justification. In the  last chap ter I considered different 
possible explicanda of epistem ic justification. Here were the  possibilities:
1. Fulfilling intellectual duties.
2. Value from an  intellectual perspective.
3. W h a t m akes tru e  belief knowledge.
Schiffer seems to  claim  th a t  explicandum  3 is incoherent. I t includes b o th  
the claim th a t  o rd inary  perceptual beliefs are justified, and th a t knowledge
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is closed under known im plication, and it is th e  conflict between these two 
aspects of th is  explicandum  th a t makes knowledge incoherent. Therefore we 
should replace it w ith  justification*. However, I d on ’t  th ink  th a t  th is  is the  
best replacem ent, for it doesn’t  account for S tan ley’s examples of practical 
in terests partia lly  determ ining w hat counts as knowledge.
T he concept of epistem ic justification th a t  I offered in the  last chapter, 
m axim izing expected epistem ic utility, won’t  work either, for it also doesn’t 
account for S tan ley ’s examples. However, consider ano ther concept I expli­
cated  in chapter four: general justification. T he explicandum  basically says 
th a t  a  belief is justified for S  iff the  form ation of th e  belief was in line w ith 
w hat S  values overall, th a t  is, w ith w hat she values bo th  epistem ically and 
practically. T he explication for this view is straightforw ard using BTRA: an 
acceptance is justified overall for S  iff it m axim izes general u tility  for S.
Regarding S tan ley’s examples, to  explain them  it needs to  imply th a t  as 
practical stakes get higher for S ,  the probability  th a t  P  has to  have to  m ake 
accepting P  m axim ize general u tility  for S  rises. As it stands, B TR A  doesn’t 
do this, for it raises the  probability  th a t P  has to  have in inverse relationship 
w ith the  odds, no t in  d irect relationship to  the  stakes involved. Is th is a  big 
problem ?
T hough S tanley claimed th a t it is a rise in stakes th a t  raises the  probabil­
ity  P  needs to  have for H annah to  know it in his examples, it is more accurate 
to  say th a t  it is really a  lowering in odds. C onsider two of his examples:
Low Stakes. H annah and her wife Sarah  are driving home on 
a  Friday afternoon. T hey  plan to  stop  a t th e  bank on the  way 
home to  deposit their paychecks. I t is no t im portan t th a t  they  do 
so, as th ey  have no im pending bills. B u t as th ey  drive past the 
ban k , th e y  n o tice  th a t  th e  lines inside a re  very  long, as th e y  often  
are on Friday afternoons. Realizing th a t it isn ’t  very im portan t 
th a t  th e ir paychecks are deposited right away, H annah says, “I
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know th e  bank will be open tom orrow, since I was there ju s t two 
weeks ago on S aturday  morning. So we can deposit our paychecks 
tom orrow  m orning.”
High Stakes. H annah and her wife Sarah are driving hom e on a 
F riday afternoon. T hey plan to  stop  a t th e  bank  on th e  way home 
to  deposit their paychecks. Since th ey  have an  im pending bill 
coming due, and very little  in their account, it is very im portan t 
th a t  they  deposit their paychecks by Saturday. H annah notes 
th a t she was a t the  bank two weeks before on a  Saturday  morning, 
and  it was open. B ut as Sarah po in ts out, banks do change their 
hours. H annah says, “I guess you’re right. I d on ’t  know th a t  the 
bank will be open tom orrow .” (2005, 3-4)
According to  Stanley, the  evidential base is th e  same in bo th  examples, w hat 
changes are th e  stakes.5 However, I th ink  th is  change is actually  a change in 
odds. G iven th a t  a very bad consequence follows from not paying the  bill, 
and the  payoff if they  are right is relatively little  (avoiding th e  lines), we 
have very low odds. Com pare to  th e  first exam ple where the  payoff if they  
are righ t isn ’t  g reat, b u t the  loss if they  are w rong isn ’t  g reat either. I t isn ’t  
a rise in stakes th a t  is occurring here, bu t an  increase in the  loss if th ey  are 
wrong (the  payoff if they  are right rem ains constan t), and thus a lowering of 
odds.
B T R A  im plies th a t  th is  lowering of odds raises th e  probability  threshold  
for ra tionally  accepting P.  Therefore I propose knowledgeg such th a t:
S  knowsg  th a t  P  iff S  accepts P , P  is true , accepting P  maximizes 
general expected u tility  for S ,  and  S ’s subjective probability  for P  
is reasonably close to  its inductive probability  given S 's  evidence.
T hus B TR A  and knowledge,, can account for the  shifting in tu itions— 
we d on’t  a ttr ib u te  knowledge in the  second case because accepting th a t  the
5T h e  se c o n d  e x a m p le  d o e s  h a v e  th e  m e n tio n  o f  b a n k s ch a n g in g  h o u rs, w h ich  is cer ta in ly  
a relevant piece of evidence. However, the mentioning doesn’t add this piece of evidence 
to Hannah’s knowledge base, for in all likelihood she already knew it—Sarah’s remark was 
a mere reminder.
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bank is open doesn’t  m axim ized expected u tility  for H annah, unlike the  first 
exam ple in which it does and we do a ttr ib u te  knowledge.
Schiffer’s account doesn’t  explain th is, b u t does it have other advantages 
over knowledge^? One m ight be th a t it doesn’t  violate intellectualist in tu ­
itions. Intellectualism  is definitely a p a rt of th e  ordinary concept of knowl­
edge, b u t so is practical use. W hich do we favor? I subm it th a t  we don’t  have 
to  favor either, for once the concept of knowledge is adm itted  to  be incoher­
ent, replacem ent concepts can be devised to  fit w hatever our desiderata  are. 
In fact, w hat th e  incoherence shows is th a t  there  are different explicanda 
th a t  can be chosen for the  explication of knowledge, mine being one th a t 
fills th e  practical use of the  word “know” and  reflects m aking good cognitive 
decisions. If our desiderata include explaining S tanley’s examples, th en  my 
explicatum  fits b e tte r  th an  Schiffer’s, if it isn ’t  then  Schiffer’s m ight be b e t­
te r  (or some o ther theory  th a t obeys in tellectualist in tu itions).6 B ut w here I 
th in k  knowledge,, really has an advantage is in the  fact th a t  it is em bedded in 
larger theories (probability  and Bayesian decision theory): we already have a 
well developed ap p ara tu s  th a t can be used to  determ ine which beliefs count 
as knowledge,, and which d on’t. Schiffer’s alternative, however, doesn’t  have 
th is  advantage. Therefore I th ink  th a t  though  b o th  knowledge,, and  Schif­
fer’s knowledge* are legitim ate explications of knowledge, knowledge^ has 
significant advantages over knowledge*.
6However, even Schiffer’s view may be seen as not avoiding violating intellectualist 
intuitions in that the reason for accepting perceptual beliefs as a priori justified is largely 
practical in nature.
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6.4 Conclusion
Now I ’d  like to  briefly apply knowledge, to  AI. Suppose accepting th a t  we 
have hands maximizes general expected u tility  for us. Also suppose th a t  
accepting weak closure m axim izes general expected u tility  for us. Finally, 
suppose th a t accepting th a t  we d on’t  know th a t  we are no t brains in vats 
doesn’t  m axim ize general expected utility. As these suppositions are initially 
plausible (given th a t we need to  live the  lives we a t least th in k  we have), 
and  as they  do not form an  inconsistent set, if it is indeed tru e  th a t we 
have hands, th en  we know', th a t  we have hands. I subm it th a t  knowledge, 
solves AI. Of course, i t ’s an  unhappy face solution, the  solution comes out of 
th e  smoke of the  destruction  of our ordinary  concept of knowledge. B ut i t ’s 
b e tte r  th a n  no solution, and  b e tte r  th an  unsuccessfully d isputing  w hat the 
incoherent concept expressed by “knowledge” really is.
110
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C hapter 7 
B urden o f P roof
In the  final chapters of th is thesis I will apply B TR A  to  two m ore philo­
sophical points of interest, the  concept of burden of proof, and th e  principle 
of m ethodological naturalism . R egarding burden of proof, I will explicate 
it as an example of a  default function and offer B TRA  as way to  evaluate 
th e  ra tionality  of burden  of proof settings. T hen  I will apply th is explica­
tion  to  skepticism  of several kinds, arguing th a t burden  of proof shifting is a 
prom ising approach to  answering skeptics.
7.1 Explicating Burden of Proof as Default
I should first make my explicandum  a t least practically  clear w ith  examples. 
One of th e  best known is the  presum ption of innocence in crim inal courts. 
In a crim inal tria l there is a burden  of proof on th e  prosecution: unless guilt 
is established “beyond reasonable d o u b t” the  court will rule in favor of the 
defense. If no evidence is presented  or the  evidence is inconclusive, th e  court 
holds th a t  the  defendant is innocent. T he reason for th is presum ption is 
roo ted  in the  values of the  court (and th e  government th a t established it): it 
would ra th e r let the  guilty go free th an  punish the  innocent, as it considers 
the  la tte r  a  far g reater loss th a n  the  former. T he presum ption of innocence
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is a way of approaching court decisions th a t  reflects these values.1
A nother exam ple is the  common practice of giving friends the  “benefit 
of the  dou b t.” If there  is a question of w hether or not a  friend has done 
som ething offensive, and there is no relevant evidence, or th e  relevant evi­
dence is inconclusive, we often presum e th a t  th e  friend hasn ’t  com m itted  the 
offense. Thus there  is a burden of proof on accepting th a t  he has com m itted 
the  offense. I th in k  th e  reason for th is burden  of proof is also practical; it 
is more conducive to  successful relationships to  favor the  innocence of our 
friends in th is  way.
A th ird  exam ple would be the  common practice a t firing ranges to  pre­
sum e th a t  th e  firearm s are loaded— one should tre a t the  weapon as loaded 
until it is shown not to  be. T hus there is a  burden  of proof on the  propo­
sition th a t  th e  firearm  is empty. Again practical effects of basing decisions 
on the  propositions are responsible for the  burden  of proof, we would ra th e r 
err on the  side of caution  when it comes to  handling firearms, given the  
consequences of a m istake w ith  them .
Douglas W alton (1996, 86-89) argued th a t  th e  practical effects of deci­
sions based on acceptances determ ine where th e  burden of proof lies in th is 
example by noting  th a t  th e  burden  of proof regarding firearms shifts when 
th e  practical contex t of handling them  shifts— suppose one is a t war and 
abou t to  conduct an  assau lt on an  enemy position. A soldier m ight w ant to  
presum e as he prepares th a t his weapon is no t loaded— given the  practical 
consequences of carrying on the  assault w ith  an  em pty weapon. T his is a
1In law one can distinguish burden of persuasion from an evidentiary burden of proof, 
the former being the presumption of innocence that remains throughout a trial. The latter, 
however, changes: when a party presents evidence for a claim in a trial, the opposing party 
then has an evidentiary burden to challenge that evidence. However, as my point here 
isn’t so much to examine legal practice as it is to illustrate the more general concept of 
burden of proof, I will restrict myself to the first type.
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clear indication th a t it is practical in terests th a t  are m otivating the  burden 
of proof in b o th  contex ts.2
One final exam ple is found in geology. In 1915 Alfred W egener published 
The Origins o f  Continents and Oceans, in which he claimed th a t  the  con­
tinen ts of Europe, Africa, and Am erica were once joined, and have since 
spread ap a rt (and were still spreading ap art). He offered this hypothesis to  
explain th e  discovery of sim ilar fossils on th e  Am erican east cost and Euro­
pean west coast, geological sim ilarities between form ations on the  different 
continents, and the  rough com plem entarity of th e  coastlines of Am erica and 
those of Africa and Europe. A t first his theory  received m ostly ridicule, as he 
provided no m echanism  for th e  movem ent of th e  continents, and it seemed 
im plausible th a t  the  softer form ations of th e  continents could “plow” through 
the  harder rock found a t th e  bo ttom  of the  ocean.
However, fu rther evidence for th e  m ovem ent of th e  continents appeared 
in the  1960’s w ith  th e  discovery of sea floor spreading. A com bination of 
th is and other observations overcame the  evidential difficulty regarding the 
softness of th e  continent form ations and th e  hardness of the  bo ttom  of the  
ocean to  tip  th e  scales in  favor of W egener’s hypothesis th a t  the continents 
were drifting apart, and the  theory  was accepted by geologists.
T his is a clear exam ple of burden of proof in science—when a new hypoth­
esis is offered and it conflicts w ith or seems im plausible in light of established 
beliefs, there is a burden  of proof on th a t hypothesis. T h a t was the  situation  
regarding W egener’s hypothesis when it was first offered— even though there 
was evidence for th e  proposal, it w asn’t  enough to  m eet the  burden. W hen
more evidence for it was found, the  cum ulative evidence m et the  burden, and
2Walton (1996, 55-56, 117, 222) seems to agree with my claim that practical factors, 
viz, the consequences of basing decisions on a proposition, are a powerful influence on 
many burden of proof settings, though he allows for other influences as well.
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th e  hypothesis was eventually accepted by geologists.
T he logical s tru c tu re  of the  above examples is cap tured  by th e  concept 
of a default. D efaults can be viewed as a  type of function in which all inpu ts 
except a set of “overriders” are m apped onto the  default o u tp u t, and those 
inpu ts  in th e  set of overridders are m apped onto ou tpu ts o ther th a n  the  
default. To represent the  possibility of no input, we include in th e  dom ain 
of th e  function the  tautology (which always o b ta in s); if it alone is th e  inpu t 
for the  function, the  default o u tp u t follows.
Exam ples of default functions are com m on in software. In M icrosoft 
Word, for example, there is a default regarding page layout; th e  program  
will produce docum ents w ith  the  “p o rtra it” page layout unless some inpu t is 
entered to  override it.
B urden of proof m ay be though t of as a  special type of default function 
in which th e  dom ain is restric ted  to  th e  set of evidence (and the  tau to logy), 
and  the  range is a  set of possible acceptances (including the  tautology) such 
th a t  all evidential inpu t into the  function except inpu t from th e  overriding 
set yields th e  default acceptance, while inpu t from the  overriding set yields 
some o ther ou tpu t.
T he presum ption  of innocence can be expressed as a  default of th is  type. 
Here th e  inpu t dom ain is evidence presented regarding the  charge against 
th e  defendant. T he overriding subset of th is  evidence is evidence in favor 
of guilt th a t  m akes the  guilt of th e  defendant “beyond a reasonable d o u b t.” 
A nd th e  range of ou tpu ts  for th is default is to  find the defendant guilty or 
no t guilty. Unless there is inpu t from th e  set of evidence in th e  overriding 
set th e  default will ob tain—th e  court will find the  defendant no t guilty.
R egarding giving a friend the  benefit of the  doubt, the inpu t is evidence 
for th e  friend’s guilt, the  overriding subset is evidence th a t  convinces to  a
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sufficient degree. T he o u tp u t range are the judgm ents th a t  the  friend is 
guilty, not guilty, or the  tautology (suspend judgm ent). Unless th e  inpu t is 
one of th e  overriding set, the  default judgm ent of no t guilty obtains. W ith  
th e  gun range example, the  inpu t is evidence for the  gun being unloaded, the  
overriding subset evidence th a t  convinces to  a  sufficient (apparently  high) 
degree, th e  o u tp u t range is to  accept th a t  th e  gun is loaded, to  accept th a t  it 
is no t th e  case th a t th e  gun is loaded, and the  tautology. T he default o u tp u t 
is to  accept th a t  th e  gun is loaded.3
R egarding continental drift, and m any other scientific hypotheses, bur­
den of proof functions a b it differently— it operates as an evidential “score 
keeper” th a t indicates which of the  com peting hypotheses are behind  in the 
evidential “race,” viz., the  one w ith  th e  burden  of proof. T he continental 
d rift hypothesis was behind in evidence, even w ith  W egener’s observations 
ab o u t fossils and geographical sim ilarities, because of the  in itial im plausi- 
bility  of th e  movements of th e  continents given th e  scientific com m unity’s 
background inform ation. It w asn’t  until th e  additional evidence of sea floor 
spreading was added did the  theory  have more evidence th an  its  negation. 
T hus in th is exam ple th e  overriding set of evidence will be evidence th a t  
raises th e  probability  of the  theory  to  greater th an  its alternatives. T he 
default will be the  field’s currently  accepted position regarding w hatever 
question th e  theory  was form ulated to  answer.
T he score keeping burden of proof in th e  last example is a  special case
3 Perhaps it is better to think of accepting that the gun is loaded as more of a policy 
of action rather than a real acceptance, if we were to ask a person at the gun range if he 
believes the gun is loaded, he may answer, “No, but why take the chance.” However, for 
the purposes of illustration, the mechanism of this burden of proof (and the presumption 
of innocence as well) serves as a clear example, so I will use it. I’m not trying to prove 
that acceptances often have burden of proof settings with this example (I think that much 
is  obvious) as m u ch  as i llu s tr a te  h o w  su ch  b u rd en s w ork— I th in k  th e  s im ila r it ie s  are  c lo se  
enough for my purposes.
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of th e  type of burden of proof found in the  first three examples in th a t the 
overriding inputs are evidence for the  hypothesis th a t  renders its  probability  
g reater th an  one half, or a t least greater th an  any of its  rivals (if there  are 
m ore th an  two com peting hypotheses. We will see th a t  th is  is w hat hap­
pens in burden of proof settings when there  are two com peting hypotheses, 
practical factors are removed, and when the  two hypotheses have th e  same 
am ount of content and  the  sam e distances from tru th  when false.
7.2 Burden of P roof and B T R A
Defaults th a t  have sets of evidence as their dom ains and propositional a t­
titu d es  (including acceptances) as their ranges I will term  doxastic defaults. 
B urdens of proof are doxastic defaults in which the o u tp u t set contains only 
acceptances.4
T hus there is, for any particu la r doxastic default: a specification of the  
overriding set of evidence, a  specification of the doxastic a ttitu d es  in the 
range, a specification of th e  default o u tp u t, and a  m apping of inpu ts in the 
overriding set onto doxastic a ttitu d e s  in the  range other th an  the  default. In 
th is  section I will use B TR A  to  specify th e  overriding sets of evidence. L e t’s 
also assum e as we did th roughou t th e  thesis th a t  evidence for a  proposition P  
can be quantified as follows, th e  level of evidence for P  from body  of evidence 
E  is given by its  inductive probability, th a t  is: p (P  \ E ).
4Defaults could also apply to other doxastic attitudes, such as hoping that P , wishing 
that P , acting as if P  is true, having faith that P , etc. Presumably Bayesian decision theory 
could be used to decide whether these attitudes are rational as well. Also, the presumption 
of innocence could be thought of as a default course of action (as opposed to an acceptance), 
the court will not convict unless the burden of proof is met by the prosecution. Yet 
one could think of the court “accepting” the proposition that the defendant is guilty or 
innocent, in at least a symbolic way. I include it here as it is a well known example of 
burden of proof, and the logic behind it is the same regardless of whether we see it as a 
rule for acceptance or a rule of action.
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T hen  the  set of evidence th a t would qualify as overriding would be all 
evidence such th a t  p ( P  \ E ) is g reater th an  or equal to  some threshold  value 
r. T he job of B TR A  is to  set such thresholds (or evaluate already existing 
thresholds). T he thresholds could be evaluated by determ ining w hether the 
threshold value is th e  lowest value of p (P  | E )  th a t  m akes accepting P  
m axim ize expected u tility  (assuming, of course, th a t  the agen t’s subjective 
probability  for P  is the  sam e as the  inductive probability).
R egarding th e  exam ple of giving our friends th e  “benefit of th e  doub t,” 
we m ight say th a t th is  is a  doxastic default w ith the  default being accepting 
th e  proposition “My friend is innocent.” Here the  evidential threshold  is 
presum ably some value greater th an  0.5. We can determ ine th is threshold 
by applying BTRA. To aid th is  evaluation le t’s consider a  single example— 
suppose M ary told Fred a  secret and, to  her dismay, she la te r found th a t 
here entire network of acquaintances knows the secret. T his causes her to  
en terta in  the  proposition P  =  “Fred betrayed my secret to  m y friends.”
To find a threshold  using B TR A  we find a  probability  value for P , r, 
where th e  expected u tility  of accepting P  is equal to  or g reater th an  the 
expected u tility  of any o ther option. T hough we are u ltim ately  in terested  in 
th e  to ta l expected u tility  of these acceptances, it m ight be easier to  consider 
epistem ic and practical u tility  separately  first. To simplify th e  analysis I will 
consider only accepting P  and  accepting P.
T he expected epistem ic u tility  of P  is calculated by a p robability  weighted 
average epistem ic u tility  of P  given each possible consequence of accepting 
P.  T he epistem ic u tility  of P  in any particu lar s ta te  of the  world is a function 
of th e  content of P  and its  d istance from tru th  given th a t s ta te , th a t  is, from 
chapter four:
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Ue(P, x ) =  kcon t(P )  — d(P, x )
where “x ” is a s ta te  of th e  world, l‘con t(P )” is th e  function expressing how 
m uch content P  has, “d(P , x ) ” is the function describing how far from the 
tru th  P  is given x, and  “fe” is a constant describing how much weight content 
has com pared to  d istance from tru th . T hen  expected epistem ic utility, as the 
probability  weighted average is:
E U e(P ) = J 2 p ( x )(kcon t(P ) ~  d (p >x ))
x ex
where “X ” is a p artitio n  of the  relevant s ta tes  of the world. To find r  
regarding expected epistem ic utility, we need to  find out w hat probability  P  
has to  be to  m ake th e  expected epistem ic u tility  of accepting P  the  same or 
greater th a n  accepting P , which we can do by solving the  following equation 
for p (P ):
y ^ j p (x ) (kc o n t(P )  — d { P ,x )) =  y~ '^p(x)(kcont(P) — d (P ,x ) )
x e x  x ex
In th is decision problem  le t’s assum e the  s ta tes  p a rtitio n  is sim ply {P, P } . As 
is difficult to  say w hether P  or its  negation in th is  exam ple has greater con­
ten t, perhaps it is reasonable to  assum e their conten t values are the  same— for 
expediency sake let us do so here. T hus we need only consider d istance from 
tru th . To simplify th ings, we are only considering th e  s ta tes  in which P  is 
tru e  or false, thus th e  d istance from tru th  can only take one of two values,
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zero or one. A nd rem em ber we are assum ing th a t she has only two choices— 
she will e ither accept P  or accept P.  Assum ing th e  content values of P  and 
its  negation are th e  same, and their distances from tru th  are th e  same when 
false, expanding th e  sum m ations and solving th e  resulting equation for p (P )  
yields a value of 0.5.
Thus, considering th is  decision alone, if M ary’s burden  of proof evidential 
threshold is a t (or somewhere near) 0.5, it seems an epistem ically rational 
burden of proof to  have.
However, th ings m ight be different regarding expected practical utility. 
Regarding it, E U a is th e  expected utility, taken  together, of all th e  choices 
S  will make if she accepts a proposition. T hen  we solve the  equation below 
for p(P)-
Y^P(x)(Ua{P,x)) =  ^2p(x) (Ua(P,x))
Keeping th ings simple, let us suppose th a t  if M ary accepts P ,  she will break 
off her friendship w ith  Fred, and if she accepts P  she will rem ain friends w ith  
Fred. T hen  let M ary’s utilities for each outcom e be given in the  following 
table:
P P
Accept P 0 - 1 0
Accept P - 5 10
These utilities reflect th a t  M ary doesn’t  w ant to  lose th e  friendship, b u t would 
not w ant to  be friends w ith someone unfaithful in keeping secrets. However, 
she would consider the  worst consequence one in which the  friendship was 
term inated  because Fred was incrim inated unjustly. Ju s t considering practi-
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cal u tilities, the  default action would then  be ra tional iff p ( P ) is less th an  or 
equal to  0.8. T his value reflects the  fact th a t  M ary would ra th e r err on the  
side of F red’s innocence.
To com bine the  two u tility  functions, we need to  specify w, th e  weight 
placed on epistem ic u tility  relative to  practical utility. Given a w  value of, 
say, 10, th e  default is ra tional iff it sets r  a t 2 /3 — it maximizes expected 
u tility  to  accept P  iff its probability  is a t least th a t  high. As w  increases, r 
will approach 0.5, the  value it would have if she only cared abou t epistem ic 
value, and  as it decreases, it will approach 0.8, the  value it would have if she 
only cared abou t practical outcom es of th e  default.
Of course, th is  calculation takes into consideration only one proposition 
and  th e  decisions th a t will follow from its acceptance/non-acceptance, the  
general default of giving friends th e  benefit of the  doubt is a m uch broader 
in its effect, bo th  in the  propositions accepted and th e  decisions th a t  follow 
from those acceptances. To see w here r  should be set, we need to  consider 
all the  these acceptances and decisions. This, of course, com plicates finding 
a  value for r . However, we can see th a t  w here r  should be placed will depend 
on ju s t these kinds of considerations, and  rough approxim ations to  answers 
to  th e  above questions will inform  our choices of burden  of proof. T he answer 
will be determ ined by the  value of r  derived from a decision problem  th a t 
takes into consideration all of these po ten tia l acceptances, decisions, and 
consequences. B ut if m ost of the  decisions involving a ttrib u tin g  guilt to  a 
friend have u tilities like the  ones specified in th is example, th en  r  for th is 
burden  of proof will be near where it is here. T his makes intu itive sense, ju s t 
as the  practice of giving friends th e  benefit of th e  doubt does.
R egarding th e  presum ption of innocence in Am erican crim inal courts, the  
overriding set of evidence will be th a t  which is beyond reasonable doub t. We
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m ight th ink  of it th is way: P  is beyond reasonable doubt iff: p ( P  | E )  > r.
T his specification of a th reshold  is of course vague, for w hat value r  m ust 
be so th a t  probabilities less th an  or equal to  it im ply reasonable doub t against 
P  is no t clear. We can probably say w ith  some confidence th a t  it is g reater 
th a n  0.5 and less th an  1. However it m ight be useful here for th e  purposes 
of dem onstrating  the  relevance of B TR A  in testing  evidential thresholds to  
supply an  artificial value for th is threshold, le t’s say th a t it is equivalent to  
a probability  of 0.9.
According to  the  doxastic default in place, th e  court will accept th a t  the 
defendant is guilty only if the  evidential inpu t is such th a t it will render the  
probability  of the  proposition th a t  he is guilty  0.9 or higher.
Let us look a t a specific fictional tria l. Suppose Mr. Sm ith is on tria l for 
m urder. If convicted he will be sentenced to  death . If not he will be set free. 
Let P  =  “Sm ith is guilty.” If th e  court accepts P,  it will convict Sm ith. If 
it accepts P ,  it  won’t. Suppose th a t  th e  practical utilities of the  court are as 
follows:
Sm ith  is guilty. Sm ith is no t guilty.
Accept th a t  Sm ith is guilty 100 -1 5 0 0
Accept th a t  Sm ith is no t guilty -1 0 0 100
These utilities reflect the fact th a t  th e  court would consider it a  g reat travesty  
to  send an  innocent m an to  death , com pared to  the  reverse m istake. T he 
default is th e  m ost ra tional action iff the  expected u tility  of accepting th a t  
Sm ith is guilty is less th an  or equal to  the  expected utility  of accepting th a t 
he isn ’t  guilty. T he threshold r  will be the  probability  th a t th e  proposition
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“Sm ith is guilty” needs to  have to  make its acceptance rational.
To decide we will only consider practical utility, assum ing th a t  th e  co u rt’s 
p rim ary  function isn ’t  an  epistem ic one, bu t one of m eeting out rulings th a t 
help society handle crime. T hen , the  default is ra tional if and  only if the 
probability  of P  is less th an  or equal to  0.89 . In th is s ituation  it seems th a t  
th e  default of 0.9 is a t least a good approxim ation of the  a ttitu d e  the  court 
should take regarding how it rules given evidence.
However, suppose ano ther case: Mr. Blake, a  16 year old, is on trial 
for burglary. Let P  m ean “Blake is guilty.” If the  court accepts P ,  th en  it 
will convict Blake, and  sentence him  to  a  year in a work cam p for juvenile 
offenders. If it accepts P ,  th en  it will let Blake go free. Suppose further th a t 
th e  co u rt’s utilities are represented  in the  following table:
Blake is guilty. Blake is no t guilty.
Accept th a t  Blake is gu ilty 50 -2 0 0
A ccept th a t  Blake is no t guilty. - 5 0 75
T he crime here is considerably less serious th an  in the  first example, thus 
there are lower u tility  num bers, and th e  court doesn’t  abhor th e  consequence 
of sentencing an  innocent Blake as m uch as it would sentencing an innocent 
Sm ith, as it would m erely involve a year a t an unpleasant labor cam p. Given 
th e  above utilities r  =  0.73. T his case seems to  indicate a  different threshold 
th a n  0.9, for th is th reshold  would recom m end an irra tional action in those 
cases where 0.73 <  p (P )  < 0.9, th a t  is, when the  probability  of P  is high 
enough to  make convicting Blake the  reasonable choice, yet is not high enough 
to  override the  default threshold. Different cases seem to  require different 
thresholds. If we were to  choose a  single burden of proof value for all crim inal
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cases, we would have to  accept th a t  som etimes the  court verdict w ouldn’t  be 
ra tional according to  BTR A . Nonetheless, we could try  to  find a num ber th a t 
would maximize expected u tility  given all the  decisions th a t m ay follow in 
the  long run. One could also m itigate the  loss in individual cases by choosing 
r  values for narrow er contexts—we could choose an  r  value for m urder cases, 
and for p e tty  theft, etc.
O f course, evaluating a  th reshold  for a doxastic default th a t  ranges over a 
wide num ber of doxastic decisions would thus be a long and perhaps im possi­
ble task  to  do completely. B ut evaluations of th is so rt need not be complete, 
instead the  above could serve as a  p a tte rn  of intelligent discussion— in the 
court case, for example, we can discuss w hat sorts of rulings would likely 
occur given different thresholds, and  rough ou t which value has the  best ex­
pected utility. We also m ight say th a t, if the  values used in th e  above tables 
are a t least approxim ately  correct, thresholds for m urder cases should be 
higher th an  thresholds for p e tty  trials, and possibly use th is  as an  argum ent 
for not having a single evidential threshold for all court cases.
A t th is  point one m ight wonder why the  court has a burden  of proof in 
th e  first place: why doesn’t  the  court sim ply calculate the  expected u tility  of 
each ruling available to  it, using th e  probabilities th a t  th e  evidence affords 
and the  relevant u tilities of each option. Of course, th is objection would 
apply to  all uses of bu rden  of proof—why not use Bayesian decision theory  
to  decide, for every situation  in which burdens of proof are operable, which 
action to  take. T his would be very im practical, for this would require tim e 
and effort, it m ay cost m ore in th e  added deliberations th an  would be gained 
by m aking b e tte r decisions using Bayesian decision theory  for each.
T his is the  sam e reasoning th a t is behind using acceptances as bases for 
decisions (as opposed to  using only probabilities along w ith  u tilities as in
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Bayesian decision theory). I t is a “short cu t.” T hen  it appears th a t  burdens 
of proof are really second order “sho rtcu ts,” th ey  are shortcu ts regarding 
acceptances, which in tu rn  are shortcu ts regarding decision making. If th is  is 
so, then  burdens of proof can be evaluated in term s of w hether th e  shortcu t 
loses too m uch in term s of decision m aking precision.
However, th is  m ight be a  m oot point, for to  elim inate burdens of proof 
in general would cause such an upheaval in everyday life as to  render this 
option out of th e  question. Instead  the  question is one of w hether a  particu lar 
burden of proof (w hether explicit, or implied) is rational. T he above analysis 
offers direction in evaluating burdens of proof th a t  w asn’t  available before.
T hus we can see th a t  burdens of p roof set by B T R A  are really the  same 
th ing  as setting  evidential thresholds for individual beliefs, though burden of 
proof is d istinct from th e  acceptance problem  in th a t  it m ay involve m ultiple 
acceptances, and th a t  burdens of proof as functions have default ou tputs, 
which are absent from  non-burden of proof acceptances.
T he last exam ple involved burdens of p roof in science. T he W egener case 
seemed to  me to  be a  m ere “scorekeeper” burden  of proof—th e  side w ith  the  
burden of proof is th e  side th a t is behind in evidence. This is w hat a B TR A  
analysis will yield if there are no relevant p ractical consequences involved in 
the  decision, th e  content values of the  com peting propositions are the  same, 
and the  distances from tru th  are the  sam e when wrong: these circum stances 
imply th a t it is ra tiona l to  accept a proposition if its  probability  is no t lower 
th an  any com peting proposition, and when there  are two propositions, the  
threshold will be 0.5.
However, th is  isn ’t  always the  case in science. If a  theory  has a high cog­
nitive content, th a t  could lower its r  value. A theory  th a t tells us much m ay 
not need as m uch evidence for its  ten ta tive  acceptance. One m ight th ink  th a t
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theories th a t  challenge the  dom inant paradigm  have a very heavy burden  of 
proof on them — their r  values are a lot higher th a n  0.5. However, one could 
argue th a t  th e  apparen t heaviness of th e  burden  of proof isn ’t  really caused 
by a high r  value, b u t by the  fact th a t  th e  new theory  has a  low probability  
because it contrad icts established beliefs. Here r  m ay also be 0.5, the  scien­
tific com m unity is re luc tan t to  accept the  new theory  because they  deem its 
probability  to  be lower th an  th is value, due to  its  in itia l implausibility. T h a t 
seems to  be the  case w ith  W egener’s theory.
Still, one could argue th a t  in some cases higher or lower r  values are 
justified in science. R ichard R udner argued th a t  scientists m ust allow prac­
tical in terests to  inform  their evidential thresholds, and I th ink  w ith  some 
plausibility (see chap ter three). Also, new theories, even if they  are more 
likely th a n  not, m ight be rejected because of th e  massive cognitive restruc­
tu ring  th a t accepting the  theory  would m ean for its discipline—th a t massive 
restructu ring  has costs, m ostly practical, b u t some epistem ic as well. This 
m ight explain a t least some of the  reluctance K uhn spoke of regarding ac­
cepting theories th a t  would im ply a  scientific revolution. It also seems to  fit 
w ith  Jam es’s concept of th e  conservation of belief.
Space does not perm it anywhere near an  adequate study  of such phe­
nom ena in science. W h at I claim is th a t  the  explication of burden of proof 
offered in th is chap ter allows for a more inform ed discussion of the  rationality  
of such burdens of proof. Again the  u tilities and probabilities involved would 
be extrem ely complex, and we can ’t  p re tend  any precision. However, B TR A  
and the  above explication of burden of proof a t least provide some guidance 
as to  how to  organize the  inform ation we have.
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7.3 Other Ways of D eterm ining Burden of 
P roof
T here are  a t least two other widely accepted ways of determ ining burden  of 
proof. T he first is expressed by the  d ictum  “He who asserts m ust prove.” 
If a person makes a positive claim, it is up to  him  to  provide evidence for 
it if challenged (W alton 1996, 230). However, as A nthony Flew observed in 
“T he P resum ption  of A theism ,” for each positive claim there is an  equivalent 
negative claim. W ho has the burden  of proof th en  seems to  depend on how 
th e  claim s are phrased, which doesn’t  seem plausible. Furtherm ore, Flew 
argued th a t  b o th  parties in the  d ispute m ay positively assert his side. If this 
happens, which side has the  burden  of proof? T he above principle cannot 
say.5 A nd th is principle cannot account for burdens of proof in crim inal tria l 
cases, benefit of th e  doubt cases, or th e  gun range case. Suppose a  defendant 
were to  assert th a t  he is innocent, or som eone were to  claim th a t a  gun is 
loaded, would th e  burden of proof be on them ?
T he second is given in term s of plausibility— in a dispute th e  side w ith 
th e  least in itial plausibility has the  burden  of proof. This principle as well 
doesn’t  account for the  presum ption of innocence in crim inal trials, benefit 
of th e  doub t cases, and gun range cases. In th e  cases it does account for 
it is really an  expression of the  result th a t  B T R A  produces. W hen we say 
th a t  one side is m ore plausible th a n  th e  o ther in a dispute, we are saying 
th a t, given our background inform ation and observations, it  has a higher 
probability  th a n  the  opposing side. So th is  burden  of proof is really ju s t the 
scorekeeper burden  of proof m entioned earlier, which is w hat we have when
5Flew’s view regarding where to place burdens of proof roughly parallels mine—he 
u se d  th e  a n a lo g y  w ith  th e  p resu m p tio n  o f  in n o c e n c e  to  a rgu e th a t  b u rd en s o f  p r o o f  are  
set relative to the goals and utilities held by the parties in the dispute, and he seemed to 
include both practical and epistemic utility in the evaluation (1992, 23-25)
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there  are no practical in terests involved in a dispute (or the practical results 
are sym m etrical) and the  propositions have the  same content and  distances 
from tru th  when false. I th ink  th a t the  instances when th is principle seems 
m ost plausible (e.g. scientific disputes, or disputes in which th e  stakes are 
purely  epistem ic) are the  ones in which score keeping burdens of proof are 
operative— in crim inal tria ls and a t gun ranges, places where the  practical 
results of acceptances are im p o rtan t and asym m etrical, we find th e  principle 
im plausible. T hus the  above procedure using B TR A  is the  best m ethod I 
have to  offer for determ ining burden  of proof.
7.4 Philosophical Gains from U nderstanding  
Burden of Proof: A B rief Sketch
W h at is there to  gain in philosophy from th e  above understanding  of burden  
of proof? I can th in k  of two contexts off-hand in which it m ight be helpful—  
debates abou t various forms of skepticism , and attacks on m oral absolutism  
from relativ ists and subjectivists. R egarding skepticism, consider a skeptic 
ab o u t X. W h at often happens is th a t  th e  skeptic will ask for evidence for X, 
and  if insufficient evidence is produced, he will no t accept X. T his can be 
applied to  skepticism  regarding th e  external world (W hat evidence is there  for 
our no t being brains in vats?), m oral skepticism  (W hat evidence do we have 
th a t  we can know m oral tru th s? ), skepticism  regarding induction stem m ing 
from H um e’s problem  (W hat evidence is there  for the  uniform ity principle?).
T here are, of course, o ther anti-skeptical approaches to  these problem s, 
b u t consider for a m om ent th e  role burden  of proof could play. Suppose 
th a t  the  burden  of proof were shifted to  th e  skeptic—th a t, for instance, we 
accept th e  uniform ity principle underlying induction  until evidence against it 
is produced. Or regarding external world skepticism , suppose th a t  we accept
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th a t  we are not dream ing or BIVs until some reason is produced to  accept 
th e  skeptical hypothesis. G iven the  above analysis of burden of proof, we 
m ight be able to  make a  case based on B TR A  considering w hat we have to  
gain /lose given the  decisions th a t we will base on the  relevant acceptances. 
For instance, regarding th e  ex ternal world skepticism, we m ight argue th a t 
th e  gains m ade by rejecting it if it is false outweigh the  costs of rejecting it if 
it is correct. This would shift the  burden  of proof from the  belief th a t  we can 
generally tru s t our senses regarding the  external world to  skeptical positions.
Of course, skeptics m ay reply th a t  th is m ay be good practical advice 
for accepting th a t we know abou t the  external world th rough  our senses, 
b u t th a t  doesn’t  m ean th a t  we really know, for knowledge requires having a 
sufficient level of evidence or epistem ic justification. I have already argued 
th a t  one reasonable way to  construe knowledge is to  see it as tru e  belief 
th a t  maximizes expected u tility .6 In th e  spirit of th a t  alternative is another, 
it  seems th a t a t least p a r t of th e  ordinary concept of knowledge implies a 
burden  of proof on skeptics regarding skeptical hypotheses, and  the  burden 
is ra tional according to  B T R A  given th e  decisions th a t need to  be m ade 
based on acceptance of sensory propositions. However, suppose these ways 
of viewing knowledge seem implausible; here is another argum ent. Instead  of 
considering w hether or no t we should accept P , consider w hether or not we 
should accept th e  proposition K ,  expressed by “We know th a t  P .” Perhaps 
we won’t  be able to  produce m uch in the  way of evidence for the  tru th  of 
K ,  b u t m aybe we can produce an  argum ent for shifting the  burden  of proof 
onto those who challenge th is  proposition. Here we do no t have to  argue 
th a t  we know K  because it doesn’t  have the  burden of proof, we merely need
6I argued that the ordinary concept of knowledge is incoherent and that a replacement 
concept is needed for some of the uses of the original, this was the concept I offered as a 
replacement, see chapter five.
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to  argue th a t  we should accept it on th is basis (provided K  isn ’t  defeated). 
T hen  we need not argue th a t  burden  of proof shifts can am ount to  epistem ic 
justification or knowledge to  avoid skepticism — once we accept K ,  th en  we 
accept th a t  we know th a t P . We avoid skepticism  no t by proving th a t P  or 
proving th a t  we know P ,  b u t by arguing th a t we should accept th a t  we know 
P — this is a  second-level argum ent against skepticism  regarding P . This is, 
of course, given th a t  good reason could be given for shifting the  burden of 
proof off of K ,  and B T R A  m ight be used to  do this: given our values we m ay 
be b e tte r  served by accepting K .
C .A .J. C oady actually  considered a sim ilar decision theoretic approach re­
garding th e  justification of testim ony as an epistem ic source when he trea ted  
P rice’s a ttem p t to  ju stify  testim ony through  practical reason. C oady consid­
ered th e  following proposition:
(A): W h at is said to  be (or to  have been) there  is (or was) more
often th an  not.
By th is proposition C oady was expressing the  idea th a t testim ony, as as 
evidence for belief, is usually reliable. He then  set up  the following decision 
problem : T here are two acts, accept A, or not (suspension of belief abou t A 
is considered in th is  problem  to  be included in not accepting A). T hen  the 
problem  can be represented in th e  following table:
A is true. A is false.
Choose to  believe testim ony reliable T E
Choose not to  believe testim ony reliable F S
In the  above table, “T ” stands for the  consequence of having “greatly  ex­
tended  ‘tru e  belief’ and some new false beliefs,” “E ” stands for “greatly
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extended error and  some new true  beliefs,” “F ” stands for “great failure 
to  get available ‘tru e  belief,’”  and “S” stands for “great safety from error.” 
(The letters are my addition). Coady took  P rice’s rejection of the  a ttem p t 
to  justify  A th rough  observation as m eaning th a t  the  probability  of A is 
one-half. If th is  is th e  case, th en  w hether or no t one should accept A would 
depend on one’s utilities, in particular, w hether one views the  gain of tru e  
belief g reater th an  th e  losses associated w ith  error. Coady related  th is to  the  
debate between Jam es and Clifford by noting th a t  these differences am ount 
to  different weights one places on either of Jam es’s two epistem ic goals w ith  
Clifford favoring safety, and Jam es favoring risking error for the  chance of 
tru e  belief. According to  Coady, Price favors th e  riskier approach, and hence 
he accepts A. However, C oady rejects th is  argum ent. His reason is th a t  he 
assigns the  sam e u tility  to  each consequence, and  thus w ith  the  probability 
of A being 0.5, neither decision has g reater expected u tility  th an  the o ther 
(1992, 108-113).
I don’t  see where C oady gets these values, he gives no rationale (other 
th an  saying th a t  he th inks they  are plausible), and  in th is  assignm ent he 
ignores the  subjective n a tu re  of such utilities. C learly people can differ in 
their utilities regarding these consequences— Jam es and Clifford surely did.
Also Coady d id n ’t  consider the  practical consequences of the  choices in 
the  way he set up  th is  problem . If we were to  reject A, and as a  result reject 
all of the  s ta tem en ts th a t  presum e A as lacking support, there would be 
significant p ractica l consequences. O ur practica l lives would be crippled as 
much of the  inform ation th a t we use to  m ake daily decisions would no longer 
be available. However, if A is false, p ractically  speaking our lives would be 
about the  sam e as they  are now if we accept A. T hus if we were to  apply 
these consequences to  th e  above problem  we find th a t accepting A is the
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ra tiona l choice— we lose nothing regardless of A ’s tru th  value, and lose a  lot 
if we reject A, w hether or no t A is false.
W hat th is shows is th a t  the  situation  is m ore com plicated th an  C oady de­
scribed. P ractically  speaking it seems th a t accepting A is definitely justified, 
epistem ically it is hard  to  tell w ithout knowing one’s epistem ic utilities.
One other context where burden of proof m ay be of philosophical im­
portance is the  debate abou t m oral absolutism . Some m ight argue th a t the 
apparen t lack of em pirical verifiability of m oral claims renders them  baseless. 
O thers m ight argue th a t th e  lack of consensus in ethics all the  way from the 
m eta-eth ical level down to  specific practical m oral issues (such as abortion) 
indicates th a t  we do no t know m uch abou t m orality, or th a t  m orality is itself 
som ething th a t  we cannot know abou t— perhaps because there is nothing to  
know.
However, one could reply th a t though no one has produced an uncontro- 
versial basis for an  absolute morality, no one has proved th a t there isn ’t  one 
either. Given th e  possible practical consequences of w idespread acceptance 
of alternatives such as m oral subjectivism  or relativism  (perhaps people will 
stop respecting m orality  for its own sake and only follow rules if it is in their 
in terests to  do so— som ething like the  situ a tio n  G laucon depicts in th e  R e­
public), one m ight argue, given the  above understand ing  of burden of proof, 
th a t  the  burden  of proof should not be on th e  m oral absolutist here, bu t 
on the  re lativ ist and  th e  subjectivist. W ith  th is  burden of proof, the  m oral 
absolutist only needs to  show th a t a ttacks on objective m orality are unsuc­
cessful, he doesn’t  need to  produce a  m etaphysical or em pirical ground for 
m orality. T his would make the  project of the  m oral absolutist a lot easier.
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C hapter 8 
M ethodological N aturalism
In  th e  context of the  philosophy of religion, m ethodological natu ra lism  is 
the  thesis th a t science m ust lim it itself to  th e  n a tu ra l realm. Recently the  
principle has appeared in the  philosophical portion  of the intelligent design 
debate. O pponents of Intelligent Design Theory (IDT) often argue th a t  sci­
ence cannot allow supernatu ra l explanations, and since ID T  does, it  cannot 
be science (and thus shouldn’t  be tau g h t in science classes).1 Exam ples of 
those who have used it th is way include prom inent biologists such as Douglas 
Fu tuym a (1983, 12), K enneth  M iller [Tammy Kitzm iller, e t al. v. Dover A rea 
School D istrict, e t al. 2005 W L 578974 (MD Pa. 2005)] and Niles E ldredge 
(2001, 13); position sta tem ents from th e  N ational Academy of Sciences (Ay­
ala 1984) have also cited th is principle. In  th is  chapter I will argue th a t  the 
best support for th is sense of m ethodological naturalism  only justifies it for 
people w ith  certain  practical and epistem ic utilities, and th a t people w ith 
different u tilities are no t ra tional in accepting it.
One m ight th ink  th a t m ethodological natu ra lism  follows from  th e  defini­
tion of science, or the  concept of w hat science is. In fact Ruse (1982) argued 
for m ethodological naturalism  along these lines. I will not consider th is  argu­
m ent here as P lan tinga (2001) and Lauden (1988) have, to  my m ind a t least,
1See Tammy Kitzmiller, et al. v. Dover Area School District, et al. 2005 WL 578974 
(MD Pa. 2005).
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already refuted it .2 I will refer the  reader to  them  ra th e r th an  rehearse their 
argum ents. R obert T . Pennock (1999, 194-205, 284-308) has also argued 
for m ethodological naturalism . His case involves several argum ents includ­
ing th a t  because scientific explanations m ust appeal to  laws, and  because 
supernatu ra l entities are no t subject to  laws (if they  were th ey  would cease 
to  be su p ern a tu ra l), th e  assertion th a t supernatu ra l beings could violate the  
laws of n a tu re  would underm ine science’s reliance on the  stab ility  of these 
laws. He also appeals to  th e  claim ed hum an inability to  ever determ ine if 
an  event is supernatu ral, to  the  fact th a t  supernatu ral entities are not under 
our control (hence we cannot perform  controlled experim ents w ith  th em ), to  
th e  “science stopper” argum ent, and  to  the  claim  th a t  supernatu ral explana­
tions can m ake no em pircally testab le  predictions, and hence aren ’t  scientific. 
M ost of these argum ents are addressed and rejected by P lantinga, Laudan, 
and  Michael M artin; M artin  (2002) u ltim ately  defends m ethodological n a t­
uralism  because of th e  “science s topper” argum ent (more on th is below). 
Pennock’s only argum ent th a t  is no t addressed by them  is th a t  sup ern atu ­
ral entities aren ’t  under control im plies we cannot use them  in explanations. 
However, even th is  argum ent is unconvincing, for scientists s tudy  th e  stars, 
th e  sun, etc., yet we cannot control them  in any way. T hus it seems th a t  
the  best argum ents for m ethodological natu ralism  given th e  above are the 
“science stopper,” and  the  “success of science” argum ents. Fortunately  these
2Though they seem unsuccessful, see Ruse’s response to Plantinga (1988) and his re­
sponse to Laudan (2001). There is one relatively simple way to refute this claim that is not 
mentioned by Lauden or Plantinga. Consider this adaptation of G.E. Moore’s open ques­
tion argument: If science could be defined as a purely naturalist activity, then it wouldn’t 
be an open question to ask “Should science be a purely naturalist activity,” just as it 
wouldn’t be an open question to ask whether “Should all bachelors be unmarried males.” 
However, given the literature offered by both proponents and opponents of methodologi­
cal naturalism, and the intuitive plausibility of the question, it seems that, whatever one 
believes in the end, the question is one that it makes sense to ask—it is an open question. 
Methodological naturalism is not an analytic truth.
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argum ents especially lend them selves to  Bayesian analysis, and  in particular, 
to  BTRA.
8.1 Success o f Science
B arbara  Forrest (2000) argued for m ethodological natu ra lism  roughly as fol­
lows; as science began to  adop t m ethodological natu ra lism  it blossomed. 
Previous phenom ena th a t  were though t to  be the  result of a direct action 
from God or the  su p ern atu ra l are now known to  have n a tu ra l causes, and 
theories based purely on observation and inference have replaced theological 
explanations (exam ples include th e  heliocentric solar system  replacing the 
geocentric model, uniform itarianism  in geology replacing B ible-m otivated 
catistrophism , D arw inism  over creationism ). Once we stopped  relying on 
G od or the  supernatu ra l to  explain natu re , our knowledge of the  world in­
creased dram atically, overcoming obstacles previously though t im passable, as 
testified by the  m onum ental achievem ents of m odern science. T hus m ethod­
ological naturalism  in science has proved itself, whereas supernaturalism  
h asn ’t. Inferring from p ast success, we can conclude w ith  justification th a t 
everything, a t least in principle, is natu ra lly  explainable, and  thus natura l. 
Here the  success of m ethodological naturalism  not only supports its  universal 
adoption, it also confirms philosophical naturalism .
By way of response, I first w ant to  rem ind us th a t, of course, everything 
is na tu ra lly  explainable, given underdeterm ination, we will be able to  find a 
n a tu ra l explanation  for any event if we are clever enough. Everything is also 
supernatu rally  explainable. In  fact, there are always m ultiple explanations 
for a n y  event—th is  m uch is known. W hat rem ains to  be seen is w hether or 
no t there are n a tu ra l explanations th a t are to  be preferred to  all non-natural
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explanations for every event.
Also, the successes of m ethodological naturalism  do not im ply th a t m eth­
odological natu ra lism  is th e  only m ethod of gaining knowledge; in o ther 
aspects of life, successes in one m ethod generally do n ’t  proscribe investigating 
o ther m ethods, for instance, a  m arketing team  m ight have great success w ith 
a particu lar stra tegy— th a t doesn’t  imply th a t  there  are no o ther desirable 
strategies and th a t  one should never use them . M ethodological natu ra lism ’s 
success doesn’t, by itself, adequately support its categorical adoption (in 
science or otherw ise), as success in any m ethod doesn’t  preclude investigating 
or adopting o ther m ethods. Yet th is is w hat the  success of science argum ent 
seems to  argue.
Perhaps there is a confusion in the  above argum ent in th a t  it is trea ting  
m ethodological natu ra lism  as though it were a proposition, it isn’t, it is a 
m ethodology; it would have to  be transla ted  into a proposition to  be con­
firmed. For m ethodologies a ren ’t  “confirmed” in th e  sam e way propositions 
are; often different (and incom patible) m ethodologies will work equally well. 
If th a t  is the  case, th en  th e  success of one m ethodology doesn’t  “discon- 
firm” other methodologies, m ethodologies are n o t th e  sorts of things th a t are 
disconfirmed—propositions are.
However, the  above argum ent for m ethodological naturalism  can be re­
constructed  in a way th a t involves the  confirm ation of propositions. One 
way is as follows— if th e  successes of m ethodological natu ralism  were to  con­
firm philosophical natu ra lism  (which is a proposition), th a t  would im ply th a t 
we should adopt it universally, for everything is natu ra l. T he question now 
becomes, how much do the  p ast successes of na tu ra listic  science confirm 
philosophical naturalism ?
There is a weaker proposition th a t we could tran sla te  m ethodological
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naturalism  into as well:
MN: All th e  events or objects norm ally stud ied  by science have 
na tu ra l causes.
Of course th is  proposition  is vague, as “science” doesn’t  have clear bound­
aries. I th ink  it  would be b e tte r  to  change it to:
MN*: All th e  events or objects th a t  are, in principle, publicly 
observable have n a tu ra l causes.
MN* is a stronger claim  th an  MN, for it includes the  objects of such disci­
plines as carpentry, football, and even aspects of lite rary  theory. B ut I d on ’t 
th ink  th a t  m ethodological na tu ra lists will be inclined to  object; it is in the  
spirit of m ethodological naturalism  to  lim it all public investigations to  n a tu ­
ral phenom ena, and  to  use only na tu ra l explanations to  account for them — if 
the  supernatu ra l is to  be invoked a t all, it  should be invoked only to  ex­
plain purely private, personal, or m ystical phenom ena. Still, MN* is weaker 
th an  philosophical natu ra lism  in th a t it allows th a t  some private phenom ­
ena m ight be explained by th e  supernatu ral, and  it doesn’t  claim th a t  only 
na tu ra l things exist.
So w hat can we say abou t the  confirm ation of philosophical naturalism  
and MN*? Have these propositions been confirmed by the  success of science, 
and if so, to  w hat degree. In o ther words, we would like to  know: P ( P N  \ 
S S .B ) and P (M N *  \ S S .B ) ,  where “P N ” is philosophical naturalism , “SS” 
is the  success of science, and “B” is background inform ation.
This evaluation is a  daunting  task, and I w on’t  p re tend  to  be able to  give 
a definitive answer here. B ut le t’s see if we can a t least get some idea of w hat 
the  answer is (we need to  a t some point to  use B TR A ). Perhaps it would
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be helpful to  re-express the  above expressions using Bayes’ Theorem . L e t’s 
s ta r t  w ith  philosophical naturalism . Given Bayes’ Theorem  the  following are 
true:
P ( P N  | S S .B ) P (S S .B  | P N )  w P { P N )
P ( P N  | S S .B ) ~  P (S S .B  | P N )  X P (P N )
O n the  right hand  of th e  equation we have a  p roduct of the likelihood ra tio  of
P N  and its negation (i.e., philosophical natu ra lism  is false) and the  ra tio  of
th e  prior probabilities of PN  and its negation. T he left side is the  ra tio  of the
probability  of PN  given the  success of science and  background inform ation
and th e  negation of PN  given the  same. If th e  ra tio  on the left side is g reater
th an  one, th en  PN  has a probability  g reater th an  its  negation, and if i t ’s less
th a n  one, th en  PN  is less probable th an  its negation.
This expression allows some arguably plausible simplifications. W ith ­
ou t considering evidence, it seems to  me th a t  there isn’t  much to  recom ­
m end philosophical natu ralism  (assum ing there  isn ’t  some a priori argum ent 
against the  supernatu ral) over its  negation. T hus it seems th a t the  prior 
probability  of PN  isn ’t  greater th an  its  negation. So le t’s assum e th a t  they  
are the  same. If th a t  is the  case, th en  the  ra tio  on th e  far right of the  equation 
is 1. T hen  th e  equation simplifies to:
P ( P N  | S S .B )  P ( S S .B  | P N )
P ( P N  | S S .B )  ~  P ( S S .B  | P N )
According to  th e  above equation, the  probability  of PN given the  success 
of science and  background inform ation is g reater th an  the  probability  of its 
negation given th e  sam e if and only if the  probability  of the  success of science 
and  background evidence is higher given PN  th a n  given P N .
Is th is  tru e— is the  success of science (given our background inform ation) 
m ore likely given th e  tru th  of philosophical naturalism ? I d on’t  see why it
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would be, for why m ust non-natural en tities hinder science? Do we have good 
reason to  th ink  th a t  they  would? It seems very possible th a t  the  n a tu ra l 
world could operate regularly enough for science to  advance while a t the  
sam e tim e allow for occasional miracles. PN  gives us no reason to  th in k  the  
universe operates in a regular fashion, th a t  the  laws of science are stable, 
th a t  reality  isn ’t  pure chaos. I th ink  non-natu ralist worldviews like theism  
are b e tte r  off in term s of th a t  assum ption, though it is true  th a t  G od could 
create a world of pure chaos, there is m ore reason to  th ink  th a t th e  world 
would operate in a regular fashion if intelligent supernatu ral forces/beings 
exist th a n  not. P lan tinga (1993, 216-243) has argued th a t given natu ra lism  
and  evolution, the  probability  of our cognitive faculties being reliable is low, 
as n a tu ra l selection isn’t  in terested  in selecting brains th a t form tru e  beliefs 
as m uch as it is interested in brains th a t  have survival and reproductive 
advantage (the  sets of beliefs th a t  are survival conducive and  th e  set of 
tru e  beliefs need not be the  same, especially regarding high level scientific 
theories). If P lan tinga is right, th en  th e  tru th  of evolution and  natu ra lism  
underm ines th e  success of science.
T hus I th ink  th a t  the success of science confirms the  negation of PN 
if anything, which would (assum ing no o ther evidence is available for PN ) 
render th e  probability  of PN  given th e  success of science no g reater th an  
one-half.
W h a t if we focus instead on MN*? T hen  we would w ant to  know: 
P ( M N * | S S .B ) .
MN* asserts th a t  publicly observable em pirical phenom ena have n a tu ra l 
causes. T hus only na tu ra l explanations m ay be offered for these phenom ena.
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Again, according to  Bayes’ theorem :
P ( M N * | SS.B) _ P(SS.B  | MN*)  w P{MN*)
P(MN*  | SSJ3) ~  P(SS.B  | W N * j  X P(MN*)
S tarting  w ith  the  prior probabilities— is it reasonable to  assum e th a t  the 
prior probability  of MN* is roughly equal to  th a t of its  negation? A gain i t ’s
hard  for me to  th in k  of a  reason to  say th a t  is g reater th an  its negation,
ap a rt from any evidence, and in fact it seems unlikely, ju s t on the  face of 
it, th a t  the  causes of publicly observable reality  be lim ited to  some specific 
type of event or process. T hus I th in k  it is a t least reasonable to  say th a t its 
p rior probability  is no greater th a n  th a n  th a t  of its  negation. T hen  we can 
simplify:
P(MN*  | SS.B) P(SS.B  | MN*)  
P(MN*  | SS.B) ~  P(SS.B  | M T V * )
So, as w ith  philosophical natura lism , the  question comes to  w hether the 
p robability  of the  success of science is more probable given MN* th a n  its 
negation. Again I d on’t  see why th e  tru th  of MN* would raise the  probability  
of th e  success of science— why would th e  possibility of publically detectable 
miracles, or th e  possibility of th e  em pirical confirm ation of th e  superna tu ­
ra l lower the  probability  of th e  success of science? If I am  right, th en  the 
probability  of the  success of science given MN* isn ’t  greater th an  its  nega­
tion. Given our use of Bayes’ theorem  and our sim plification of elim inating 
the  prior probabilities, th is m eans th a t  the  probability  of MN* is no greater 
th an  its negation. Of course, if th is  is true, th en  PN  m ust have an  even lower 
probability  th an  MN* as MN* is weaker th a n  PN.
T he above evaluation of PN  and MN* is broad, we shouldn’t  expect any­
th ing  near an  exact determ ination  of the  relevant probabilities. B ut I th ink
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th a t  it is enough to  show th a t there isn’t  overwhelming em pirical evidence 
for either PN  or MN*, and  in fact, their probabilities given available evidence 
a ren ’t  much higher th a n  th e ir negations, if they  are higher a t all. T hus there 
isn ’t  a lot in th e  way of support for the  high probability  of PN  or MN*. 
T hen  the  best support for its  acceptance is the  science stopping argum ent 
m entioned above. I th in k  th is  argum ent can fruitfully exam ined w ith  BTRA.
8.2 Science Stoppers and B T R A
According to  th e  science stopper argum ent, even a theist m ight w ant to  adopt 
m ethodological naturalism . He m ight th ink  th a t, as P lan tinga hypothesized:
God has created  th is  whole wonderful . . .  world of ours. One of 
the  things we w ant to  do as his creatures is to  understand  the 
world he has m ade, see (to  the  extent th a t  we can) how it is 
made, w hat its  s tru c tu re  is, and how it works . . .  th a t  is w hat 
goes on in n a tu ra l science . . .  B ut there will be little  advance 
along th is  front if, in answer to  the  question W hy does so and so 
work the  way it does? or W h at is the  explanation of so and  so? 
we regularly and often reply “Because God did it th a t  way” or 
“Because it pleased G od th a t it should be like th a t .” . . .  th is is 
not the  sort of answer th a t  we w ant a t th a t  ju n c tu re  . . .  C laims 
th a t to  the  effect th a t  G od has done th is or th a t  (created  life, 
or created hum an life) directly  are in a  sense science stoppers.
(2001, 355-356)
P lan tinga then  rejects th is  reasoning, arguing th a t even if hypotheses th a t 
God directly did som ething stops scientific investigation in to  th a t  event, th a t 
in no way precludes the  hypothesis being true. If it  is, th en  a scientific view 
of the  world should recognize it.
I believe there is a risk here th a t  P lan tinga did not acknowledge—granted  
if G od  did  X  th en  he d id  X , an d  p reten d in g  he d id n ’t in  order to  find out how 
it “really” happened will only lead to  a fictional account of X. Yet we are
140
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
perhaps never in a position to  know w ith  certain ty  th a t  God did X .3 Thus 
accepting th a t  God did X is tak ing  the risk th a t there isn’t  another cause of 
X, for accepting th a t  God did X will stop  th e  search for o ther causes of X, 
n a tu ra l causes. A ccepting th a t  God did X risks losing the  knowledge th a t 
there is a n a tu ra l explanation  for X.
However, the  sam e goes for those who say th a t  God d id n ’t  do X— once 
th a t proposition is accepted, then  support for G o d ’s doing X is no longer 
sought. T hus it is a risk either way. W hen one accepts any proposition P , 
regardless of w hat P  is (as long as the  probability  of P  isn ’t 1), one risks 
loosing the  opportun ity  of correct belief P , and th e  opportun ity  of accepting 
(correctly) any tru e  proposition th a t  is incom patible w ith P.
Yet m ethodological natu ralism  m ay be tak ing  a greater risk th an  accept­
ing th a t God did any specific ac t X  in th a t  it isn ’t  a proposition of relatively 
narrow  scope th a t  is being accepted, b u t a far reaching methodology. If one 
adds to  it th e  belief th a t  science is the  lim it of knowledge one incurs an  addi­
tional risk: it would be im possible to  detect G od’s existence should he exist, 
as G od’s action could never be allowed as an  explanation  for any observation. 
Furtherm ore it would m ake it impossible to  hear from God: suppose God 
exists and th a t he tried  to  com m unicate w ith  a  person by giving him  a sign 
(voices, visions, miracles, etc.), th a t  person, if he adopts th e  above princi­
ples, would never accept the  sign from God as a sign from God, he would 
instead accept th a t  some n a tu ra l explanation  b e tte r  accounts for w hatever 
observations he m ade regarding the  sign. Even a m ountain  moving expe­
rience w ouldn’t  help— for he would be com m itted to  looking for a natu ra l 
explanation  here as well. He is cu t off from th e  supernatural.
3I am using God as the supernatural agent here, other agents or supernatural forces 
could be inserted in God’s place. It seemed natural to use God as Plantinga was discussing 
God in the quote.
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However, one could reply th a t  the risks of rejecting m ethodological n a t­
uralism  are g reater th an  missing a plausible n a tu ra l explanation of a small 
num ber of isolated events a ttrib u ted  to  m iracles. T his is because of the  in ter­
relatedness of scientific theories. Suppose one accepts, for instance, th a t  God 
directly  created  K rebbs cycle.4 T hen  we would miss out on the  possibility 
a na tu ra l explanation  of Krebbs cycle, and  th is  n a tu ra l explanation m ight 
lead to  th e  discovery of h itherto  unknown biochem ical phenom ena. These 
discoveries in tu rn  m ay lead to  more, and from these new bio-technology m ay 
arise th a t is very useful, if not life-saving. T hus we risk more th an  giving 
up the  possibility of a  few isolated theories when we infer a supernatu ral 
cause for an  event under scientific investigation. However, there is a way 
to  avoid th is— th e  claim  th a t an event has a  supernatu ral explanation isn ’t 
indefeasible— if someone were to  investigate th e  phenom enon and found a 
plausible n a tu ra l explanation, th en  even someone who rejects m ethodologi­
cal naturalism  could th en  adopt the n a tu ra l explanation  (theists have done 
th is  m any tim es). T hus th is worry doesn’t  seem compelling.
W hat would happen  if a person only accepted th a t science is lim ited to  
n a tu ra l explanations? T he risk here would be less, as he m ay allow th a t  
there are o ther p a th s  to  knowledge th an  science, and th a t  through those 
paths one m ay discover God. Still, it seems th a t  th is  position would make 
em pirical observations useless in detecting or hearing from God, for em pirical 
observations, if th ey  do no t directly  to  fall under th e  dom ain of science, are 
such th a t they  could conflict w ith or confirm scientific claims, and hence be 
scientifically testab le , contra  MN*. T hus signs from God, even m ountain 
moving signs, w ouldn’t  be accepted. O ne’s knowledge of God would have
4T h is  is  e x a c t ly  w h a t  so m e  p r o p o n e n ts  o f  in te llig e n t  d e s ig n  are c la im in g , in  p a rticu la r ,
Michael Behe (1996), who argued that complex biochemical machinery exhibits irreducible 
complexity, and therefore must have been directly designed.
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to  be restric ted  to  non-em pirical sources, presum ably to  the  private world 
of one’s inner experience. T here are prom inent philosophers of religion th a t  
argue for th e  possibility of such knowledge, W illiam  A lston (1991) is a notable 
example. T hus the  risk is m itigated, b u t it is still there, though confined to  
losing public confirm ation of G od’s existence, m iracles, signs, etc.
So w hat does B T R A  have to  do w ith  this? W hether or no t to  adopt 
m ethodological natu ra lism  am ounts to  a  problem  of decision under uncer­
tainty. O f course, to  pre tend  th a t we have anyth ing  close to  precise prob­
abilities relating to  the  tru th  of w hatever propositions th e  acceptance or 
rejection of m ethodological natu ra lism  entails would be absurd  (though I 
did  a ttem p t a  rough determ ination), and the  sam e goes for the  assigning of 
u tilities to  different relevant states. Nonetheless Bayesian decision theory  is 
useful here in th a t  it helps us organize th e  inform ation we do have.
Again, to  apply  BTR A , we need to  tran sla te  m ethodological naturalism  
into an  acceptance. L et’s use MN*. Here is a tab le  of the decision problem :5
MN* is tru e MN* is false
Accept MN* W X
D on’t  accept MN* Y Z
T he relevant probabilities are P (M N *  \ S S .B )  and P (M N *  | S S .B ) .  I have 
already provided some argum ent for assigning to  the  first probability  a  value
5For convenience sake I am only considering accepting and not accepting MN* as 
choices, when the choices could be more accurately described as accepting MN*, denying 
MN*, or withholding judgment on MN*. As withholding judgment on MN* seems to me 
to have the same practical effect as denying it, and as the epistemic consequences don’t 
seem to differ between denying or withholding judgment on MN* in any important way, 
I treat the two as the same choice. If the decision were expanded to include all three 
choices, I don’t think the result would conflict with anything I will claim.
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of no g reater th an  one half, or perhaps to  be safe no greater th a n  slightly 
above one half.
Now le t’s consider the  consequences. Consequence W  and X  are w hat 
happens if one accepts MN*, W  if it is true, X  if it is false. W h a t can 
we say abou t these consequences? T here are parallels here w ith  P asca l’s 
W ager, accepting MN* is sim ilar to  no t believing in God. However, w ith 
th e  well known difficulties w ith  th e  W ager we shouldn’t  expect m uch light 
here, especially considering th e  fact th a t  th e  Wager has to  m ake very spe­
cific assum ptions abou t w hat God m ust be like if he exists. Nonetheless, 
acceptance of MN* has some relatively obvious im plications, some of which 
I no ted  above. Considering X  first, it  seems th a t  if MN* is false, one forfeits 
th e  ability  to  em pirically detect m iracles, G od’s existence, signs from God, 
evidence for anything supernatu ral, thus one misses out on em pirical knowl­
edge of G od’s existence (or the  existence of the  supernatu ral), his will, etc. 
R egarding W ,  w hat one gains isn ’t  clear, as one could still succeed a t science 
(there are, and have been, successful scientists who didn’t  accept M N*), per­
haps one m ay gain more m otivation to  look into events th a t  are commonly 
explained using the supernatural, and  hence be more likely to  find th e  tru th  
regarding w hat caused those phenom ena. T hus there are th e  advantages of 
th e  increased probability  of finding explanations for some events.
T he gains and risks of not accepting MN* are reciprocal. If one doesn’t 
accept MN*, and it is tru e  (consequence Y ) ,  one risks losing th e  scientific 
gains th a t would be m ade regarding events in  which one accepts superna tu ra l 
explanations. If  one doesn’t  accept MN* and  it is false (consequence Z ),  one 
gains th e  possibility to  em pirically detect th e  supernatu ra l (in com bination 
w ith  th e  possibility of losses from false positives regarding the  su p e rn a tu ra l, 
even if G od exists people can and  have m ade th a t  m istake).
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T his is the  epistem ic side of th e  consequences of accepting MN*. W hat 
ab o u t practical side of these consequences? Again we will have to  se ttle  for a 
very rough account, and a  subjective one, for the u tility  of an  outcom e may 
vary between people. Also we will assum e here th a t  there a ren ’t  any direct 
practical consequences resulting  from accepting MN* or not accepting it, the  
practical consequences come from decisions m ade as a  resu lt of accepting 
MN* or not accepting it. How would accepting MN* or rejecting MN* affect 
th e  o ther decisions a  person makes? W hat comes to  m ind first would be 
how the  person responds to  alleged m iracle claims, claims to  have received 
a  sign or revelation from God. Could a person who accepts MN* accept 
an  alleged m iracle claim, sign or revelation from God? T his is im portan t 
because much of trad itiona l religion involves m iracle claims— C hristian ity  
in p articu lar involves supposed revelation th a t speaks not only privately to  
believers, b u t publicly abou t th e  hum an condition, present and future. I t also 
m akes m iracle claims— Jesu s’ miracles for example, and  his resurrection. T he 
la tte r  is a core belief of m ost C hristians. Could a  m ethodological natu ra lis t 
rem ain a  C hristian  in th is sense?
Ruse th inks th a t he can:
C an you be an  evolutionist— a genuine one . . .  and yet take in 
th e  essential h eart of th e  Bible? T he answer of course depends 
on w hat you take to  be th e  “essential h ea rt” of th e  Bible. At 
a m inim um  we can say th a t, to  th e  C hristian, th is h eart speaks 
of our sinful natu re , of G od’s sacrifice, and of the prospect of 
salvation. It speaks of th e  world as a  meaningful creation of God 
(however caused) . . .  original sin, Jesus’ life and death , and His 
resurrection and anything th a t  comes after it. A nd clearly a t once 
we are plunged into th e  first of th e  big problem s, nam ely th a t  of 
m iracles— those of Jesus him self (the tu rn ing  of w ater in to  wine 
a t the  m arriage a t C anna), his re tu rn  to  life on the th ird  day . . .
T he m etaphysical na tu ra lis t would reject all of these. B u t w hat 
abou t the  m ethodological n atu ra lis t?  T here are a  num ber of op-
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tions. You m ight sim ply say th a t  the m iracles occurred, th a t  they 
did involve violations of the  law, b u t th a t  they  are outside your 
science . . .  You cannot explain the event scientifically, b u t this 
does not m ean th a t  it d id  not happen . . .  A little  ab ru p t, bu t I 
am  not sure th a t  th is  is an  impossible option. You sim ply say 
th a t God laid th e  salvation history on top  of the  norm al course 
of events. T he world goes by law, and then  Jesus and th e  saints 
worked their ways on top  of this. (2000, 271-272)
I d on’t  agree w ith  Ruse, for to  accept public miracles a t all would be 
to  accept th a t  there are m iracles th a t  are publicly detectable. Any publicly 
detectable event influences th e  affairs of the  m aterial realm , and these influ­
ences would in tu rn  influence others and so on. A t some poin t a  scientist 
could, a t least in principle if not practically, detect th e  m iracle th rough these 
influences. For example, suppose th a t M ary prays th a t  a  m ountain  move, 
and  it moves. She prays th a t  it move back, and it moves back. She prays 
th a t  a  boy w ith  a  bra in  tu m o r be healed, and im m ediately he is. She prays 
for num erous people, and  all of them  are m iraculously cured. Clearly these 
m iracles would be detectib le by a scientist, as a scientist. If th is is the  case, 
th en  scientific detection of m iracles w ouldn’t  be impossible, yet th is is w hat 
accepting MN* implies, one cannot, in principle, detect a m iracle publicly. A 
m ethodological na tu ra lis t would therefore have to  conclude th a t  these events 
were not miracles, some n a tu ra l process m ust be responsible for them .
T hus he would never base any decisions on the  acceptance of the  C hristian 
miracle-involving beliefs. Also he would probably not expect in teraction from 
G od regarding publicly observable events (if God did in teract w ith  them , his 
actions m ight be em pirically detectable), thus he w ouldn’t  p ray  to  God to  
change any of these— e.g., he w ouldn’t  pray for his ailing m other to  be healed, 
th a t  h is precarious finan cia l s itu a tio n  im prove, or for p ea ce  in  Israel. The 
reverse would go for those who don’t  accept MN*, they  could accept an
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alleged m iracle claim, sign from God (given th a t the  evidence is enough to 
w arrant th e  acceptance, given his utilities), he m ay expect God to  in teract 
w ith  the  public, world, thus he m ay pray  for his m other to  recover, for a 
b e tte r  financial s ituation , for peace in Israel.
T hough m any everyday decisions won’t  be affected— w hether one takes 
a  specific s tree t home, or which grocery store one goes to , etc., m any will. 
I th ink  th is is best brought out by considering th e  life of a  very religious 
person, perhaps a devout C hristian. T his person sees her relationship w ith 
God as a highly in teractive one, w ith God personally  involved throughout 
her life. She m ay a ttr ib u te  m any things to  G od’s action, and  pray th a t God 
influence other th ings (e.g., to  help a sick relative, to  end a  war). T his sort 
of life, w hether or no t one finds it agreeable, will not be possible for someone 
who holds MN*. G ranted , she could rem ain a theist, b u t in a lim ited sort 
of way— she would re ta in  th e  pub lic /p rivate  distinction, and place G od’s 
involvement only in the  la tte r  category. T hus she w oudn’t  p ray  for God to  
heal a sick relative or for peace. This acceptance would preclude anything 
like acceptance of th e  trad itio n al theistic religions (especially C hristianity  
and Judaism ), for those religions claim th a t God is in tim ately  involved w ith 
all of the  universe, including the  public world. T he w om an’s fa ith  would 
have to  be either a  very liberal sort of C h ris tia ity /Ju d aism /Is lam , or a sort 
of pagan theism  not far from deism (not exactly  deism, as God still in teracts 
w ith  one’s private world).
T hen  practically  speaking, accepting MN* precludes th e  public religious 
life (including acceptance of C hristian ity  or Judaism ) in  any of its  trad itional 
forms. Now w hether th is  is a  great loss will depend on how valuable th a t  
kind of religious life is to  a person. T hus subjectiv ity  returns.
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Now th a t  we have briefly discussed th e  effect accepting MN* has on de­
cision making, le t’s re tu rn  to  the  chart and try  to  fill in the  practical con­
sequences for W , X ,  Y ,  and Z . R egarding W ,  if a person accepts MN*, 
she will live in a way th a t rules out G od’s (or supernatural) activ ity  in the  
public realm , and  rules ou t those religions th a t  have God intereacting w ith 
the  public world (including trad itional theistic  religions), and it is indeed the  
case th a t  there  are no em pirically detectable supernatu ral events. R egarding 
X ,  the  decisions rem ain the  same, b u t there are events th a t are supernatu ral 
events th a t  are em pirically detectable. She will, of course, reject these as 
genuine miracles. Regarding Y ,  she doesn’t  live ou t one’s life in a way th a t 
rules ou t publicly detectab le miracles, or th e  publicly religious life, yet there 
are no publicly detectable miracles. R egarding Z , her actions are the  sam e 
as in Y ,  bu t there  are publicly detectable m iracles, and hence the  possibility 
of knowing G od (or some supernatu ral being/force) has acted.
Here the  values of U (W ) ,U (X ) ,U (Y ) ,  and  U (Z ), th a t is, the  u tility  of 
these consequences, will be subjective as well.
So how can we combine th e  practical and  epistem ic considerations to  
form a general recom m endation regarding MN*? It would be instructive a t 
th is po int to  com pare two contrasting  sets of u tilities. T he first is w hat I 
will call th e  “hum anist set.” From an epistem ic point of view th is person 
sees the  goal of advancing and expanding a  purely  natu ra list account as, if 
true, w orth m uch more th an  detecting a  miracle,’ or receiving a message from 
God. R egarding practical utilities of th is  person, he doesn’t  care m uch for 
the  religious life, doesn’t  need a  grand m eaning or purpose for life beyond 
the  purely earthly, and  doesn’t  care m uch ab o u t w hether or not there  is an  
after-life. C om pare th is to  the  religious set— from an  epistemic point of view 
th is person finds th e  value of correctly a ttr ib u tin g  an  event to  the  supernat-
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ural, and th e  value of receiving an  actual message from God, m uch greater 
th a n  correctly expanding na tu ra listic  accounts of reality. P ractically  th is set 
reflects th e  u tilities of a person who likes th e  religious life, w an ts/needs a 
grand  m eaning to  his life th a t  goes beyond purely hum an or earth ly  goals, 
cares abou t w hether or not there  is an  after-life. T he first set would have the 
gain of U (W )  and the  loss of U (Y )  relatively large, and it would have the 
gain of U (Z )  and  the  loss of U( X )  relatively small. U( X )  is small, because 
even though accepting MN* rules out accepting trad itional theistic religions 
(as discussed earlier), their lifestyles, and  w hatever benefits (or losses) they  
m ight yield in the  afterlife (should there  be one); agents w ith  th is set of 
utilities d on’t  value such things. T he gain of U (W )  is larger because, as 
a person w ith  th is set sees it, m aking decisions tow ard hum anistic goals is 
enhanced when we aren ’t  burdened w ith  th e  cares of the religious life, and 
because w hat happens here on ea rth  is of param ount im portance, we need 
to  m ake accurate decisions abou t w hat will bring abou t the  best life here. 
For th e  sam e reason the  loss of U (Y )  is greater, as one w ouldn’t  be able 
to  focus on hum anistic goals in one’s decision making, if one doesn’t  accept 
MN* one m ight be inclined to  look for m iracles when there a ren ’t  any to  be 
found. T he gain of U( Z)  is small; a  person w ith  these utilities doesn’t  value 
a  religious life or care abou t the  after-life, even if there is a reality  beyond 
th e  natu ra l. T hus a person w ith  th is set of u tilities would have his practical 
u tilities reflected in the  following chart:
MN* is true MN* is false
A ccept MN* Large gain Small loss
D on’t  accept MN* Large loss Small gain
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Com pare th is  to  the  religious set:
MN* is true MN* is false
Accept MN* Small gain Large loss
D on’t  accept MN* Small loss Large gain
For th is  person, U {W ) is a sm all gain (and U( Y)  is a sm all loss), as he 
isn ’t  as in terested  in earth ly  success, and  as a religious life in a  world where 
G od exists and in teracts w ith  th e  em pirical world (or, m ore generally, a 
supernatu ra l world) is valuable to  th is person, th e  loss of U (X ) and  th e  gain 
of U( Z)  is g reat.6
According to  BTRA, th e  evidential threshold for accepting MN*, from 
a b o th  th e  epistem ic and practical po int of view, will be lower for those 
w ith  th e  utilities of the  hum anist set th an  those w ith the  u tilities of the 
religious set: the  probability  of MN* need not be as high for those w ith  the 
first set of u tilities to  m ake accepting MN* the  act th a t  m axim izes expected 
utility. Given th a t  th e  probability  of MN* on the  current evidence is a t 
best somewhere around one half, w hether or not one is ra tiona l to  accept it 
depends on one’s utilities: it would be ra tional for a person w ith  hum anist 
utilities to  accept it, and irra tional for a  person w ith religious utilities.
Of course, these aren ’t  th e  only ways to  flesh out the  utilities, b u t they 
are instructive in showing how th e  ra tionality  of accepting MN* depends 
on one’s utilities. I t is enough to  show th a t there are sets of u tilities th a t
6For an interesting exploration of the relationship between religious values and natural­
ism, see G.K. Chesterton’s Orthodoxy. There he explored what a person has to lose from 
accepting naturalism: he believed that a natural world view could be logically coh eren t  
(and parsimonious), but he complained of its emptiness, and argued that to retain his 
sanity one should not accept naturalism (1991, 7-24).
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m ake accepting it irrational. Thus the  evidence for accepting m ethodological 
natu ralism  a t best recom m ends the  policy only to  some—for example, those 
w ith  hum anist-like utilities.
Obviously the  num bers I used in the  above calculations are imprecise. 
In fact, as they  are so imprecise, one m ight wonder w hat work B TR A  does 
in my argum ent. I th in k  th a t  B TR A  is doing work in th a t  it organizes the 
inform ation we do have in a  precise way; the  inpu ts  them selves are imprecise, 
th e  m ethod of evaluating th e  inpu ts shouldn’t  add to  the imprecision.
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